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Abstract 
During the era of global financial uncertainty, stable access to appropriate funding sources has been 
much harder for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The global financial crisis impacted SMEs 
and entrepreneurs disproportionately, exacerbating their traditional financing constraints. The financial 
conditions of many SMEs were weakened by the drop in demand for goods and services and the credit 
tightening. The sovereign debt crisis that hit several European countries contributed to further 
deterioration in bank lending activities, which negatively affected private sector development. 
The global regulatory response to financial crises, such as the Basel Capital Accord, while designed to 
reduce systemic risks may also constrain bank lending to SMEs. In particular, Basel III requires banks to 
have tighter risk management as well as greater capital and liquidity. Resulting asset preference and 
deleveraging of banks, particularly European banks with significant presence in Asia, could limit the 
availability of funding for SMEs in Asia and the Pacific. Lessons from the recent financial crises have 
motivated many countries to consider SME access to finance beyond conventional bank credit and to 
diversify their national financial system. 
Improving SME access to finance is a policy priority at the country and global level. Poor access to 
finance is a critical inhibiting factor to the survival and growth potential of SMEs. Financial inclusion is 
thus key to the development of the SME sector, which is a driver of job creation and social cohesion and 
takes a pivotal role in scaling up national economies. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have recognized that it is crucial to develop a comprehensive range of policy options on SME 
finance, including innovative financing models. With this in mind, sharing Asian and OECD experiences on 
SME financing would result in insightful discussions on improving SME access to finance at a time of 
global financial uncertainty. Based on intensive discussions in two workshops organized by ADB in Manila 
on 6–7 March 2013 and by OECD in Paris on 21 October 2013, the two organizations together compiled 
this study report on enhancing financial accessibility for SMEs, especially focusing on lessons from the 
past and recent crises in Asia and OECD countries. 
The report takes a comparative look at ADB and OECD experiences, and aims to identify promising policy 
solutions for creating an SME base that is resilient to crisis, from a viewpoint of access to finance, and 
which can help drive growth and development. 
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Basel III requires banks to have tighter risk management as well as greater capital and 
liquidity. Resulting asset preference and deleveraging of banks, particularly European banks 







job creation and social cohesion and takes a pivotal role in scaling up national economies.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have recognized that it is crucial to develop a comprehensive range 
of policy options on SME finance, including innovative financing models. With this in mind, 
sharing Asian and OECD experiences on SME financing would result in insightful discussions 
on  improving SME access  to finance at a  time of global financial uncertainty. Based on 
intensive discussions in two workshops organized by ADB in Manila on 6–7 March 2013 




promising  policy  solutions  for  creating  an  SME  base  that  is resilient  to  crisis,  from  a 
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11  Emerging Trends in SME  Finance and Policies




government  policy  responses  to  financing  SMEs,  illustrating  the  SME  landscape  and 
the  impact of bank  lending on national  economies  in Asian Development Bank  (ADB) 
developing member countries  (DMCs). The discussion  is based on  the data collected 
for  14  countries  through  the  ADB Asia SME Finance Monitor 2013  (ASM).1 Various 
types of SMEs, differing by  size and sector,  exist  across  the world, which makes  the
homogeneous  classification  difficult  for  SMEs.  According  to  the  degree  of  economic 
development, different policy focus and strategies and different financing models for SMEs 
have been developed in individual countries to establish a resilient national economy and 
promote sustainable economic growth and social welfare enhancement in that country. 




The  rapid  growth  of  Asia  has  positioned  the  region  as  a  growth  driver  in  the  global 
economy. The recent crises—the 2008/09 global financial crisis (GFC) and the eurozone 
debt  crisis—have  increased  capital  flows  within  Asia.  The  depressed  demand  from 
developed countries caused by the crises is increasingly promoting the dependence on 
intraregional trade in Asia. Intra-Asia foreign direct investment has also been increasing 
since  the  crises. Against  this  backdrop,  it  is  considered  that SMEs  involved  in  global 
supply chains, e.g., supporting industries or parts industries, play a critical role in further 
encouraging  intraregional  trade  and  intra-Asia  foreign  direct  investment,  which  will




1  The ASM covered 14 countries  from  the five ADB  regions:  (i) Kazakhstan  (Central Asia);  (ii)  the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of Korea (East Asia); (iii) Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka (South Asia); 
(iv) Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Southeast Asia); and (v) Papua 















capital markets  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  and  reviews  government  policy  responses  to 
financing SMEs,  together with  illustrating  the SME  landscape and  the  impact of bank 
lending on national economies in ADB DMCs.
B.  SME Landscape in Asia and the Pacific
Various  types of SMEs, differing by  size,  sector,  and business characteristics,  exist  in
Asia and the Pacific, which makes homogenized grouping of SMEs difficult across the 
region. In ADB DMCs, SMEs are generally classified based on the number of employees 
and/or  the  value  of  assets,  sales  turnover,  or  capital  (Table  1).  Among  the  14  ASM 




BasisEmployee Asset Turnover Others
By	
Sector
Central Asia Kazakhstan   
East Asia China, People's Rep. of    
Korea, Rep. of    capital 
South Asia Bangladesh   




Southeast Asia Cambodia  
Indonesia   
Malaysia    
Philippines   
Thailand    
Viet Nam   capital  
The Pacific Papua New Guinea 
Solomon Islands  
Source: ADB Asia SME Finance Monitor 2013 (ASM).
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in 2010 compared to the 2003 census. 
The extent of  job absorption by SMEs varies by country  (Figure 2). The share of SME 
employees  to  total  employment  ranged  between  28.0%  (Kazakhstan)  and  97.2% 
(Indonesia)  in 2012. The workforce employed by SMEs sharply expanded  in  the PRC 
in 2012 (21.9% year-on-year growth). There was also moderate annual growth of SME 




due  to  the  deep-rooted  aftermath  of  the  2008/09 GFC  (1.8%  year-on-year  decrease 
in 2012).




economy. To  improve  this,  Thailand has  targeted  the  increase of SME contribution  to 
GDP to 40% or more in its 2012 country strategy. In Kazakhstan, while the nominal GDP 





(Figure 4). A  tangible SME share  to  total export values also existed  in  the Republic of 
Korea (18.7% in 2012) and Indonesia (14.1% in 2012). However, both the SME share to 
exports and the growth ratio in these four countries have yet to recover to pre-GFC levels.
C. Impact of Bank Lending on National Economies in the ADB Area
The  financial  system  in Asia  and  the Pacific  is bank centered, where bank credit  is  a 
major  instrument  of  business  funding  for  enterprises.  To  what  extent  does  domestic 
4 ADB–OECD Study on Enhancing Financial Accessibility for SMEs



























CAM  =  Cambodia,  PRC  =  People’s  Republic  of 
China,  INO  =  Indonesia,  KOR  =  Republic  of  Korea, 
KAZ  =  Kazakhstan,  MAL  =  Malaysia,  PHI  =  the 
Philippines,  SME  =  small  and  medium-sized  enterprise, 
THA = Thailand, VIE = Viet Nam.
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CAM  =  Cambodia,  PRC  =  People’s  Republic  of 
China,  INO  =  Indonesia,  KOR  =  Republic  of  Korea, 
KAZ  =  Kazakhstan,  MAL  =  Malaysia,  PHI  =  the 





Figure 2: Employment by SMEs
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is  the  possibility  that  SMEs  keep  profits  earned  from business  operations  backed  by 
bank credit as precautionary corporate savings against unexpected events such as a 






D. Bank Lending to SMEs
SME  access  to  banks  has  gradually  improved  because  of  the  various  government 
support measures such as credit guarantees and mandatory lending in Asia and the 
Pacific. Among participating ASM countries, the lending scale to SMEs is relatively large 



























adopted by  the  central  bank.  Indonesia  recorded  an SME NPL  ratio  of  3.6%  to  total 
SME loans by commercial banks in August 2013, a figure which is gradually increasing.
6 ADB–OECD Study on Enhancing Financial Accessibility for SMEs
In Thailand, the NPL ratio of SME lending by commercial banks has been decreasing,
down to 3.4% in the second quarter of 2013 from 3.5% in 2012. However, it remains
high compared to the gross NPL ratio of 2.2% in the same period. In Cambodia, the NPL
ratio in MFIs is low (0.5%), while that in the banking sector was 2.5% in September 2013.
Although the actual situation differs, by comparing SME NPLs to total SME loans with
those to total loans, it can be concluded that SMEs are the main contributor to generating
NPLs (Figures 8–9).
To improve bankability for SMEs, the central banks in Bangladesh and India have set
annual credit volume targets for lending to SMEs. For instance, banks have been advised
to achieve a 20% year-on-year growth of credit provision to MSEs in India. The central
bank in the Philippines has set up mandatory lending to MSMEs, where banks allocate















































































































Figure 5: Impact of Bank Lending on National Economies in ADB Area*
A. Bank Credit and Gross Domestic Product Growth
C. Bank Credit and Savings
B. Bank Credit and Unemployment




lending schemes by the government or central bank have also been developed in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. 




Figure 6: SME Loans to Gross  
Domestic Product
Figure 7: SME Loans to Total Loans
BAN  =  Bangladesh,  CAM  =  Cambodia,  INO  =  Indonesia, 
KAZ = Kazakhstan, KOR = Republic of Korea, MAL = Malaysia, 
SME = small and medium-sized enterprise, THA = Thailand.
* Data  for CAM and  THA  are  as  of  3rd  and  2nd quarters, 
respectively.
Source: ADB Asia SME Finance Monitor 2013.
CAM  =  Cambodia,  PRC  =  People’s  Republic  of  China, 
INO  =  Indonesia,  KAZ  =  Kazakhstan,  KOR  =  Republic  of 
Korea,  MAL  =  Malaysia,  SME  =  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprise, SOL = Solomon Islands, THA = Thailand.
* Data  for CAM,  INO, and THA are as of 3rd quarter, end-
August, and 2nd quarter, respectively.
Source: ADB Asia SME Finance Monitor 2013.
Figure 8: SME Nonperforming Loans  
to SME Loans
Figure 9: SME Nonperforming Loans  
to Total Loans
BAN  =  Bangladesh,  CAM  =  Cambodia,  INO  =  Indonesia, 
SME = small and medium-sized enterprise, THA = Thailand.
* Data  for CAM,  INO, and THA are as of 3rd quarter, end-
August, and 2nd quarter, respectively.
Source: ADB Asia SME Finance Monitor 2013.
BAN  =  Bangladesh,  CAM  =  Cambodia,  INO  =  Indonesia, 
SME = small and medium-sized enterprise, THA = Thailand.
* Data  for CAM,  INO, and THA are as of 3rd quarter, end-


































































guarantee programs  for MSMEs:  the partial guarantee scheme provided by  the Small 
Business Corporation (70% of the credit applied), and the Credit Surety Fund Program 




for SMEs  in 2009 as part of  the Thai economic stimulus measures  in  response to  the 
GFC.  Viet Nam has  two  channels  of  credit  guarantees,  although  they  do  not  directly 
target  SMEs:  the  credit  guarantee  fund  operated  by  the  Vietnam Development  Bank 
(85% partial  guarantees),  and  the  local  credit  guarantee  funds  operated  by  provincial 
authorities under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. 
There  are  also  perceived  developments  of  financial  infrastructure  that  promote  SME 
lending  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  The  Credit  Bureau Malaysia  provides  comprehensive
credit  information  and  ratings  for  SMEs.  The  Philippines  established  the  centralized 
national  credit  bureau,  the Credit  Information Corporation,  in 2011. Viet Nam has  the 
Credit Information Center as a unit of the central bank. Legal reforms for secured lending 
have been promoted  in  the Pacific  region, an example being  the collateral  registry  for 







In Bangladesh, NBFIs that cope with wide-ranging business instruments such as leasing, 
factoring, invoice discounting, and equity investment are considering SME financing as 




























such as venture capital,  factoring, and  leasing companies also cater  to SME financing 
needs. At present, the Malaysian Venture Capital Association serves the small number of 
SMEs or early stage firms through agriculture funds. In the Philippines, the central bank
regulates NBFIs including savings and loan associations and pawnshops. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission also regulates NBFIs such as finance companies. The pawn 









firms  licensed  by  the  central  bank; NBFIs  have  yet  to  adequately  serve  the  financing 
needs  of  Thai  SMEs.  As  of  the  end  of  2012,  18  finance  companies  and  12  financial 
leasing companies were operating in Viet Nam under the central bank’s supervision. They 
were mostly affiliated firms of large enterprises or banks’ subsidiary firms.
F. Capital Market Financing
Asia’s  rapid  economic  growth  requires  the  development  of  diversified  SME  financing 
models that are beyond traditional bank lending, while such growth generates the need 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FreeBoard has been launched by the Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA). As 
a trading system for SME bonds, the qualified institutional buyers (QIB) system operated 
by KOFIA was launched in May 2012.
In  India,  responding  to  the  recommendation  of  the  Prime Minister’s  Task  Force,  two 
dedicated SME exchanges have been launched since 2012: (i) the SME Platform under 




In Malaysia  and Thailand,  there  are  no dedicated SME capital markets,  but  there  are 
markets  that  SMEs  can  tap.  The  ACE market  under  Bursa Malaysia  and  the Market


















G. Government Policy Responses to Ease SMEs’ Access to Finance
SMEs are  the backbone of  the national  economy  in any country. Development of  the
SME sector brings to the country inclusive economic growth through job creation. Thus, 
many countries  in Asia  and  the Pacific have attached  importance  to  encouraging  the 
SME  sector  through  midterm  or  annual  SME  development  plans,  and  regard  SMEs 




concessional business regulatory environment, and technology adaptation to innovative 
SMEs. Access to finance is a crucial part of such comprehensive national SME policies, 
which are administered and implemented by a government’s special unit, a specialized 
SME  agency,  or  line  ministries  responsible  for  SME  promotion,  generally  with  strong 
cooperation from the central bank. Table 3 presents the outlines of national SME policies 
in selected Asian countries.
Under the policy pillar of access to finance, various government and central bank support 



















to develop comprehensive policy  frameworks  for  supporting  innovative and diversified
financing models  that  better  serve  the  financing  needs  of  SMEs  at  different  business 
stages. The globalized economy will further encourage SME internationalization, especially 
in supporting industries, which may bring new financing demand from SMEs, e.g., local 






Table 3: National SME Policies in Selected Asian Countries
Indonesia Malaysia
1. Instruction of the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia No.6/2007 








shariah product development, etc.)




2. The Capital Market and Non-Bank 





(1) Reducing constraints on business 
communities to access capital market 
for source of funds
(2) Increasing public accessibility to 
finance and guarantee institutions
(3) Improving the role of professionals, 
supporting institutions, and 
underwriters in public offering














(1) Innovation and technology adaptation
(2) Human capital development
(3) Access to financing (SME Investment 































(4) Build and strengthen the business 
capability of Thai SMEs for 
international economic integration
continued on next page
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countries during 2011–2012. These recent developments are compared with trends over 









The  2008/09  global  financial  and  economic  crisis  has  severely  exacerbated  the  SME 




4 Section based on OECD (2013) Chapter 2.
2. Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development Plan 2011–2016:
(1) Enabling business environment
(2) Access to finance (sustained availability 
of reasonably priced, socially 
responsible, and environmentally 
friendly financial products, services, 
and support programs that are 
designed for MSMEs, and that MSMEs 
can conveniently and readily access)
(3) Access to markets
(4) Increasing productivity and efficiency
















The  crisis  has  also placed  a  spotlight  on  a weak  link  in  policy making  for SMEs  that 




the national and international level. The Scoreboard examines 13 core indicators related 
to SME debt and equity financing, framework conditions, and government policies. Most 
of  the  indicators  are  derived  from  supply-side  data  provided  by  financial  institutions. 







2012 in most countries. The sovereign debt crisis that hit many European countries 




This  section  describes  these  main  trends  and  provides  an  illustration  of  key policy 
measures implemented across countries to address the SME financing constraints. 
B. Business Environment and Macroeconomic Context 
The 2008/09 financial and economic crisis was the most severe in decades and deeply 
affected  the  business  and  financing  environment  in  many  OECD  countries  (OECD 
2012a).  Gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  contracted  by  3.6%  in  the OECD  area  as  a 
whole  in 2009 and by 4.3% in the euro area. The 2010 recovery was uneven and,  in 
many instances, came to a halt in the second quarter of 2011. GDP growth slowed in 
the United States, from 2.4% in 2010 to 1.8% in 2011. Similarly, in the euro area, where 











that  have  used  the  assistance  of  the European Union  and  the  International Monetary 
Fund, such as Ireland and Portugal, saw their sovereign spreads widen in 2011, despite 
financial support and a significant fiscal consolidation. In many other European countries, 
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including Italy and Spain, the increase in yields on government bonds contributed to 
a further tightening of credit conditions for the private sector as a whole. On the other 
hand, other OECD countries, such as the United States or northern European countries, 
have seen the pressure on government bonds loosen, with some improvement in credit 
conditions (OECD 2011, 2012b-c).
In  response  to  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  and  the  turmoil  in  financial markets, 
the  Federal Reserve  of  the United States  and  the European Central Bank  introduced 
an expansionary monetary policy which remained largely unchanged in 2011–2012. To 
support the banking sector, an additional $700 billion have been made available in the 
United  States.  In  Europe,  in  December  2011  the  European  Central  Bank  introduced 
a 3-year  refinancing operation, which allowed  the injection of  liquidity  (€489 billion)  at




C. Lending to SMEs in 2007–2011 
In  the  wake  of  the  crisis,  in most  countries  business  loans  and  SME  loans  declined 
markedly and, while they recovered in 2010, they did not reach their precrisis level. Indeed, 
lending to SMEs continued to decline during the recovery in some countries, although, 








In Portugal, despite  the negative  trend since 2010,  the stock of SME  loans  remained 




SME  loan shares  increased  in only  four countries and declined  in nine countries. This 
even occurred where SME loan growth was positive, as in the case of the Republic of
Korea, Russia, and Turkey, underscoring that total business loans were growing faster.
D. Credit Conditions for SMEs
During 2007–2010, in most countries SMEs faced credit terms less favorable than those 
applied to large companies, resulting in higher interest rates, shorter maturities, and 















and growth capital occurred in 2008–2009 (Table 4). Despite an overall positive trend over 
2010–2011, in half of the countries monitored, equity funding had not recovered its 2007 
level, averaging about 5% of  total financing. This situation suggests  that  the uncertain 
economic climate continued to act as a drag on equity investment.5 
5  It should be noted, however,  that  trends  in venture capital  investment are difficult  to analyze because of 
the extreme volatility in the data. In particular, just one large deal can cause volatility in countries where the 
market is not very developed. Furthermore, for most countries, the data are available for venture and growth 


































































Source: OECD. 2013. Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2013. An OECD Scoreboard. Paris.
Figure 10: Trends in SME Loans, 2007–2011
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F. Payment Delays and Bankruptcies 




able to report. Bankruptcies continued to rise in 2011 in some countries, reaching levels 
that surpassed the height of the crisis in 2009 (Table 5).
G. Government Policy Responses in 2007–2011
The global crisis has highlighted to governments and policy makers the crucial role SMEs 
and entrepreneurs play—and will continue to play—in their economies. In most countries, 
Table 4: Venture and Growth Capital Invested, 2007–2011
Country
Relative to 2007 (2007 = 1) 2010–2011  
Growth rate (%)2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Canada 1.00 0.72 0.50 0.56 0.72 30.0
Chile 1.00 0.99 0.86 … … …
Czech Republic 1.00 2.19 1.84 1.40 … …
Denmark 1.00 0.93 0.44 0.35 0.63 80.5
Finland 1.00 0.76 0.48 0.76 0.63 (16.9)
France 1.00 1.21 1.20 1.47 1.78 21.3
Hungary 1.00 3.49 0.18 1.77 2.86 62.0
Irelanda 1.00 1.08 1.28 1.37 1.21 (11.5)
Italya 1.00 1.54 0.99 0.98 1.61 65.3
Korea, Rep. of 1.00 0.73 0.87 1.10 1.27 15.6
The Netherlands 1.00 1.18 0.77 0.73 1.15 56.5
New Zealand 1.00 0.81 0.42 1.15 0.45 (61.2)
Norway 1.00 0.74 0.37 0.76 … …
Portugala 1.00 0.88 0.39 0.58 0.12 (80.0)
Russiaa,b … 1.00 1.06 1.17 1.40 19.6
Serbia 1.00 21.67 … 220.13 … …
Slovak Republica 1.00 1.14 2.06 1.63 1.64 0.9
Spaina,b … 1.00 1.08 1.08 … …
Sweden 1.00 1.46 0.75 0.67 0.50 (25.3)
Switzerland 1.00 1.03 0.91 1.12 0.70 (36.9)
Turkey 1.00 0.52 0.44 0.94 0.90 (4.2)
United Kingdomb … 1.00 0.63 0.82 0.83 1.8
United States 1.00 0.94 0.63 0.73 0.92 26.3
Note: Definitions differ across countries. 
a SMEs only. 
b Base year is 2008.
Source: OECD (2013).
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governments were  sensitive  to  the  increasing  difficulties  faced  by SMEs  in  accessing 
finance and  responded mainly by  injecting capital  into  their  loan guarantee and direct 





of  mutual  guarantee  schemes.  Table  6  provides  more  details  on  government  policy 
responses during 2007–2011.
Other  public  instruments  to  enhance SME  finance  included direct  loans, micro  loans,
export guarantees, and support for risk capital (equity) either in the form of cofinancing or 
tax credit for investors. Other measures included deferring or exempting tax payments, 
Table 5: Bankruptcy Trends, 2007–2011
Country
Relative to 2007 (2007 = 1) 2010/2011  
Growth rate (%)2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Canada per 1,000 firms 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.71 0.65 (9.1)
Chile all firms 1.00 1.05 1.21 0.94 0.93 (0.7)
Czech Republica all firms … 1.00 2.57 3.02 3.45 14.3
Denmark all firms 1.00 1.54 2.38 2.69 2.28 (15.4)
Finland % of firmsc 1.00 1.11 1.33 1.11 1.22 10.0
France only SMEs 1.00 1.08 1.23 1.18 1.16 (1.0)
Hungary per 10,000 firms 1.00 1.10 1.39 1.52 1.83 20.4
Ireland all firms 1.00 1.25 1.89 1.90 2.13 12.1
Italy all firms 1.00 1.22 1.53 1.83 1.97 7.8
Korea, Rep. of all firms 1.00 1.19 0.87 0.68 0.59 (13.4)
The Netherlandsb only SMEs … … 1.00 0.89 0.88 (0.8)
New Zealand all firms 1.00 1.02 1.24 1.10 0.99 (10.4)
Norway only SMEs 1.00 1.41 2.07 1.71 1.72 0.4
Portugal all firms 1.00 1.35 1.46 1.57 1.82 16.0
Russiaa all firms … 1.00 1.11 1.15 0.92 (20.1)
Serbia all firms 1.00 1.05 1.21 1.39 1.54 11.3
Slovak Republic all firms 1.00 1.49 1.63 2.04 2.45 20.3
Spain only SMEs 1.00 2.83 4.92 4.64 5.16 11.3
Sweden all firms 1.00 1.09 1.32 1.26 1.25 (0.6)
Switzerland all firms 1.00 0.98 1.21 1.45 1.54 6.5
Turkey all firms 1.00 0.90 0.96 1.31 1.38 5.9
United Kingdom all firms 1.00 1.23 1.51 1.32 1.40 5.7
United States all firms 1.00 1.54 2.15 1.99 1.69 (15.1)
a Base year is 2008. 












Some governments have adopted programs based on models in place elsewhere, while 
others  have  established  new  forms  of  public  support.  For  instance,  in  2011,  Ireland 
established lending targets for banks as well as a code of conduct for business lending to 
SMEs, and a loan guarantee program was launched in October 2012. Russia and Turkey 
both engaged in subsidizing interest rates, which tended to be much higher than in most 
other Scoreboard countries. Russia offered low interest rate financing for innovation and 
modernization. Turkey created interest rate support programs to assist enterprises during 
the financial crisis, as well as to help enterprises in the high technology sector invest in 
new machinery and equipment. 




guarantees and/or percentage guaranteed, 
number of firms eligible, countercyclical loans 
Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Italy, Republic of Korea, the 
Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United 
States 
Special guarantees and loans for start ups  Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands 
Increased government export guarantees Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
Government cofinancing and/or pension fund 
cofinancing 
Sweden, Ireland, Denmark 
Increased direct lending to SMEs  Canada, Chile, Hungary, Republic of Korea, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Spain 
Subsidized interest rates Hungary, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom 
Venture capital and equity funding, guarantees  Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain 
Business advice, consultancy Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden 
Tax exemptions, deferments  France, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain 









Among  new  programs,  Denmark  introduced  negative  interest  rates  for  excess  funds  on 
deposits at its central bank in order to encourage bank lending, an approach that earns 
public funds instead of costing money. The United Kingdom took another approach so as to 
encourage lending in its Funding for Lending Programme, i.e., a central bank scheme which 




approaches are needed to address long-standing challenges and pursue the long-term 
objective of sustainable growth.
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1.3.  Common and Different Conditions on SME Financing  
in ADB and OECD Areas
The  recent  crises—the  2008/09 GFC  and  the  eurozone  debt  crisis—have  had many 













growth  in every country, where SME access to finance  is a critical part of  the national 
financial inclusion strategy. Given the largely bank-centered financial systems established 
in Asia and the Pacific, the issue of how to enhance the bankability for SMEs, raise more 




Figure 11: Trends in SME Finance and Policies in ADB and Organization  
for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries


























Scale 5 4 3 2 1
A. SME Landscape
Number Share of SMEs  
to total number  
of enterprises
more than 90% 70–90% 60–70% 50–60% less than 
50%
Employees Share of SME 
employees to total 
number of employees





more than 50% 40–50% 30–40% 20–30% less than 
20%
Lending growth Annual growth,  
latest year
more than 30% 20–30% 10–20% 0–10% negative
C. Venture and Growth Capital Invested
Venture capital Relative to 2007 
(2007 = 1)






with direct lending 
and refinancing 
scheme(s)
90–100% 70–90% 50–70% 30–50% less than 
30%
Public guarantees Share of countries 
with public credit 
guarantee scheme(s)
90–100% 70–90% 50–70% 30–50% less than 
30%
Tax exemption Share of countries 
with tax incentive 
schemes for SMEs
90–100% 70–90% 50–70% 30–50% less than 
30%
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public  credit  guarantee  schemes. Also,  supplementing  the promotion of bank  lending 
to SMEs are measures such as concessional direct  lending  to SMEs by policy banks 
and/or  central  or  local  government  authorities,  refinancing  schemes  for  banks  by  the
government and/or bi- or multilateral development organizations to create additional 
credit lines for SMEs, and government interest rate subsidies for banks to reduce lending 
rates for SMEs.







bank  lending to SMEs. The nonbank sector,  including the venture capital  industry and 
capital markets, is still in an early stage of development and has yet to develop feasible 
business models  for  SME  financing.  Scaling  up  SME  finance  in  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
requires a two-pronged approach: improved bank lending efficiency, and diversification of 
financing models that serve various financing needs of SMEs. Lessons from the financial 
crises have  motivated  many  countries  to  consider  SME  access  to  finance  beyond 
conventional bank credit and to diversify their domestic financial systems. Accordingly, 
national policy makers are required to develop a comprehensive policy framework that




innovative ones. This  is a  long-standing hurdle  that  limits SME growth  in many OECD 
countries and  in most emerging economies, where SMEs and micro  firms often have 
limited access to both debt financing and equity capital.







Basel capital accords, especially Basel III, require tighter risk management by banks, 







The GFC has  affected both ADB and OECD countries  but  the  impact  of  the  crisis  is 










and technology, is a key action commonly shared by ADB and OECD countries, and one 
which can also be achieved via well-organized public–private initiatives.
The crisis has highlighted a weakness  in policy making  for SMEs  that has existed  for 
some time: the lack of timely, comparable data and the absence of a sound monitoring 
framework  for  SME  finance.  In  response  to  this  limitation,  the  OECD  launched  the 
Scoreboard on SME and entrepreneurship finance in 2012, and similarly ADB will launch 
the Asia SME Finance Monitor in 2014. Both provide a unique framework for monitoring 
SME access to finance at the national and the international level. The OECD Scoreboard 
examines  13  core  indicators  related  to  SME  debt  and  equity  financing,  framework 
conditions,  and  government  policies. Most  of  the  indicators  are  derived  from  supply-
side data provided by financial institutions. The ADB Asia SME Finance Monitor reviews 
various country aspects of SME finance covering  the banking sector, nonbank sector, 
capital markets, and related policies and regulations, mainly to support evidence-based 









2 Bank Lending Efficiency
2.1. Financial Infrastructure for SMEs




















a robust private sector with dynamic enterprises. However, improving access to external 
sources  of  funding  remains  one  of  the  main  challenges  of  firm  finance,  especially  in 
emerging and developing economies. Availability of  funds determines a firm’s ability  to 
maximize efficiency gains in almost all areas of its operations, including market research, 





6 Economist, People’s Republic of China Resident Mission, Asian Development Bank. nkhor@adb.org
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their creditworthiness to banks and other financial institutions because they suffer from 
more severe  informational  asymmetries between  lenders and borrowers and  incentive 
asymmetries between owners and managers than  large firms. Often this results  in  low 
access  to  finance  for  small  firms,  which may  compromise  profitable  project  ventures 
of even high-quality small firms. Without access to external finance, smaller firms often 
resort to internal resources, limiting their productivity potential, chance to innovate, and 




organizations, and economies.7 Even within similar sectors,  firms vary on  the  types of 
production technology they choose and wages they pay. Thus, constraints on the growth 
of enterprises will have adverse impacts on the growth of productivity and wages received 
by workers.8 In an earlier report on enterprises in Asia, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB)  (2009)  found  that most firms  in the  region’s developing economies are still  very 
small. In most of the countries surveyed, the majority of firms are small and employ less 
than 50 people. In some countries, such as India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, small 
establishments accounted for more than 90% of all firms. The prevalence of small firms
can be attributed to two things: (i) in economies where structural change is just beginning 
to  shift  workers  away  from  agriculture,  firms  in  both manufacturing  and  services  are 
naturally younger, and hence typically smaller; and (ii) endemic institutional features might 
favor  large  state-owned  enterprises  or  other  large  domestic  private  interests,  thereby 




B. Banks and Credit Access for SMEs in Asia
A large determinant of firm size is the availability of credit and access to finance, especially 
for smaller firms.  In  this  regard, a  large body of  literature  in recent years has emerged 
to study SME finance  from a  firm perspective  (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2006; Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt,  and Martinez  Peria  2008;  Ayyagari,  Demirgüç-Kunt,  and Maksimovic 
2008).  Recent  supply-side  studies  of  SME  financing  show that investing  in  the  SME 
market  can  be  lucrative. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,  and Martinez Peria  (2008),  examining 
how large banks perceive the SME market  in 45 developed and developing countries, 
find that although banks are more exposed to larger firms, they consider the SMEs to be 
7  While the terms “enterprise” (or “firm”) and “establishment” are two distinct concepts, in this section these are
often used interchangeably. The survey data used are based on establishment-level data. An establishment
is a single physical location at which business is conducted or where services or industrial operations are 
performed. An enterprise or firm is a business organization consisting of one or more establishments under 
common ownership or control. 
8 Although most of the literature has focused on labor markets in developed countries, empirically this finding




of smaller firms in the Philippines is much lower than that of larger firms.
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an attractive, profitable market. De la Torre, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler found similar 
results, relying on interviews conducted in 37 banks in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and 









guarantee  schemes,  encouraging  lending  to  the  SME  sector,  and  requiring  banks  to 
designate a minimum amount of their portfolio to SMEs, which might introduce distortion 
away from the optimal resource allocation.10 Most of the financial inclusion reforms were 
implemented  in South Asia and East Asia, with  the Philippines and Malaysia  reporting 
the highest number, each having 10 different areas of reform. Governments around the 














medium-sized  firms  employ  20–99  workers,  and  large  firms  employ  more  than  100 
workers. Obviously, this effort in standardization for intercountry comparison means that
the definition of an SME is  likely to depart from official national guidelines that typically 
differ  from  country  to  country.  Sixteen  Asian  economies  are  included  in  the  sample: 





10 In the Philippines, the Magna Carta Law (per 2008 revision R.A. 9501) mandates all banks to allocate




of resource allocation (see Tacneng, Jacildo, and Khor 2013).
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strata: firm size, business sector, and geographic region within a country. The weighted 
results provide a  reasonably detailed overview of  the financial participation of SMEs  in 
the region. 
The module on finance includes three questions on types of financial services accessible
to  these  firms:  (i) whether  the  establishment  has  a  checking  and/or  savings  account, 
(ii) whether the establishment has an overdraft facility, and (iii) whether the establishment 
has  a  line  of  credit  or  loan  from  a  financial  institution.  For  recent  loans,  the  following 
details are available: whether the  loans required collateral, and what types of collateral 
were accepted.
In addition,  to understand the potential effects of credit access, data on  investment  is 
investigated,  specifically  whether  the  establishment  purchased  fixed  assets  such  as 
machinery, vehicles, equipment, land, or buildings in the year prior to the interview. 
The survey’s finance module provides sources of financing for these purchases. It also 
contains  questions  investigating  how  firms  made  those  investment  purchases,11 and 
further details on how operations of the firms were financed.12 For working capital, the 
survey asks whether the establishment’s purchases of  inputs were paid for before, on, 
or after delivery, and what were the payment methods for the establishment’s outputs. 









others (such as moneylenders, friends, or relatives).
Note: Firm size is measured using the number of employees.
Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank Enterprise Surveys data.












variable  cannot be used  in  the empirical model,  the  relevant  statistics  for Asia will  be
reported in the following section.
2. Patterns of Firm Characteristics
According  to  the  above  standardized  typology,  the  distribution  of  firms  in  the  sample 
for Asia13 tends towards smaller firms. Altogether, the survey sample in Asia consists of 




Perhaps somewhat surprisingly given the  importance of export-led growth  in Asia,  the 
percentage of firms involved in some exporting (17%) is roughly similar in Asia and non-










with  another  indicator  of  firm  quality  and  technology:  i.e.,  whether  the  firm  has  an 
internationally  recognized  quality  certification.  This  investment  rate  is  also  lowest  for 
small firms in Asia, where only one-quarter of firms made some fixed-assets investment 
recently (Figure 13). Thus, given that  investments underpin the dynamism of firms,  it  is 
13 Asia refers to Asian member economies of ADB listed above.
14   Exporters are defined as those whose outputs were not 100% sold in the domestic market. By this definition, 
in addition to those who export directly, firms whose products were sold domestically to third parties that 
export are also counted as exporters.
15   Unconditionally, 45.7% of large Asian firms are involved to some degree with exports, compared with 35.4% 
of non-Asian firms of a similar size.







Latin America and 
the Caribbean
Middle East and 
North Africa Asia*
Small 56.5 58.5 48.0 89.7 62.2
Medium 34.3 30.4 35.9  9.0 27.2




Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank Enterprise Surveys data.
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imperative  to understand whether  the  lower  levels of observed  investment  in Asia are 
related to access to finance.
3. Financial Inclusion in Asia
One of the most notable findings is that, despite recent gains, SMEs in Asia still lag behind 
other  regions  in  access  to  various bank  services  (Figure  13).  The  following  are  seven 
empirical observations: 
• Enterprises in Asia have less access to credit and overdraft facilities than their 
counterparts in other regions. Of the three types of banking access examined, 
a  checking  or  savings  account  is  the most  prevalent  type of  banking  services 
accessed.  Almost  all  firms,  both  Asian  (85.4%)  and  non-Asian  (88.5%),  have 
some type of bank account, either checking or savings. However, the coverage of 
the other two types of financial services is far from universal in Asia. Only 19.5%
of Asian  firms could access overdraft  facilities, compared  to 52.8% elsewhere. 
Another 24.1% of Asian firms have a line of credit or loan from a financial institution, 
compared to 43.6% elsewhere (Table 8).
• SMEs	in	Asia	have	lower	access	to	credit	than	large	firms	in	Asia. Not surprisingly, 
credit lines are more accessible for larger firms than small ones. This is also true 
across other regions over the three aspects of financial services available  in the 
dataset.  The  inequality  of  access  is  of  least  concern  for  savings  and  checking 
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• SMEs	 in	 Asia	 were	 least	 likely	 to	 have	made	 recent	 investment,	 and	most	





non-Asian firms  report much higher propensities  to  receive credit  from financial 








firms and 31.8% of small firms.






Exporter  9.7 22.4 35.4 9.3 24.3 45.7
Investment - fixed assets  34.9 34.9 35.8 54.1 60.3 60.4
Female owners 41.2 61.1 77.4 24.9 49.2 64.6
Financially constrained 55.8 60.0 59.2 26.1 25.9 25.0
Banking access
Checking 83.5 93.3 95.7 79.4 94.9 97.4
Overdraft 40.7 64.0 72.8 12.2 29.5 37.9
Credit 31.8 51.5 71.0 15.4 34.5 49.7
Sources of credit for most recent loan
Private commercial banks 79.3 77.9 84.6 28.3 27.0 27.9
State-owned banks 14.8 18.5 13.5 59.1 65.5 70.2
Nonbank financial institutionsa  5.2  2.8  1.3  8.6  6.9  1.6










of  the  large Asian  firms.18 Perhaps more striking  is  that,  for  small  firms  in both 
Asia and elsewhere, only about half of all the firms that report being affected by 
inaccessibility of  financing actually applied  for a  loan  (Figure 14). This suggests 
that  there  are  other  extenuating  circumstances  leading  to  the  self-selection  of 
firms applying for loans, and that the issue affects small firms disproportionately. 
Approximately  two-thirds of  large  firms  that  did  not  seek out  loans  stated  that 
they did not need the credit, but less than half of small firms expressed no need. 









collateral  is  personal  assets  of  the  owner.  For  those  Asian  firms  that  obtained 
loans, the majority obtained this credit  from state-owned banks (63%), while,  in 
stark  contrast,  private  commercial  banks  constitute  the  main  source  of  credit 
(71%) for non-Asian firms (Figure 15 and Table 8). 
18   Outside of Asia, 61.5% of all large firms, 45.2% of medium-sized firms, and 28.0% of small firms reported 
having applied for loans.
Figure 14: Access to Finance and Loan Applications
Note: Firm size is measured using the number of employees. 
Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank Enterprise Surveys data. 




















state-owned  and  commercial  banks)  provided  over  90%  of  their  most  recent 
loans. This underscores the still-dominant role of formal financing, as well as the 
space  for growth  for nonbank financial  institutions and other alternative modes 
of financing.





firms.  Female participation  in  ownership  increases  slightly with  firm  size  in  Asia  (from 
54.1% to 60.4%), while it remained roughly constant in non-Asian firms (35.0%). 
The percentage of  firms  in Asia with women managers  (20.9%)  is  also  slightly  higher 
than in their non-Asian counterparts (18.5%). However, unlike the distribution of women 
owners, women are more likely to be part of the management in smaller firms. In Asia, 






with women owners tend to have slightly  less access to overdraft  facilities  (Figure 16). 
These descriptive statistics have yet  to consider  the simultaneous effects of other firm 
19   Specifically the corresponding percentages outside of Asia are 11.1% for large firms, 17.2% for medium-
sized firms, and 21.6% for small firms.


















characteristics. As the results in part C.2 below would show, once those are taken into 
account, female ownership lowers the probabilities of financial access for Asian firms. 
C. Empirical Analysis
It is important to note that the statistical observations in the previous section are derived 
from  descriptive  statistics  from  pairs  of  variables.  That  is,  there  could  be  specific 
characteristics  of  firms  that  vary  across  countries  and  region  that  contributed  to  the 




1. Maximum Likelihood Estimations
Thus, to proceed with this empirical exercise, we begin with a parsimonious model to 
investigate factors that materially affect the probability of firm i’s financial access using a 
univariate binary model: 




when it comes to account ownership or lines of credit. However, Asian firms with women owners 
tend to have slightly less access to overdraft facilities (Figure 4). These descriptive statistics 
have yet to consider the simultaneous effects of other firm characteristics. As the results in part 
C.2 below would show, once those are taken into account, female ownership lowers the 
probabilities of financial access for Asian firms.  
 
C. Empirical Analysis 
 
It is important to note that the statistical observations in the previous section are derived from 
descriptive statistics from pairs of variables. That is, there could be specific characteristics of 
firms that vary across countries and region that contributed to the patterns discussed in sections 
2.3 and 2.4. To understand whether access to credit is constrained for SMEs, and how various 
determinants of this access interact with each other, it is thus essential to obtain conditional 
expectations of the outcome variables while holding a set of explanatory variables constant.  
 
1. Maximum Likelihood Estimations 
  
us, to roceed with this empirical exercise, we begin with a parsim nious model to investigate 
factors that materially aff ct the probability of firm i's financial access u ing a univariate binary 
model: 
 
  (                  |   )   ( 
 
   )   (1) 
 
where                  takes the values 0 or 1 depending on whether the firm was able to 
access this particular financing facility,15   is a known distribution function,     is a known 
nonstochastic vector, and   is a vector of unknown parameters. Assuming that,   is the 
standard normal distribution function, then the likelihood function of the model is given by: 
 
   ( )   ∑ (                   ( 
 
   ) (                  )  (  ( ( 
 
   )))
 
     
 (2) 
 
It is useful to note that the choice of a normal distribution would not affect the implications of the 
results. Although the estimated   coefficients would differ, the important vector is that of the 
partial derivatives ??? (Amemiya 1994). Equation (2) is estimated using the maximum 
likelihood estimation method. For these estimations,   contains firm-specific characteristics, 
including firm age, female participation in ownership, firm size, year, and geographical location.  
To explore this, we fit various regression models onto the firm data. In the first set of 
estimations, maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the likelihood function first using 
the following parsimonious reduced form:  
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where                is a set of variables pertaining to credit access for firms, including 
availability; ASIA is a dummy variable for geography and refers to countries within Asia. In 
addition, firm-level characteristics (Z) include the age of firm, whether the firm exports or ha 
externally audited financial statements or internationally recognized certification, and whether 
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banking account, the availability of an overdraft facility, or the ability to access a loan or line of credit. 
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20  Similar to previous sections, the three aspects of financial access available are considered: the ownership of 
a banking account, the availability of an overdraft faci ity, or the ability to access a loan or line of credit.
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when it comes to account ownership or lines of credit. However, Asian firms with women owners 
tend to have slightly less access to overdraft facilities (Figure 4). These descriptive statistics 
have yet to consider the simultaneous effects of other firm characteristics. As the results in part 
C.2 below would show, once those are taken into account, female ownership lowers the 
probabilities of financial access for Asian firms.  
 
C. Empirical Analysis 
 
It is important to note that the statistical observations in the previous section are derived from 
descriptive statistics from pairs of variables. That is, there could be specific characteristics of 
firms that vary across countries and region that contributed to the patterns discussed in sectio s 
2.3 and 2.4. To understand whether access to credit is constrained for SMEs, and how various 
determinants of this access interact with each other, it is thus essential to obtain conditional 
expectations of the outcome variables while holding a set of explanatory variables constant.  
 
1. Maximum Likelihood Estimations 
  
Thus, to proceed with this empirical exercise, we begin with a parsimonious model to investigate 
factors that materially affect the probability of firm i's financial access using a univariate binary 
model: 
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It is useful to note that the choice of a normal distribution would not affect the implications of the 
results. Although the estimated   coefficients would differ, the important vector is that of the 
partial derivatives ??? (Amemiya 1994). Equation (2) is estimated using the maximum 
likelihood estimation method. For these estimations,   contains firm-specific characteristics, 
including firm age, female participation in ownership, firm size, year, and geographical location.  
To explore this, we fit various regression models onto the firm data. In the first set of 
estimations, maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the likelihood function first using 
the following parsimonious reduced form:  
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that of the partial derivatives δФ/δXi (Amemiya 1985). Equation (2) is estimated using the 
maximum likeliho d estimation metho . For these estimations, X contains firm-specific 
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using the following parsimonious reduced form:
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  is  a  set    riables pertain g  to credit  access  for  firms, 
including  availability;  ASIA  is  a  dummy  variable  for  ge graphy  and  ref rs  to  ountries 
within Asia. In addition, firm-level characteristics (Z) include the age of firm,  hether the 
firm exports  or  ha  externally  audited  financial  statements or  internationally  recognized 
certification, and whether there is any female participation in the ownership of the firm. 
Geogr phical  fixed  effects  are  accounted  for  through  individual  country-year  ummy 
variables. Given  our  choice  of  a  probit model,  the  interpretation  of  the  coefficients  is 
straightforward: a statistical significant estimate of 




ther  is any female participation in the ownership of the firm. Geographical fixed effects are 
ccou t d for through i dividual c u t y-year dummy variables. Given our choice of a probit 
mod l, the interpretation of the coefficients is straightforward: a statistical significant estimate of 




Table 3 presents the results from the pooled data. The main results from the regression confirm 
the first observation that SMEs in general are less likely to have access to the three types of 
banking services discussed earlier.16 The lack of access is more acute for small firms than 
medium-sized ones and remained significant even after accounting for sector and country 
effects. Although Asian firms also access less financial services, there appears to be no 
significant difference in the relative gap between large Asian SME Asian firms and large non-
Asian SME firms. In the pooled model, the interaction term between firm size and Asia was 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Tables 4–6 present the results for Asia and non-Asia separately (columns 3 and 6 in each table). 
The following are three highlights from the results which take into account fixed effects of 
geography and sectors: 
 Fe ale firm ownership in Asia is negatively correlated with the probability of 
having bank accounts and having overdraft. In particular, having at least one 
female owner is associated with a 3.0% reduction in probability of having bank 
accounts, and a 8.5% reduction in probability of having an overdraft facility. 
 Engaging in exporting activities is associated with an increase of up to 10% in the 
probability of accessing bank services. The effect of exporting is roughly similar 
for firms in Asian and non-Asian economies. 
 Having an externally audited financial statement is correlated with up to a 14% 
increase in probability of accessing bank services. The effect is more 
pronounced for SMEs in Asia, in line with the unconditional observation that 
these are the firms that receive the least banking services and that external 
auditing would attenuate the issue of asymmetric information that has been the 
issue for banking access for small firms. 
 
D. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
SMEs in Asia receive less credit than other non-Asian SMEs. While they do raise the issue of 
financing access less than non-Asian counterparts, they also invest at about half the rate of 
non-Asian SMEs. Results from multivariate models suggest that credit access is correlated 
strongly with firm size, with small firms enjoying the least access. The results also suggest that 
exporting and having an externally audited financial statement are positively correlated with 
increased credit access, while having a women owner is associated with a reduction in the 
probability of financial access. 
 
Thus, addressing credit needs for Asian SMEs achieves several facets of financial inclusion 
goals. It would help Asian SMEs access credit, and that in turn would likely increase the rate of 
investment of these Asian SMEs. In addition, given the high rate of female participation in the 
ownership of Asian SMEs, increasing access to these firms would also support gender equality 
in the region. Given the prominent role of state-owned banks in SME lending in Asia, increasing 
                                               
16 The model does not claim causality. However, statistical significance for estimated coefficients suggests that the 
variable is correlated with the dependent variable. 
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21  The model does not claim c usality. However, statistical sign ficance for estimated coefficients suggests that 
the variable is correlated with the dependent variable.
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Medium-sized firm –0.012 –0.017 –0.032 –0.036 –0.160 –0.147
–0.670 –1.140 –0.790 –1.260 (4.43)** (5.67)**
Small firm –0.086 –0.100 –0.210 –0.215 –0.331 –0.331
(4.83)** (7.36)** (5.12)** (6.58)** (9.60)** (12.29)**
Asia = 1 –0.003 –0.036 –0.331 –0.339 –0.192 –0.182
(0.130) (4.41)** (7.61)** (17.50)** (5.27)** (10.64)**
Asia*medium –0.015 –0.009 0.039
(0.520) (0.18) (0.81)
Asia*small –0.042 –0.011 –0.002
(1.620) (0.20) (0.04)
Exporter –0.003 –0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003
(4.04)** (4.16)** (4.43)** (4.55)** (2.45)* (2.41)*
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.66)** (2.68)** (3.68)** (3.72)** (2.46)* (2.41)*
Age squared 0.020 0.020 –0.006 –0.006 0.017 0.017
(2.35)* (2.37)* (0.27) –0.260 (0.92) –0.940
Female owners 0.051 0.051 0.067 0.067 0.100 0.100
(5.00)** (5.13)** (2.87)** (2.83)** (4.05)** (4.00)**









• Having an externally audited financial statement  is correlated with up  to a 14% 
increase in probability of accessing bank services. The effect is more pronounced 
for SMEs in Asia, in line with the unconditional observation that these are the firms 
that receive the least banking services and that external auditing would attenuate 
the issue of asymmetric information that has been the issue for banking access
for small firms.
D. Conclusions and Policy Implications
SMEs  in Asia  receive  less credit  than other non-Asian SMEs. While  they do  raise  the 
issue of  financing access  less than non-Asian counterparts,  they also  invest  at  about 
Bank Lending Efficiency 37














Medium-sized firm –0.083 –0.011 –0.02 –0.038 –0.026 0.001
(3.28)** (0.49) (1.00) (2.45)* (1.57) (0.10)
Small firm –0.204 –0.073 –0.06 –0.127 –0.107 –0.017
(12.07)** (4.10)** (3.68)** (8.33)** (6.38)** (2.15)*
Firm age –0.012 –0.006 –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(6.67)** (4.48)** (0.64) (0.24) (0.05) (1.04)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(4.34)** (2.58)** (0.18) (0.04) (0.13) (1.35)
Female owners –0.016 –0.028 0.029 0.01
(1.30) (2.71)** (2.99)** (2.06)*
Exporter 0.062 0.049 0.040 0.010
(2.94)** (3.24)** (4.12)** (2.03)*
International 
Certification
0.043 –0.028 –0.013 0.003
(2.23)* (1.28) (0.91) (0.40)
Audited 0.162 0.101 0.038 0.023
Country Dummies YES YES
ISIC Dummies YES YES




half the  rate of non-Asian SMEs. Results  from multivariate models suggest  that credit 
access is correlated strongly with firm size, with small firms enjoying the least access. The 
results also suggest that exporting and having an externally audited financial statement 
are positively correlated with increased credit access, while having a women owner is 
associated with a reduction in the probability of financial access.
Thus,  addressing  credit  needs  for  Asian  SMEs  achieves  several  facets  of  financial 
inclusion goals. It would help Asian SMEs access credit,  and  that  in  turn would  likely 
increase the rate of investment of these Asian SMEs. In addition, given the high rate of 
female participation  in  the ownership of Asian SMEs,  increasing access  to  these firms 





















Medium-sized firm –0.058 –0.023 –0.031 –0.074 –0.05 –0.05
(2.51)* (0.96) (1.37) (1.87) (1.27) (1.21)
Small firm –0.247 –0.139 –0.189 –0.28 –0.24 –0.218
(8.25)** (3.96)** (5.94)** (7.44)** (6.16)** (5.11)**
Firm age –0.004 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.003
(1.20) (0.10) (0.60) (6.69)** (6.18)** (1.86)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.30) (0.43) (0.48) (5.28)** (5.05)** (1.79)
Female owners –0.086 –0.085 0.047 0.028
(2.93)** (3.16)** (2.08)* (1.39)
Exporter 0.034 0.060 0.090 0.062
(1.20) (2.11)* (3.55)** (2.27)*
International 
Certification
0.061 0.048 0.048 0.033
(1.74) (1.54) (1.56) (1.06)
Audited 0.168 0.132 0.017 0.046
(5.36)** (4.39)** (0.81) (1.77)
Country Dummies YES YES
ISIC Dummies YES YES
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Medium-sized firm –0.116 –0.098 –0.095 –0.19 –0.182 –0.168
(4.82)** (3.79)** (3.80)** (5.19)** (4.52)** (4.38)**
Small firm –0.334 –0.285 –0.294 –0.373 –0.353 –0.339
(12.42)** (8.46)** (8.49)** (11.69)** (9.35)** (8.68)**
Firm age –0.003 –0.001 –0.002 0.005 0.005 0.000
(0.94) (0.41) (0.56) (3.45)** (3.02)** (0.34)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Female owners –0.023 –0.018 0.04 –0.004
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Certification
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2.1.2. SME Data Infrastructure and Challenges
This section outlines  the methodology of  the OECD’s Scoreboard on Financing SMEs 
and Entrepreneurs, detailing the methodology used for  its build-up and the challenges 
faced  in  the  process.  It  interprets  the  data  on  SME  financing,  their  limitations,  and 
the  impact  of  definitions.  The  section  also  presents  the  core  indicators  used  in 
the  OECD  Scoreboard  to  monitor  debt  and  equity  financing,  SME  solvency,  and 
government policy measures  to support SME access  to finance. Limitations  to cross-





SME  competitiveness  would  benefit  from…effective  access  to  financial  services, 
particularly  to  seed,  working  and  development  capital,  including  innovative  financial 
instruments to reduce the risks and transaction costs of lending to SMEs. (Bologna 2000)
Access  to  finance  for  SMEs  and  entrepreneurs  has  since  built  up  into  a  key  area  of
work  for  the  OECD  Working  Party  on  SMEs  and  Entrepreneurship, a  high-level 
international forum for SME policy makers who work to promote entrepreneurship and 
advance  the  performance  of  small  businesses  by  reviewing  issues  and  diffusing  best 
practice policies. 
At  the  OECD  Global  Conference  on  Better  Financing  for  Entrepreneurship  and 
SME  Growth  held  in  Brasilia  in  March  2006,  participants  recognized  in  the  OECD 
Brasilia  Action  Statement  for  SMEs  and  Entrepreneurship  Financing  that  a  “lack
of  data impedes  a  complete  analysis  of  the  financial  situation  of  SMEs  in OECD
countries.” It urged the OECD to take the lead in developing better data and statistical 
information,  thereby  allowing  the  establishment  of  international  benchmarks  to
facilitate  comparisons of  the  relative performance of markets  in providing  financing  to 





In  the  wake  of  the  global  crisis,  the  OECD working  party  has  addressed  the  urgent 
challenge of  developing  a  framework  for monitoring SME  financing  trends  and  needs 
and  for  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  policies  supporting  the  access  of  SMEs  and 
entrepreneurs  to  finance.  In  fact,  the  global  financial  crisis  has  once  more  seriously 
highlighted that the lack of appropriate data is a critical obstacle for policy makers and 
22 Section based on Chapter 1 and Annex 1 of: OECD (2013).
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The OECD efforts  to  develop data  and  statistical  information  on  the  access  of SMEs 
and entrepreneurs to finance also addresses the G-2023 call  for more and better data, 
and  international  benchmarks  on  the  financial  situation  of  SMEs.  The  importance  of 
SME  finance was  recognized  at  the  Pittsburgh  summit  in  2009,  where G-20  leaders
acknowledged that such finance provides growth opportunities for businesses and the 
economy as a whole. Financial  inclusion  is a pillar of  the G-20 Multi-Year Action Plan 
on Development, and the G-20 Global Platform for Financial Inclusion was launched in 
the Republic of Korea in December 2010. The need to address the financing hurdles to 
SME growth was also underlined by G-824 leaders at the 2011 Deauville summit, where 
the  OECD  was  invited,  in  cooperation  with  other  international  institutions,  to  identify 
impediments to SME growth. 
Better data can improve understanding of business financing needs and provide a sound 
basis  for  informed policy discussions,  as well as give  the  suppliers of  finance a more 
comprehensive assessment of  their  clients’ needs  that enables  them  to design better 
products and services. 
B. The OECD Scoreboard on Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 
1. The Importance of Data Collection 
Data  are  required  on  SME  and  entrepreneurship  financing  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
First,  better  data  can  improve  the  understanding  of  business  financing  needs  and 
therefore  provide  a  basis  for  a  better informed  public  discussion.  Second,  better 
data  can  give  the  suppliers  of  finance  a more  comprehensive  understanding  of  their 
clients’ needs, enabling them to design better products and services. Third, better 
data  can  facilitate  policy  makers’  assessments  of  whether  firms’  financing  needs 




adequately measured and  therefore monitored. One of  the  reasons  is  that  credit  flow 
statistics are generally compiled on the basis of loan size rather than firm size. The OECD
Scoreboard  intends  to  fill  this  gap  and  provide  a  systematic  framework  for  analyzing
not only the financial situation of SMEs but also the policy responses and their ultimate 
impact on SME survival and national employment. Rather than taking a snapshot in time, 
23  The Group of  Twenty  (G-20)  is  a  group of  finance ministers  and  central  bank  governors  from 20 major 
economies: 19 countries plus the European Union, which is represented by the President of the European 
Council and by the European Central Bank.
24  The Group of Eight (G-8) is a forum for the governments of a group of eight leading industrialized countries: 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States.
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the OECD Scoreboard focuses on the changing conditions over time and on analyzing 




became apparent that better and timelier data could lead to better policy responses both 
now and in the future. 
2. Building the Scoreboard—Objectives











(i) To  develop  a tool  for  policy  makers,  consisting  of  a  select  number  of  core 
indicators which reveal the real situation of SMEs in terms of access to finance, 
and allow them to judge the effectiveness of their policies.
(ii) To assist OECD member and nonmember countries to monitor, report on, 
and discuss  the  indicators of SME financing  trends on a  regular basis across 
countries, identifying good policies and practices.
(iii) To  serve  as  a  framework  and  guide  for  governments  on  how  to  assemble 
meaningful indicators of SME access to finance.
In addition, the development of the OECD Scoreboard and its indicators are instrumental 
in  improving  the  comparability  of  SME  data,  and  increase  cooperative  efforts  across 
countries  and  institutions  to  harmonize  definitions,  data  collection  methods,  and 
time frames.
C. Core Indicators on SME Financing 
1. Criteria for the Selection of Core Indicators 





can monitor SME access  to  finance over  time. To  that end,  the  indicators assembled 
should not only be the most easily obtainable indicators but also the most useful ones 
which  give  a  coherent  view  of  the  situation  regarding  SME  access  to  finance  and 
policy responses. 
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Several  criteria  were  used  to  select  the  core  indicators  for  the  OECD  Scoreboard  in 
order to achieve the three main objectives discussed earlier. The criteria were usefulness, 




(ii) The data for constructing the indicators should be readily available in order not to 
impose new burdens on governments.
(iii) Often the information for constructing the indicator is not publicly available but it 
is feasible to make it available at a modest cost. In other cases the information 
could be collected during routine data exercises or surveys. 
(iv) The information should also be collected in a timely manner so that the situation 
of SMEs can be monitored. This means that annual or quarterly data are needed. 
In many cases, turning points can be better captured by quarterly data and so 
they are more useful than annual data which might not show when a trend has 
changed and intervention is necessary. Some countries are downsizing their 
periodic surveys so that they can be administered on a quarterly basis. 
(v) For the purposes of the OECD Scoreboard, the indicators should be comparable. 









• How much credit goes to investment (growth) versus operational expenses 
(survival)?
• Does the supply of credit match the SME demand for credit?
• How  large  is  the  unmet  demand  for  credit  and  does  this  constitute  a  serious 
financing gap?
• Do SMEs  face  tighter  credit  conditions  than  larger  firms? Are credit  conditions 
becoming more onerous for them?
• What percentage of SMEs loans are government guaranteed?








a more comprehensive manner than would be possible by looking at just one indicator. 
When it comes to analyzing each indicator on a standalone basis, the following are a few 
basic guidelines about how to read the indicators: 





and growth needs. However, caution has to be used in interpreting this indicator 
because  it  is affected by  the composition of short-term  loans versus  long-term 
loans  in  the SME  loan portfolio of banks.  Indeed,  the share of  long-term  loans 
could actually increase during a financial crisis, because it is easier for the banks 
to shut off short-term credit.
Table 13: Core Indicators in the OECD Scoreboard  



















credit conditions are loosening
7. SME non-performing loans/
SME loans
When  compared  to  the  ratio  of  non-performing  loans 




9. Interest rate spreads between 




provide collateral on their last 
bank loan
Tightness of credit conditions
11. Venture capital and growth 
capital 
Ability  to  access  external  equity  for  start-up,  early 
development and expansion stages






direct government loans:  These  indicators  show  the  extent  of  public  support 
for  the financing of SMEs  in the  form of direct  funding or credit guarantees. By 
comparing government  loan guarantees with guaranteed loans,  information can 
be drawn on the take up of government programs and on their leverage effect.
• SME	authorized	loans	to	SME	requested	loans: This indicator shows the degree 
to which SME credit demand is met. A decrease in the ratio indicates a tightening 
in the credit market. It also provides information about the rejection rate for SME
loans.  A  limitation  in  this  indicator  is  that  it  omits  the  impact  of  discouraged 






• SME loans used to SME loans authorized: This ratio is used as a proxy by 
some countries for the previous indicator. It shows the willingness of the banks to 
provide credit. However, in contrast with the previous ratio, a decrease in this ratio 
indicates that credit conditions are loosening because not all credit authorized is 
being used. 
• SME nonperforming loans to SME loans:  This  indicator  provides  information 
about the relative performance of SME loans in banks’ portfolios, i.e., the riskiness 
implied  by  exposure  to  SME  loans.  It  can  be  compared  with  the  overall  ratio 
of  nonperforming  loans  to  all  business  loans  to determine  whether  SMEs  are 
less creditworthy. 







• Venture capital and growth capital: This indicator shows the ability to access 
external equity in the form of seed, start-up, or early stage venture capital as well 
as expansion capital. It excludes buyouts, turnarounds, and replacement capital, 
as these are directed at restructuring and generally concern larger enterprises. 











underestimates  the  number  of SME exits,  as  some SMEs close  their  business 
before being  in  financial difficulties. Bankruptcies per 1,000 or 10,000 SMEs  is 







allowing participants  to observe  trends over  time on access  to  finance  for SMEs and 
entrepreneurs. This is particularly useful also as a means of evaluating policy responses 
undertaken in previous years and the decision, among other things, on the appropriate 
timing for the phasing out of measures already in place or the retaining of those that are 
still deemed as necessary. 
D. Process of Data Collection
Data on SME financing are collected in two ways: 
(i) Administrative data or  records of actual  transactions collected by government 
agencies  from the suppliers of SME finance. There are some cases, however, 
where quantitative surveys are undertaken and the  information  is distinct  from
the  administrative  data. Quantitative  data  are more  consistent,  verifiable,  and 
generally classified as supply-side data. 
(ii) Surveys of SMEs (demand-side surveys) and bank loan officers and equity fund 
members (supply-side surveys) undertaken by government agencies, business 
associations, and investors’ associations. This  information is usually qualitative 
and is based on estimates or opinions and so is hard to verify. Some governments 
and  regional  banks  do  undertake  quantitative  demand-side  surveys.  If  every 
country had quantitative demand-side surveys much uncertainty could be 
avoided.
Experience shows that qualitative information based on opinion survey responses must 
be used cautiously as  it often appears  to be contradictory. For example, supply-side 
surveys  of  senior  loan  officers  sometimes  show  demand  for  credit  decreasing  while 
at  the  same  time  demand-side  surveys  show SMEs’  need  for  credit  increasing.  The 
size  of  the  sample population  also  affects  how  representative  the  survey  results  are. 
It is preferable to collect transaction-based data and use opinion survey responses as 
supplementary, until the time that such surveys are standardized and their reliability is 
tested across the board. 
1. Use of Country Experts 











The  country  experts  indicated  from  the  beginning  that  they would  be  able  to  access 
only  information which was  already  available  or  could  be made  available  easily.  They 
explained that it was unlikely that governments would undertake any new surveys 
for  the  purpose  of  building  the  pilot OECD Scoreboard. However,  over  the  course  of 
the  following  editions  of  the OECD Scoreboard,  existing  surveys  have  been modified 
to  feed  the OECD Scoreboard  and  new  studies  have  been  undertaken  by  a  number 
of countries.
E. Data Issues
1. Differences in the Statistical and Financial Definitions of an SME






Box 1: What is an SME?
There is no single definition of an SME, and employee numbers need not be the sole defining 
criterion. However, SMEs are generally considered  to be nonsubsidiary firms which employ 
less  than  a  given  number  of  employees.  This  number  varies  across  countries.  The  most 
frequent upper limit designation of an SME is 250 employees, as in the European Union (EU). 
















In  the  final  analysis,  the  diversity  of  national  definitions  was  not  as  important  as  the 
difference  in  the definitions used by  the banks  and  financial  institutions.  They defined 
an SME  loan  either  by  the  firm  size  or  by  loan  size.  In  the  end, most  countries  tend 











2. Other Data Problems: Preferred Definitions and Deviations
At the individual country level, the OECD Scoreboard on Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 
provides a coherent picture of SME access to finance over time and monitors changing 










Loan Size or Firm Size










companies, and sole proprietorships with 
fewer than 20 workers













country  are  necessarily  complemented with  a  table  of  definitions, which  provides  the 
definition adopted for each indicator and the reference to the data source.










Government loan guarantees is another indicator where deviations are observed. 
Supply-side  data  is  the  best  source  of  information  on  loan  guarantees,  and  sources
for such guarantees can be local, regional, or central governments. In some countries, 
an  important  volume  of  guarantees  is  also  provided  by  mutual  guarantee  schemes. 
However, the various loan guarantees schemes, public, private, and mixed, are not 
always consolidated to obtain national figures. Therefore, the OECD Scoreboard reports 
mostly on government loan guarantees which are readily available. In some cases, lack 
of awareness and reporting make it difficult to collect data on guaranteed SME loans. In 
fact, SMEs are not always aware that their loan is backed by a government guarantee and
banks do not usually report this information.




loans used divided by SME  loans authorized. While this does not provide  information 
identical to the preferred definition, a decline in the ratio suggests that the credit market is 
easing, or that banks have been providing more credit than is being used. 
Significant  differences  exist  across  countries  in  the  calculation  for SME interest rates. 









External equity, i.e., venture and growth capital, is usually reported by stage of development: 
seed,  start-up,  and  early  expansion  capital.  Later-stage  expansion  capital,  referred  to 
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as growth capital, is also reported. Buyouts, turnarounds, and replacement capital are 
excluded from venture and growth capital. Country classification systems do not always 
break down private equity data into these categories. Most do not break it down by firm 
size. Venture capital data are collected by private venture capital associations, which 




Payment delays and bankruptcy  data  are  usually  collected  for  all  enterprises  and  not 
broken down by firm size. Since SMEs account  for more than 97% of  the enterprises 
in  the  participating  countries,  the  national  figures  for  payment  delays  and bankruptcy 
rates are used. However, bankruptcies are hard to compare across countries because 
of different bankruptcy costs, legislation, and behavior in the face of bankruptcy. In some 
cases, bankruptcy procedures take a long time and so bankruptcies only show up in later 
periods rather than during the crisis period. 
A much wider and longer-term challenge is the further standardization of SME definitions 
and data in order to obtain indicators that are as comparable as possible both within and 
across countries.  It has to be said that a  lot of progress has been made on that  front 
since  the  launch of  the pilot OECD Scoreboard. However,  international  harmonization 
is an ongoing task and  full harmonization will  require  time and collective effort  from all 
stakeholders.  This  is  in  line  with  the  OECD  Scoreboard’s  objective  of  contributing  to 





were  able  to  identify  sufficient  data  which  would  allow  core  indicators  or  reasonable 






indicators one by one. Having them side by side allow a coherent story to be told in terms 
of SMEs access to finance, government responses, and the impact of those responses 
on  SME  survival  during the  crisis  in  each  country. Moreover, when  the  indicators  are 
assembled as a group on the national Scoreboard, they give a clear picture of the SME 
situation in terms of their treatment by the financial system. While considerable work has 
already been done  to  harmonize  the  indicators  of  the OECD Scoreboard, more work
needs to be done in the harmonization of data collection. What  is needed is not more 
data collection but better data collection. For example, some governments, in order to 
have more precise and timely information, are reducing the size of their surveys so that 
they can be conducted more frequently and they are harmonizing the questions asked 









and how this is to be achieved and made available to the wider community interested in 
SME and entrepreneurship promotion.





• Analysis  of  SME  financing  should  be  based  on  timely,  quantitative  supply-side 
data and demand-side data. Qualitative  information coming  from demand- and 
supply-side opinion surveys should be used only to supplement the analysis. 
Where supply-side data are not available (as  in the case of collateral), demand-
side survey information can be used.
• To improve quantitative supply-side data, banks and other credit institutions should 







associations carrying out demand-side surveys should work together to develop 
core questions which could simplify and standardize  the questionnaires. Where 
possible, these surveys should be undertaken jointly to increase the response rate 
and decrease the cost. There is a role for increased international cooperation and 







• To  assess  the  health  of  the  SME  sector,  national  authorities  should  monitor 
payment delays and firm failures by firm size. 


















amounts or new loans 
Supply- or demand-side 
data
SME long-term loans Loans for more than one year; outstanding 
amounts or new loans 













SME loans authorized Stocks or flows  Demand-side survey
SME loans requested Stocks or flows Demand-side survey




Supply- or demand-side 
data
Interest rate spreads Between small and large enterprises; for maturity 
less than 1 year; amounts less than €1 million and 
equal to or greater than €1 million
Supply- or demand-side 
data
Collateral Percentage of SMEs that were required to provide 
collateral on latest bank loan
Demand-side survey
Venture capital Actual amounts invested in SMEs in the country 
in early stage development (excludes buyouts, 
turnarounds, replacements) 
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2.1.3.  Secured Transactions Reform and SME Access to Finance:  
Issues and Examples from the Pacific Region
Paul Holden25
The  Pacific  region  has  undergone  some  of  the  most  extensive  secured  transactions
reforms anywhere. Although the reforms are relatively recent, initial results of the reforms 
indicate that they will allow more borrowing on better terms than under the previous 
legacy systems. The reforms have especially benefitted smaller businesses.
A. Introduction
Substantial  analytical work has documented  the association between  financial market 
development and growth.26 Without access to finance, investment is limited and growth 
potential  wasted.  Credit  is  required  for  many  business  transactions  and  consumer 
purchases.  For  thousands  of  years,  when  people  have  looked  to  borrow  money  for 
business purposes, they have found that lenders want security as a condition for loans. 
Lenders want collateral. Under the law, collateral comes in two types: land (real estate)
and personal property.27 
Typical  of  most  developing  countries  are  those  in  the  Pacific  region,  where  analysis 
undertaken  by  ADB  on  access  to  finance  concluded  that  one  of  the most  important 




to  finance  in  most  developing  countries,  where  legislation  governing  lending  and  the 
enforcement framework seriously impede the use of collateral, in particular using personal 
property,  as  security  for  the  granting  of  credit.  The  result  is  reduced  access  to  credit 
except for large companies or wealthy individuals with substantial land holdings. Smaller 
borrowers are essentially excluded from the system. A secondary effect is that the credit 
chain is shortened. This means that, unlike in countries that have highly developed 
financial  markets,  few  businesses  extend  credit  terms  to  their  customers,  borrowing 
against inventories or warehouse receipts rarely occurs, purchase of equipment through 
leasing is unusual, and specialized financial institutions do not exist. As a result, there is 






26   For  an  overview  of  this  work,  see  P.  Holden  and  V.  Prokopenko  2001.  Ayyagari,  Demirgüç-Kunt,  and 
Maksimovic (2005) analyze firm surveys to ascertain the impact of the business environment on growth and 
find that access to finance is one of the most important determinants of the growth rate of firms (together 













Potential borrowers without titled, registered real estate and other substantial assets 
cannot find financing.





framework and  then describes a  series of  reforms  in Pacific  region countries  that  are 
among the most innovative in the world. 
B. Some Features of a Well-Functioning Secured Transactions Framework
1. Secured Transactions Under Legacy Systems
The description of secured transactions reform outlined in the previous section does not 
provide any details  of what  a well-functioning collateral  system  involves. Essentially,  a 
secured transactions framework allows borrowers to pledge personal property as security 
for a loan in a manner that removes ambiguity regarding exactly what property has been 
pledged and to whom the property has been pledged, and gives the lender the right to 
repossess these assets speedily in the event of payment default. To function effectively, 
the  costs  involved  in  utilizing  the  system  should  be  low, the  rights  and obligations  of 
all parties to the transaction should be clear, and the procedures to be followed in the 
event of default should occur rapidly, with a minimum recourse to the courts. Successful 
secured  transactions  reform  requires  that each stage be unambiguous  in  the  law and 
that transactions costs of using the system are low. Unfortunately, there have been many 






29  The key is effective modernization. There have been a number of instances of secured transactions reform
that have not  led to  increased  lending, primarily because the reforms were  incomplete or  failed to repeal 
existing laws governing lending. 
30   For example, after New Zealand introduced its Personal Property Securities Act, there was a sharp rise in 
lending, with large numbers of new security interests being registered. In Eastern Europe, particularly Albania 
and Romania, the number of security interests registered rose substantially after the reform.
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• Security	 interest. Security interest is a property right that secures an obligation 
and is central to the pledge, mortgage, and other transactions secured by personal 
property. 
• Attachment. A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable 
against the debtor (the person who gives the security interest). 
• Perfected. A security interest is perfected when the secured lender (the person 
who takes the security interest) may enforce it against third parties such as other 






property. The security interest attaches to the goods and the security interest is 
perfected when the creditor takes possession of the asset.
• Lien: A lien is a right to hold property until an obligation is discharged. A lien 
may arise by agreement of the debtor or by operation of law. Unlike the pledge, 
the property  is not  transferred  for  the purpose of security. For example,  if a TV 
is delivered to a shop for repair, the repair shop may have a lien on the TV until 
payment  is made. Also unlike  the pledge,  there  is  no power  to dispose of  the 
property at common law, though a statute may provide such a power. 
• Mortgage: A mortgage on personal property  is a  transfer of a property  right  to 
the  creditor  entitling  the  creditor  to  foreclose  on  the  right  upon  default,  taking 
possession of the property with a right to convey title. Upon performance by the
debtor, the mortgage right is discharged. 
• Charge: A charge is a property right entitling a creditor to seize an asset upon 
a  condition  (e.g., failure  to  pay  an  obligation).  A  fixed  charge  attaches  when 
an agreement has been made, the creditor gives value to the debtor, and the 
debtor acquires  rights  in  the charged property, whichever occurs  last. Under a 
fixed charge,  the debtor may not dispose of  the charged asset. Fixed charges, 
therefore,  facilitate  equipment  finance  but  are  not  useful  for  inventory  finance, 






• The lender’s rights against third parties.
• What,  if any,  information will be available to the public when someone wants to 
buy collateral or when someone is asked to accept movable property as collateral 
under  another  loan  agreement.  Without  reliable  information,  a  potential  lender 
cannot determine  if  collateral  offered by a potential borrower has already been 
pledged to someone else. 
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2. Essential Elements of a Well-Functioning System of Secured Transactions
While every lender will state that the last thing that they want to do is repossess pledged 
collateral,  the very threat  that  they can do so provides strong  incentives  for borrowers 
to adhere to the terms of loan contracts and to make every effort to repay. The ability of 
borrowers to pledge property at  low cost and for  lenders to take collateral and,  in the 
event of default, repossess it requires a legal framework that provides for the following 
four essential elements.
(i) Creation.  The  law must  define  the  assets  that  are  being  secured,  so  that  a 
property right is created. It must permit clear and low-cost methods for creating 
this security interest on the part of the lender. Secured transactions reform will 
reduce the uncertainty that lenders have in determining whether assets have 
already been pledged.  In general, people should be  free  to secure obligations 
with personal property as they wish, without undue expense and without undue 
legal restrictions and burdens. A simple agreement should be all that is necessary 
to secure an obligation with nearly any form of personal property—tangible and 
intangible property, and present and future-acquired property. The parties may 
agree  that  the  debtor will  remain  in  possession  of  the  collateral  and  that  the 
debtor may (or may not) sell, deal in, or otherwise dispose of the collateral with, 
or without, the knowledge or consent of the creditor. This is important when, say, 
inventory is used as collateral. Typically the debtor will need to sell the inventory 
and purchase new stock, i.e., rotate his or her stock, during the life of the loan. 
The agreement needs to allow inventory to be sold and newly purchased goods 
that move into inventory to become collateral, without the necessity of drawing 
up a new agreement. This procedure  is known as creating a “floating charge” 




which a right will prevail against other claimants to the same property. Secured 
lending is less than secure when previous creditors already have rights in the 
collateral and future creditors could also acquire rights in it. The value of collateral 
is diminished when others may assert claims against it, including judgment 
holders who obtain writs of execution,  tax authorities  that can seize collateral 
based on a tax lien that is unknown to the lender, and bankruptcy trustees.
Further, since the collateral may be sold by the debtor, or otherwise disposed of, 
there must be rules that determine what rights the buyers and other transferees 
acquire  in  the  collateral.  The  rules  should  specify  whose  rights  have  priority 
over the rights of others, and under what circumstances. Secured transactions 
law clarifies  these  issues  in  the  form of priority  rules  that specify  the  rights of 
borrowers, lenders, and third parties under a variety of commercial situations.
(iii) Publicity. The law must provide a practical, effective, and sustainable system for 
publicizing rights so that other potential lenders can determine whether an asset 
has  already  been  pledged  to  somebody  else.  Therefore,  a  system  is  needed 
that publicizes such pledges. It allows the creditor to file a notice that specifies 
the parties to the loan agreement and describes the collateral that has been 
pledged.  In well-functioning modern systems, the publicity merely  indicates,  in 
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an easily searchable database,  that a security  interest exists. Filing,  therefore, 
need not  take on any burdensome formalities and need not be subject  to the 
scrutiny  of  a  state  agency.  The  notice  establishes  a  priority  right  to  collateral 
in  the  event  of  a  dispute  among  creditors  and  other  third  parties,  but  the 
actual status of property rights to collateral are to be found only in the security 
agreement itself.
The notice serves only two purposes. First, it warns prospective creditors and 
buyers of possible prior security interests in the debtor’s property. Second, the 
date of the filing of the notice indicates the date by which competing claims to 







claims are substantially reduced.




possession or control of  the collateral and  to sell or otherwise dispose of  the 
collateral  in an economically efficient manner. A sale may be through public or 
private facilities. Collateral may be disposed of in whole or in part. In appropriate 
circumstances,  the  collateral  may  be  leased  or  licensed.  Regulation  of  the 
creditor’s efforts to obtain value from collateral must be sensitive to the type of 
collateral and the commercial circumstances in which the creditor must act.






secured creditor should have statutory authority to collect on accounts receivable 
that have been pledged as collateral, without judicial permission. Perhaps only in 
the case of a noncooperative debtor in possession of tangible collateral is judicial 
intervention necessary, and then for  the purpose of repossessing the property 
and giving it to the creditor.
If  the  secured  transactions  framework  does  not  account  for  these  requirements, 
then  both  bank  and  nonbank  lenders  will  be  reluctant  to  lend  and  financial  market 
development is hindered. For private lending to serve borrowers’ needs, the legal 
and  institutional  framework  needs  to  assure private  lenders  about  one  thing:  that  the 
borrower will pay. A country’s legal framework for debt collection provides that assurance. 
When the  law  permits  effective  use  of  collateral,  the  risk  from  lending  falls.  Lenders 
react by offering more credit at the same or better terms. More credit at  lower interest 
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rates permits higher rates of  investment and more capital per worker,  leading to much 
higher incomes. 
3. Typical Problems with the Framework for Secured Lending
In  unreformed  systems  for  taking  collateral  against  security  for  loans,  procedures 
frequently  involve  substantial  legal  costs  and  furthermore,  it  is  difficult  to determine  if 
collateral has already been pledged. The main issues are as follow:
• Secured lending is organized around a variety of costly legal forms. Some forms 
are subject to registration and others are not, but registries are cumbersome and 
offer limited useful information, even though much information is typically collected.
• The secured lender’s priority against third parties is not established by registration 




The result  is that the system is costly  for the borrower, enforcement  is expensive, and 
the system is risky for both lenders and borrowers and has an adverse effect on access 
to finance. 
In common law countries, the most commonly used lending mechanisms by creditors 
are as follows:
• The	 company	 charge.  These  are  created  upon  the  registration  of  a  security 
interest at the companies registry.
















31   The countries with  fully  functioning secured  transactions  reform  frameworks are  the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Papua New Guinea and Samoa 




• Secured party name and address is required.
• Debtor name and address is required.
• Collateral is described (can be general or specific) with asset serial numbers where 
required.





it  far easier  for  single or a small number of persons  to  incorporate under a corporate 
umbrella. Special provisions have been included in this legislation which will allow women 
to incorporate easily without the need for expensive legal advice.32 This will allow them 
to also use the new secured transactions framework because they will be able to pledge 
assets as a group rather than as a number of individuals. 
1. Creating Security Interests
Under  reformed  secured  lending  law  in  Pacific  island  economies,  a  security  interest 
attaches to collateral by the same simple rules,33 no matter what the form of transaction.34




at  the  time  of  the  security  agreement  or  acquires  the  property  thereafter.  Collateral 
may be personal property  that becomes fixed by attachment  to or  installation on  real 
property. Collateral may be minerals or timber or other real property that is severable 










companies should assist women in participating in the economy to a much greater extent than in the past. 
33   A  security  interest  attaches  by  (i)  agreement  of  the  parties,  (ii)  when  the  debtor  has  rights  in  collateral, 
and (iii) when secured party gives value to the debtor, whichever occurs last (Vanuatu Personal Property 
Securities Act, S 26; Solomon Islands Secured Transaction Act, S 8).
34   The  parties  may  call  the  agreement  a  pledge,  charge,  hire  purchase,  financial  lease,  or  use  any  other 
terminology, but the effect is the same in each case. An agreement by which the debtor grants a security 
interest in collateral to the secured party has the same effect (Vanuatu Personal Property Securities Act, S 3; 
Solomon Islands Secured Transaction Act, S 3[1][(a]).
62 ADB–OECD Study on Enhancing Financial Accessibility for SMEs
considered as transactions creating security, such as title retention and consignment. 
In other words, the law applies whether the owner of the collateral is the debtor or the 
secured lender.35  For  the purposes of  notice  (registration)  and priority,  even  leasing  is 
subject to the new law.36




registers a notice will have an interest that is junior to the secured lender who has taken 
and maintained possession.




The  reformed  secured  lending  laws  of  Vanuatu  and  Solomon  Islands  change  the 
registration process  in both  form and substance. As  in New Zealand,  registration and 
public  searches of  registry  records  are only  offered by  electronic means,  available  via 
the internet.38 There are no fees and no need to create an account with the registry to 
undertakes searches. All that is required are the name of the debtor, the registration filing 
number, or the asset serial number.






means that registration does not create a security interest or any other property right. 
Registration serves only two purposes: (i) to provide notice to the public to inquire further 
before buying or  taking a security  interest  in property of  the same nature described  in 






accomplished.  Rather than  completing  lengthy  forms,  submitting  copies  of  charge 
documents, and disclosing financial  information on the public  record, notices are kept 
very simple. A notice must contain only the identification of the borrower and lender and 
35  See Vanuatu Personal Property Securities Act, S 10; Solomon Islands Secured Transaction Act, S 3(1)(a).
36  See Vanuatu Personal Property Securities Act, S 3; Solomon Islands Secured Transaction Act, S 3.
37  See Vanuatu Personal Property Securities Act, S 43; Solomon Islands Secured Transaction Act, S 13(b).
38  Vanuatu registry: http://www.ppsr.vu; Solomon Islands registry: http://www.stfosi.com
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with the debtor are undertaken. When a loan agreement is executed, a security interest 
and  priority  will  already  have  been  established  in  the  collateral  under  the  first-to-file 
rule. Furthermore, a notice  is sufficient  to perfect security  interests  in multiple security 




new agreement is made with respect to the same collateral.39
3. Priority of Security Interests
Under the reformed laws of the Pacific island economies, the first to register perfects a 
security interest that has priority over security interests that are not registered or that are 
registered at a later date. 
The rights of secured lenders and buyers are clarified under the new laws. A buyer “in 
the  ordinary  course  of  business”  purchasing  goods  from  a  seller  takes  these  goods
free  of  a  security  interest,  even  if  the  buyer  knows  of  the  security  interest.  The  rule 
protects persons who, for example, buy goods from shops which may be subject to a 





law and traditional law, in each case, is that the priority rules under the new law relate 







D. Results of the Reforms
1. Registration of Security Interests
Figure  17  shows  security  interests  and  searches  in  five  of  the  countries  where 
secured  transactions  reforms have been completed. Secured  loans and searches are 
39 See Vanuatu Personal Property Securities Act, S122; Solomon Islands Secured Transaction Act, S 30(3).
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shown cumulatively, which  indicates  the number of  filings made since  the  reform was 
implemented.40 The  secured  transactions  reforms  have  resulted  in  more  than  27,000 
outstanding secured loans in the region as of 31 December 2013. 
40   The number  of  secured  loans  is  calculated by  adding new security  interests  registered or modified  and 
subtracting  terminations of  security  interests, which occur when  loans are paid off. Cumulative data are 
obtained by adding the total outstanding security interests registered in the previous year.
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searches that did not result in a loan. For every 2.5 searches, there is one secured loan. 
However, it is very likely that a single loan application might have more than one search 
so in reality this ratio is probably smaller.
2. Benefits for Smaller Businesses




in  enhancing  productivity  and  growth  more  generally,  since  the  greatest  benefits  to 
economies generally is less from the number of SMEs that are established and more from 
the expansion of the successful ones. 
3. Lessons from the Reforms
While a significant number of secured loans have been made, banks remain conservative 




• collection concerns more generally.
There  are  other  problems  in  implementing  fully  the  secured  transactions  reforms,  the 
most important of which are as follows:









More  generally,  the  experience  in  the  Pacific  region  points  to  the  importance  of 




can assist both lenders and borrowers.









remains to be done, it is an example to other countries on just how much can be achieved 
in a relatively short space of time. 
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is also made to the Capital Requirements Directive IV package which transposes the 
framework  into European Union  (EU)  law and addresses  the  issue of SME  lending  for 
Europe.  The  discussion  on  the  possible  impacts  of  Basel  III  mainly  draws  from  early 
evaluations  and  forecasts  developed by  countries  and  international institutions.  The 
section is based on the thematic chapter of the 2012 OECD Scoreboard on Financing 
SMEs  and Entrepreneurs, which  analyzed  the  newly  introduced  regulatory  framework 
and its implications for SME and entrepreneurship financing.41 
A. Introduction





in  this  section.  Specific mention  is  being made  of  the Capital  Requirements Directive 
IV  of  the  European  Commission,  transposing  Basel  III  in  European  Union  law,  which 
brought some positive enhancements  in  the  impact  that  the  risk weighting system  for 
assets would have on lending to SMEs. The section also discusses the main arguments 
proposed  in  these  early  evaluations  and  forecasts.  The discussion  also draws on  the 
perspectives of experts  from countries participating  in  the OECD Scoreboard on SME 
and entrepreneurship finance, as collected through a survey on the expected impacts of 
these reforms on access to finance for SMEs and entrepreneurs.







sector to the real economy. Basel III extends and complements Basel II by strengthening 
capital adequacy rules and introducing a new regulatory framework which will apply to 
liquidity management. 
The  rationale  for  these  rules stems  from  the financial  crisis  that began  in 2007, when 
it became apparent that many banks, despite adequate capital levels, experienced 
difficulties because they did not manage their liquidity in a prudent manner. Prior to the
crisis, asset markets were buoyant and  funding was  readily available at  low cost. The 
41 Section based on OECD (2013).
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rapid reversal in market conditions illustrated how quickly liquidity can evaporate and that 
illiquidity can last for an extended period (Bank for International Settlements 2010).
C. The Basic Principles of Basel III




will comprise a minimum common equity requirement, to be phased in by 2015, and a 
capital conservation buffer, to be phased in by 2019.42 
The  risk weights  are parameters  intended  to measure  the  riskiness of  assets  in bank 
portfolios, which, under Basel II, are determined by one of two methods: the standardized 
method  or  the  internal  ratings-based method,  intended  for  use mainly  by  the  largest 
banks. In addition, where national circumstances are believed to warrant it in order to 
protect the financial system against large swings in asset prices, a countercyclical buffer 
of 0.0%–2.5% may be added to the ratio, based on national authorities’ assessment of 
excess credit growth.  In the case of global systemically  important financial  institutions, 
an additional surcharge of 1.0%–2.5% has been proposed. Applicability and the amount 




The Basel Committee introduced transitional arrangements to implement the new 
standards that help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital standards 
through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending 
42   Additional requirements will also apply  for Tier 1 and total  regulatory capital, which  include  lower quality 
types of capital, generally debt with equity-like characteristics. Once core Tier 1 requirements are met these 
seem unlikely to pose difficulties for banks or clients such as SMEs. 














to  the  economy.  To  that  end,  the Basel  III  framework  includes  the  following  phase-in 
provisions for capital ratios: 
• For Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), the highest form of loss-absorbing capital, the 
minimum requirement is raised to 4.5% and will be phased in by 1 January 2015.
• For Tier 1 capital, the minimum requirement is raised to 6.0% and will be phased 
in by 1 January 2015.




• The  additional  2.5% capital conservation buffer above the regulatory minimum 
capital ratios, which must be met with CET1, will be phased in by 1 January 2019.
• The additional loss absorbency requirement  for  global  systemically  important 
financial institutions, which ranges from 1.0% to 3.5%, will be phased in fully by 1 
January 2019. It will be applied as the extension of the capital conservation buffer 
and must be met with CET1.
Banks can meet their ratios by increasing their capital, reducing the average risk weights 
that apply to their assets, or decreasing their total assets, particularly through the sale of 
noncore assets. Given that capital adequacy ratios are to be met by 2019, banks have a 
period allowing them to phase in the Basel III measures and to gradually build up capital 
or divest nonstrategic assets. 
Table 17: Basel III Phase-In Arrangements for Capital Standards (%)








3.500  4.000 4.500   4.500
Capital conservation buffer  0.625  1.250   1.875   2.500
Minimum common equity 
plus capital conservation 
buffer
3.500  4.000 4.500  5.125  5.750   6.375   7.000
Phase-in of deductions 
from CET1*
20.000 40.000 60.000 80.000 100.000 100.000
Minimum Tier 1 capital  4.500  5.500 6.000   6.000
Minimum total capital  8.000   8.000
Minimum total capital plus 
conservation buffer
 8.000  8.625  9.250   9.875  10.500
Capital instruments that 
no longer qualify as non-
core Tier 1 capital or Tier 1 
capital 






Nevertheless, studies undertaken by the European Banking Authority and the Basel 
Committee suggest that most of the big banks have been forced by investors to move 
quickly towards the tighter standards, well ahead of the planned target date. According 
to  the European Banking Authority’s  fourth monitoring  report  published  in September
2013, Europe’s big banks are on track to meet Basel III capital requirements by March 
2014  if  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  is  continued  by  the  EU’s  biggest  42  banks 
(European Banking Authority 2012, Basel Committee 2013c). This, in turn, carries the risk 
of materializing through deleveraging and the reduction of financing to the real economy, 
hampering economic recovery. 
2. Risk-Weighted Assets
There are two ways to determine the value of risk-weighted assets:
• The  standardized  approach  based  on  external  credit  ratings.  Banks  classify 
their exposures to risk according to various asset classes and, where possible, 
establish weights based on the credit rating given to the entity by an external credit 
assessment institution.
• The internal-ratings-based approach, whereby large, sophisticated banks use their 
own internal risk models to determine appropriate minimum capital depending on 
estimates  of  a  loan’s  probability  of  default,  exposure  to  loss,  etc.  This  gives  a 
modest reduction in capital compared to the standardized approach, and risk 
modeling can be expensive.
The standardized approach uses certain predetermined weights depending on the 
entities’ external credit rating. For example, the following weights are used against assets 
that represent claims against corporations and commercial real estate.
Credit rating AAA to AA– A+ to A– BBB+ to B– Below BB– Unrated






complicated and costly internal-ratings-based approach. However, the standardized 
approach depends on the work of the external credit rating agencies which have come 
under scrutiny because of their failure to properly assess risk prior to the financial crisis. 
Some have questioned whether private sector entities, which are dependent on client 
fees and whose accountability is under scrutiny, should be endorsed in this way by the 
regulatory system. 
3. Liquidity Management Rules 
While many banks had adequate capital during the recent financial crisis,  they did not 
have adequate liquidity or cash, or the ability to raise cash quickly. In response, rules 
applying  to  two new measures of  liquidity are being  introduced  to  reinforce  the Basel 
Committee’s 2008 principles  for sound  liquidity  risk management and supervision:  the 
liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio.
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a. Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The  liquidity  coverage  standard  requires banks  to  maintain  an  adequate  level  of 
unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted into cash to meet their 











2015 but  the minimum  requirement will  begin at 60%,  rising  in equal  annual  steps of 
10 percentage points  to  reach 100% on 1 January 2019. This graduated approach  is 





the committee changed  the calculation of  the  liquidity  requirements, known as  run-off 




The committee has also added guidance that a bank may run down its liquidity stockpile 
in a crisis, with the permission of its supervisor (Financial Times 2013a, 2013b). 








4. The Leverage Ratio
The leverage ratio of 3% is a non-risk-weighted supplementary measure to the risk-based 
capital adequacy ratios. The ratio of Tier 1 capital to total,  i.e., unweighted assets, will 
be tested in parallel with the risk-based system with a view to making it binding in 2018, 
based on appropriate review and calibration. If fully implemented, it will provide a simple, 
easy to understand “sanity check” for the results produced by the risk-based framework. 
The  leverage ratio  is an additional  test of capital adequacy to serve as a safety net  to 
protect against problems with risk weightings. It requires a 100% risk-weight treatment of 
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all balance sheet items43 and includes certain off-balance-sheet exposures. The leverage 
ratio effectively acts as a backstop  for highly  levered banks, as it  is  a non-risk-based 
measure that complements the risk-weighted capital requirements. The Basel Committee 
has decided to study the rule’s impact and potential consequences on the economy 
before making it mandatory. 
D. Potential Impact on SME Lending
The purpose of Basel III is to mitigate and possibly avoid future financial crises. It should 
be noted that, at the time of the recent financial crisis, Basel  II had only recently been 
implemented, and not  in all countries. Therefore,  its  rules had never been tested on a 
broad scale in a noncrisis environment. If Basel III is implemented, it could have a positive 
effect on both growth and, as a result, on SME lending. Some argue that SMEs are more 
affected  by  financial  instability  than  large  firms  or  households.  SMEs  are  less  able  to 
hedge against a financial crisis than large firms, and they cannot rely on public safety nets 




more expensive and harder to obtain under Basel III. The real argument is about the 
degree, not the direction” (Elliott 2010). Others are not convinced that this would be so, 
because central banks could always mitigate the higher interest rates.
If the Basel III rules affect enterprise lending, they will affect eurozone enterprises more 
than  United  States  enterprises,  since  eurozone  enterprises  rely  on  banks  for  74%  of 
their  funding  compared  to  24%  for  United  States  enterprises  (Associazione  Bancaria 
Italiana 2011). Problems could arise from the manner in which banks achieve their capital 
adequacy ratios. Either they can increase capital or decrease their risk-weighted assets. 
It might be difficult for some banks to raise capital after the financial crisis, and so they 
might  sell  off  or  reduce  high  risk-weighted  or  nonstrategic  assets  in  order  to  reduce 
their total risk-weighted assets. Thus, they would engage in arbitrage, swapping high 
risk-weighted assets, mainly  lending  to businesses,  for  lower ones  such as  sovereign 
debt, interbank claims, and residential mortgages. It should be noted that this scope 
for  arbitraging  the  risk weights downward  implies  that  there could be no  floor for  the 
minimum capital requirements (Atkinson 2011b).
1. Impact of the Risk-Weighting System
As Basel III carries over the risk-weighting system for assets from Basel II, it retains the 
capital requirements that are sensitive to risk, which, in the initial proposal of the Basel 
Committee, discourage bank  lending  to SMEs as  the risk premium that banks charge 
for SMEs is high. As a result, it exacerbates the well-known financial difficulties of SMEs 
(Cardone-Riportella and Trujillo-Ponce 2007). According to Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 
(2010a,  2010b),  the  initial  proposals  for  capital  reform—the  new  Basel  III—did  not
address the fundamental problems with the risk-weighting approach. Since the particular 
43   This is subject to the qualification that many derivative positions, mainly for banks using the International 





in the past. 







the  standardized  approach,  the  credit  rating  of  the  collateral  or  the  guarantor will  be 
substituted  for  the rating of  the borrower  for  the collateralized portion of  the exposure 
if certain conditions are met. Specifically, the collateral must be marked-to-market and 
revalued every 6 months. Furthermore, there is a 20% floor on the risk weight that has 
been adjusted by using credit  risk mitigation. For example,  if  the SME  loan  is secured 
by a residential property, the risk weight is 35%; if it is secured by commercial business 




amount,  and  term  (Camino and Cardone 1999). The  increase  in guarantee  funds has 
eased SMEs’ access to finance in some countries both during and after the crisis. The 
new  banking  regulation  could  increase  the  use  of  guarantees. Guaranteed  loans  can
be backed by reduced amounts of regulatory capital when compared with those loans 
collateralized by  assets  (financial  or  not).  In  fact,  guarantees  issued by  entities with  a 
lower risk weight than the SME can lead to reduced regulatory capital since the protected 
portion  of  the  SME  exposure  is  assigned  the  risk  weight  of  the  guarantor  and  the 
uncovered portion retains the risk weight of the SME. For example, where the guarantor 
is a sovereign government with a AAA rating, the risk weight for the guaranteed portion 
of  the SME  loan would be zero. However, a  revision  in  these ratings  to  lower  levels  is 
under way in some countries which means that guaranteed SME loans would have to be
backed by increased amounts of capital.
The  question  remains  to what  degree  banks will make  increased  use  of  government 
guarantees as a credit risk mitigation technique. In the past, government guarantees have 
been used as a substitute for collateral and as such partially improved SMEs’ access to 
credit. In countries such as the United States, banks have been reluctant to participate 
in the Small Business Administration’s loan guarantee program, leaving at times large 
amounts  of  guarantee  funds  unused.  This  could  reflect  their  reluctance  in  general  to 
service SMEs even when their risks are reduced by guarantees. Basel III could provide 




an incentive to participate in such programs, since guarantees would serve the additional 
purpose  of  reducing  the  amount  of  capital  a  bank  has  to  hold  against  an  SME  loan 
(Box 2).
However, even with risk mitigation techniques, Basel III still carries over the problems 
of  Basel  II  in  terms  of  risk  weightings.  Previous OECD  analysis  found  that  the  Basel 
risk-weighting  approach  in  fact  encourages  portfolio  concentrations  in  low-weighted 
assets such as government bonds, mortgages, and lending between banks. There is a 
continuing incentive to economize on capital and expand business into lower-weighted 
areas  (Blundell-Wignall  and  Atkinson  2010a,  2010b).  Risk  weighting  for  assets  are
skewed in favor of sovereign debt, which has a risk weighting of 0% (if rated AAA). This 
could generate a crowding-out effect on private loans, as banks are encouraged to lend 






company with a AAA rating. 
In addition, Basel III still relies on the banks’ internal rating systems for the modeling of 
risk for the assets they hold, which results in a significant variability in the way assets are 
weighted. Part of  this variability  reflects genuine differences  in business models and  is 
commensurate with actual exposure to risk, while others suggest that variability could 
be driven by other factors, such as different modeling approaches, as is the case with 
trading assets for example (Bank for International Settlements 2013b). 
Future  policy  work  that  might  consider  narrowing  down  the  modeling  choices  for 
banks,  and  therefore  reduce  variability,  would  address  this  issue  and  would  reflect
the Basel Committee’s  increased  focus on achieving a  regulatory  framework  that  can 
be implemented consistently by supervisors and which achieves comparable levels 
Box 2: Credit Risk Mitigation
By  reducing  the  risk weight attached  to SME  loans, guarantees can  reduce  the amount of 
capital a bank has to hold against these loans. For instance:










of  capital  across  jurisdictions.  It  should be  noted,  however, that  the Basel  framework
in  certain  areas  purposely  allows  for  supervisory  discretion  to  appropriately  reflect 
domestic circumstances.
The Bank Lending Survey undertaken by the European Central Bank  (2011) finds that 
banks were already adjusting their capital position or their risk-weighted asset position 
upon  introduction  of  the  new  regulation  package,  despite  the  long  phase-in  period 
until the targets are actually required to be met. Figure 18 shows that, in 2012, banks 
intended to build their capital position via retained earnings and divest themselves of the
riskier assets.
The  Basel  Committee’s  definition  of  off-balance-sheet  items  includes  open  lines  of 
credit  and  trade credit. Under Basel  II,  such off-balance-sheet  items are currently put
on the balance sheet at 20%. For example, a short-term self-liquidating trade  letter of 





2. European Union Capital Requirements Directive IV and SME Lending
The  EU  has  developed  guidelines  for  the  implementation  of  Basel  III,  which must  be 
approved by its member countries. These guidelines would apply to 8,200 banks and 
investment firms. 
Figure 18: Bank Adjustments Implemented to Meet Basel III, 2011 
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linked to their activities and absorb any losses they may incur in doing business.
Impending restrictions in SME lending resulting from the implementation of Basel III have 















Regulatory scrutiny  is, however,  likely  to continue  to have an  impact on SME  lending, 
particularly in light of the upcoming stress tests by the European Central Bank and the 
in-depth balance sheet reviews as it prepares to take on bank supervision as part of the 
single European supervisory mechanism. 
3. Impact of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
According to liquidity coverage rules, banks must hold sufficient easy-to-sell assets. This 
will increase the cost of business lines that tie up liquid assets, such as payment services 
and foreign trade finance which is low risk (Financial Times 2010b). 
The liquidity coverage ratio could also push banks to hold more sovereign debt (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2010). According to Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010a,




Furthermore, according to the liquidity coverage ratio standard, banks must hold liquid 
assets equal to 100% of undrawn lines of credit that are used for liquidity purposes; 100% 
liquidity coverage for revolving credit could make this  facility more expensive  (Financial 
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Times  2010a).  Business  representatives  in  different  countries  expressed  the  business 
community’s concern that liquidity issues will force banks to be more restrictive in terms 
of credit (Financial Times 2010a, Associazione Bancaria Italiana 2011).






4.  The Debate at the National Level: Perspectives from Countries  






finance. While  the sample  for  this survey was  relatively small,  its  findings nevertheless 
shed light on the potential effects of Basel III on SME lending in the countries monitored.
While  some experts  expected  little  or  even  a positive  impact  on SME  lending,  others 
foresaw  more  severe  effects,  particularly  on  SMEs  which  are  heavily  indebted  or 
dependent on bank credit. There was some expectation that the negative effects might 
be  attenuated by  a  number of  factors or would gradually  dissipate.  For  example,  the 






to their customers. One country expert believed that commercial banks would continue 
to lend to SMEs because margins were higher than on loans to large enterprises. Finally, 
some experts stated that their banks were well capitalized and already met the core Tier 1 
capital ratio, so that any deposit-taking institutions that needed to raise more capital 















taking the allowed 8 years to meet requirements, banks seem to be competing with 
each other to boost capital and liquidity, possibly in order to retain a good credit rating. 
Accumulating reserves in the midst of a weak recovery, when bankruptcies are still rising 
in  some  countries,  could  have  negative  impacts  on  the  growth  of  the  real  economy 




development of nonbank  lending channels, thus  improving the  impact of new rules on 
lending (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 2011).
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2.3. Sustainable Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs
2.3.1.  Sustainable Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs:  
Lessons from Asia
Shigehiro Shinozaki45
Credit guarantees are a popular  tool  for  improving SME access  to finance  in  line with 
national  SME  development  policies  and  poverty  reduction  strategies.  In  Asia,  credit 
guarantees are provided by specialized institutions—either partially sponsored or 
fully  owned  by  the  government—and  target  SMEs  as  main  clients,  including  female 







discusses  the benefits and challenges  regarding credit guarantees  in supporting SME 
access to finance sustainably.
A. Introduction
In Asia, credit guarantees are mostly provided by specialized institutions—either partially 
sponsored or fully owned by the government—and target SMEs as main clients, including 
female  entrepreneurs  and  agri-businesses.  There  are  two  critical  reasons  behind  this 





institutions in Asia. 
Going  back  to  the  basics,  credit  guarantees  have  four  fundamental  functions: 
(i) standardized operations, (ii) continuity of services, (iii) fee business (not gratuitous), and 
(iv) supplementary business to debt financing. Considering these functions, sophisticated 
institutional  arrangements  are  needed  for  guarantee  services  to  effectively  reach  out 
to  end users.  In particular,  the guarantee  industry  cannot be  formed as a  standalone 
business;  the  provision  of  loans  or  other  debt  financing  is  a  precondition  for  doing 
guarantee business. The quality of loan assets seriously affects the performance of credit 
guarantees. Thus, the issue of how to cope with backing SME loan assets is also key for 
designing a sustainable credit guarantee scheme.
Lessons from the recent and past financial crises have motivated countries to develop 
various  guarantee  products  and  services  in  Asia,  adjusting  them  to  specific  country 




credit  guarantees  are  playing  an  important  role  in  filling  the  SME  financing  gap  in 
Asia.  At  the  same  time,  credit  guarantees  open  the  door  for  a  debate  on  potentially 
negative effects.
B. Credit Guarantee Systems in Asia
Table 18 summarizes the credit guarantee systems in selected Asian economies, 
which  was  extracted  from  the  data  compiled  by  the  Asian  Credit  Supplementation 
Institution  Confederation  (ACSIC).  Credit  guarantees  have  mostly  been  provided 
by  specialized  public  institutions,  except  for  Sri  Lanka where  the  central  bank  takes 
a  role  of  guarantor.  Guarantee  programs  mainly  target  micro,  small,  and  medium-
sized  enterprises  (MSMEs)  as  beneficiaries,  and  often  focus  on  particular  segments 




countries, where risk-sharing arrangements (partial guarantee schemes) between 
guarantee  institutions  and  financial  institutions  are  relatively well-established.  Even  in 
that  case,  however,  financial  institutions  are  typically  requiring  real  estate  security  as 
collateral for loans to cover their remaining credit risks. Credit guarantee systems have 
been centralized in most Asian economies, while some countries such as Indonesia 
are seeking to develop regional guarantee systems through newly established local 
guarantee  institutions,  given  that  guarantee  benefits  are  effectively  reaching  rural 
SMEs. At present, reguarantee systems (credit insurance) have yet to be established in 
emerging Asia.




the Republic  of  Korea  (6.2%);46  and  Taipei,China  (4.0%).  In  other  Asian  economies—
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand—guaranteed 
liabilities accounted for around 1% or less. Meanwhile, guaranteed liabilities in advanced 
non-Asian  economies—represented  by  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and the United States—accounted for 0.5% of GDP on average. Although the scale of
guarantees provided varies by country, credit guarantees have been actively granted to 
enterprises in several Asian economies.
The  increased  trend of guarantee provision  in Asia was  identified, but SME access  to 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































economies had access to guarantees. This suggests that the credit guarantee industry in 
emerging Asia still has room to expand its outreach to more MSMEs.
Figure 20 shows the net profit and loss ratio of selected credit guarantee institutions in 
Asia, which was calculated at  the ratio defined as  total  revenues of  recovery amounts 





Taipei,China  showed  less  than  100%,  or  have  unprofitable  guarantee  businesses.  In 
other words, the findings suggest that guarantee business is profitable in emerging Asian 
economies  and  not  profitable  in  advanced Asian  economies  and  the  economies  that
provide  large  volumes of  guarantees  for  enterprises,  especially MSMEs.  This  explains 
why guarantee operations for MSMEs are so difficult. Because the guarantee business is 
closely aligned with national SME policies in emerging Asian economies, these economies 
will be obliged  to provide more guarantees  for MSMEs; on  the other hand,  they need 
Figure 19: SME Access to Guarantee in Selected Asian Economies




Foundations;  KOTEC  = Korea  Technology  Finance  Corporation;  NFCGC  =  National  Federation  of 
Credit Guarantee Corporations; PKPI = Penjamin Kredit Pengusaha  Indonesia; SBC = Small Business 
Corporation;  SME  =  small  and  medium-sized  enterprise,  [Taipei,China]  SMEG  =  Small  and  Medium 
Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund of [Taipei,China]; TCG = Thai Credit Guarantee Corporation. 
* calculated based on the amount of guarantees accepted.
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Figure 20: Net Profit and Loss of Credit Guarantee Institutions



















Source: Restructured data from ACSIC. 2012. The 25th Anniversary Publication of ACSIC – The 25-year 
History of ACSIC.
to secure sufficient  funds for business and enhance profitability  further  from guarantee 
business so as to ensure sustainable guarantee services reach MSMEs. 
D. National Efforts to Develop Credit Guarantee Systems






The credit  guarantee  system  in  Indonesia  is  twofold:  (i)  central  guarantors  comprising 
Askrindo, Jamkrindo, and PKPI; and (ii) regional guarantors comprising four institutions 
located  in  East  Java,  Bali,  Riau,  and  West  Nusa  Tenggara.  Askrindo  was  originally 
established as a state-owned insurance company in 1971, and concentrated on 
a  guarantee  business  to  SMEs from  the  beginning  until  1995.  However,  Askrindo 
experienced bankruptcy twice—in 1985 and 1994—and restarted its business in 1995 
with  diversified  guarantee  products  and  services,  such  as  trade  credit  insurance,  the 
letter-of-credit guarantee, customs bond, surety bond, and guarantees to nonbank loans, 
so as to hedge risks associated with the credit guarantee business to SMEs. Jamkrindo, 
which has changed its name several times, was established as a state-owned credit 
guarantee institution in 1970. PKPI was established as a private-led guarantor in 1995. 
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With  a  strong  government  initiative  as  part  of national  MSME  sector  development 






The  credit  guarantee  regulation  allows  the CGC  to  choose  a  legal  form  from  various 
options—public company, limited liability company, regional company, incorporated 
company,  or  cooperative—and  accordingly  cope  with  guarantees  for  SME  loans, 
consumer loans, or cooperative loans. The statutory requirement of minimum capital is 












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
SME credit CB credit















2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012/May












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
SME credit CB credit















2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012/May
KUR Annual distribution (left) No. of KUR debtor (right)
SME Loans Outstanding and Nonperforming Loans








The  Indonesian  Capital  Market  Financial  Institution  Supervisory  Agency  (Bapepam-
LK)  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance  regulated  and  supervised  credit  guarantee
institutions but its role as a nonbank regulator was merged into the newly established 
Financial  Services  Authority  (OJK)  in  January  2013.  There  is  the  government  credit 
guarantee  scheme,  People’s  Business  Credit  (KUR),  started  in  late  2007.  KUR  is
provided  by  four  designated  CGCs  (Askrindo,  Jamkrindo,  and  two  regional  CGCs) 
through  22  executing  banks,  targeting  new  customers  to  banks,  with  70%  partial




(i) programs handled by the Small Business Corporation, and (ii) the Credit Surety Fund 
Program organized by the central bank (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas). The Small Business 
Corporation is a state-owned executing agency for MSME development policies, originally
created by the Republic Act 6977 (amended by RA8289/1997 and RA9501/2008)—
Magna  Carta  for  MSMEs—in  1991.  The  corporation’s  guarantee  programs,  as  part 
of  its MSME support  operations,  provide  70% partial  guarantee  for  collateralized  and 
noncollateralized loans to registered MSMEs at least 60% owned by Filipinos, excluding 





The  Credit  Surety  Fund  Program,  providing  80%  partial guarantee,  is  a  central 
bank  initiative  responding  to  the Magna Carta, which  has  been mainly  sponsored  by 
cooperatives  and  local  governments  (19  provinces  and  seven  cities  so  far)  through 
agreements, and supervised by an oversight committee comprising members elected 
by the fund contributors. Besides guarantee  initiatives,  the Magna Carta stipulates the 
mandatory  lending  for MSMEs, which  requires banks  to set aside 8% of  their  lending 
portfolios for micro and small enterprises and 2% for medium-sized enterprises.
 3. Sri Lanka




and  the  remaining five are directly sponsored by  the government. CGSs are  targeting 
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year.  The PGS  is  a  special measure with  a  limited  period  of  5–7  years.  This  scheme 
was  also  utilized  during  the  severe  flooding  in  2011.  Guaranteed  loans  outstanding, 
with continuous increase, accounted for B180 billion with 59,469 letters of guarantee in 
2012 (Figure 22).47 Newly approved guarantees have been rapidly expanding since the 
introduction of the PGS in 2009.






Conceptually, credit guarantees are expected to  (i) fill  the supply–demand gap  in SME 
finance,  (ii)  lower  funding  costs  for  SMEs,  (iii)  alleviate  financing  constraints  for  SMEs 
by  partially  or  fully  releasing  them  from  collateral  requirements, and  (iv)  respond  in  a 
timely fashion to external shocks such as a financial crisis. In addition, credit guarantees 
can reduce social opportunity costs—by increasing outreach to the underserved—and 
contribute to (i) mobilizing SME savings for investment, (ii) increasing the survival rate of 
SMEs, (iii) providing growth opportunities, and (iv) promoting a resilient national economic 








the guarantee provision  since credit  guarantees may  tempt malicious SME borrowers 




prolonged through guaranteed loans. In other words, credit guarantees will not rescue 





mostly public entities in Asia.
47   The TCG’s guarantee operations are based on the Small Industry Credit Guarantee Corporation Act B.E.2534 
(1991), which does not allow the TCG to directly provide guarantee for SMEs. Bank’s credit approval is a 
precondition for granting guarantee.
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(ii) institutional arrangements, developing reguarantees, partial guarantees, and 
second credit screenings by CGCs to hedge against risks associated with the 
guarantee business;
(iii) decentralization, promoting regional guarantee schemes with a proper regulatory 
and supervisory framework to expand guarantee availability for SMEs; 
(iv) innovative product design, managing associated risks with credit guarantees; 
and 




It is crucial to adequately balance government intervention with private-led guarantee 
business  in  terms of sustainability. A public–private partnership  to develop sustainable 
guarantee schemes is worth exploring. To this end, CGCs are required to address any 
aspect to survive, e.g., cost efficiency, profitability, product design, and self-funding, while 
the  government  prepares  the  exit  strategy of  a  public  guarantee  regime  from a  long-
term vision. However, it should be noted that the role of public credit guarantees will not 
disappear even if the private-led guarantee industry  is developed. The public schemes 
still help  increase outreach  to  the  traditionally underserved,  including MSMEs, and are 
able  to  respond  in a  timely  fashion  to external shocks such as a financial crisis and a 
natural disaster, in which the banking sector may be damaged as well.









For innovation,  CGCs  should  elaborate  diversified,  demand-driven,  and  risk-based 
products and services—such as credit insurance, trade credit guarantee, thematic 




professionals, e.g., a  “servicer”  for debt collection; and  (iii)  legal  infrastructure such as 
the regulatory and supervisory  framework to support  the development of a private-led 
guarantee industry with close collaboration between central and local governments.
Lastly, financial literacy is a key element in developing the guarantee industry. Knowledge 
gained through networking and peer learning among CGCs is critically important to the 
design and delivery of viable products and services  to MSMEs. Capacity building and 





Because  of  the  strong  public  nature  of  credit  guarantees,  business  sustainability  is  a 
critical concern. Balancing government intervention with a private-led guarantee industry 
is needed. Innovation and technology are key to developing demand-driven and risk-
based credit guarantee products. SME data infrastructure is also crucial to establishing 
a  sustainable  credit  guarantee  system  at  the  national  level.  Such  data  infrastructure 




innovative products, given the industry’s public nature in Asia.
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2.3.2  Sustainable Credit Guarantee Schemes for SMEs:  






eligibility criteria, guarantee assignment process, and credit risk management. The section 
shows that public guarantee schemes are widespread across OECD and non-OECD 












guarantee  schemes,  through  funding  or  coguarantees  has  triggered  greater  demand
for  monitoring  and  evaluation.  This  demand  concerns  in  particular  the  effectiveness 
and sustainability of credit guarantee policies  in stormy fiscal  times. At  the same time, 












This section  illustrates  the evidence on expansion of CGSs  in OECD countries,  taking 
into account both public schemes and private or public–private schemes. Structural 
and  emerging  challenges  for  the  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  these  schemes  in 
48 Section based on OECD (2012).
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the postcrisis environment are highlighted, drawing some key  lessons  from the OECD 
experience in sustaining SME financing through guarantees.
B.  Credit Guarantee Schemes across OECD Countries:  







collateral, this eventually results in a partial or negative response to the credit demand. 
The credit guarantee mechanism  is a commonly used  response  to  this market  failure. 
By protecting a part of the requested loan with a guarantee, the CGS reduces the risk 





There  exists  a wide  variety  of  designs  and  types  of  CGSs,  within  and  across OECD 
countries. The government plays an important role in its function as regulator of financial 
markets, but can also play a direct role in the guarantee schemes by providing financial 
support, participating in their management, or, indirectly, by granting counterguarantees 
whereby the government takes over the risk from the guarantor up to a predefined share 
of the guarantee.
Depending  on  the  ownership  structure  and  role  of  shareholders  in  the  management 










In other cases, the public guarantee services are delivered through private legal entities 
started on public initiative and with majority participation by public entities.
Privately  funded  schemes  and  mixed  models,  which  are  characterized  by  the  direct 




An  interesting model of private or mixed scheme  in OECD countries  is  that of mutual 
guarantee schemes  (MGSs), which,  in some  instances,  represent a  large share of  the 
guarantee market. MGSs  are  private  societies  created  by  borrowers  to  improve  their 
access  to  finance  and  are  predominantly  found  in  Europe  and South  America.  They 
are characterized by strong ties with the local community and territorial system and, 
often, member firms operate in a specific sector or value chain. This provides a specific 
information  advantage  to  the  schemes,  which  are  in  fact  commonly  active  in  credit 







Governments and  local authorities define the regulatory and  legal  framework and may 
provide  financial  support  to  MGSs,  mainly  in  the  form  of  counterguarantees.  These 
enhance  the guaranteed  credit  volume  that  can be made  available  to SMEs  (i.e.,  the 
leverage ratio), as well as the credibility and reputation of the schemes. 
In countries with well-established mutual schemes, a multilayered guarantee structure 
is commonly observed or is emerging in response to changes in the regulatory and 
competitive  environment.  There  are  local  schemes  that  benefit  from  close  proximity
to  firms  and  local  financial  institutions;  larger  regional  schemes  that provide  co-  and 
counterguarantees to the first-tier schemes; and the government, which plays a key role 
as guarantor of  last  resort,  through a central  guarantee  fund. This  is  the case  in  Italy 









C. The Role of Credit Guarantee Schemes during the Global Financial Crisis
PGSs and support to MGSs have significantly expanded in the aftermath of the 2008/09 
financial crisis. In many OECD countries, existing loan guarantee programs were ramped
up  in  terms  of  the  total  amount  of  guarantee  funds  and  direct  lending  available,  the 
percentage of  the  loan guaranteed,  the size of  the guaranteed or direct  loan, and  the 
49   MGSs can be classified into institutions with direct and indirect mutuality.  In the case of direct mutuality, 
the  schemes  are  capitalized by  the  contribution of member  firms, which  take on  joint  responsibility  for 
outstanding credits and are directly involved in the management. To be eligible for support, firms generally 
have to be members of the institution.
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number of eligible enterprises. In other countries, new programs were introduced or new 
instruments were created outside the traditional guarantee programs.
Table 19  illustrates  the  trend  in  government  guarantee  support  during 2007–2011  for 













In 2011–2012, in some countries, as crisis measures were phased out and new programs 
introduced to foster growth and job creation, some guarantee instruments were tailored 
to  specific  categories  of SMEs,  such  as  start-ups or  innovative  firms.  In  other  cases,
guarantee schemes were introduced to support equity investments, addressing, among 
other objectives, the need for deleveraging firms and supporting them in key transitions, 
such as expansion or ownership transmission.
D.  Effectiveness and Sustainability of Credit Guarantee Schemes  
in the Postcrisis Environment
The countercyclical use of CGSs to offset SME financial distress, through direct funding 
or counterguarantees, has implied, in many instances, an important change in their scale 
and scope. Evidence shows that CGSs have been effective in mobilizing large amounts 
of credit and easing access to finance for a larger number of enterprises. This, however, 
has substantially increased their exposure to risk, which may threaten their soundness 
over the medium to long term.
Also  in the case of mutual schemes, the countercyclical expansion has brought about 
an important change in scale and greater exposure to risk. This change is taking place 
in conjunction with the ongoing transformation induced by regulatory reforms, such as 
Basel  III. The greater complexity of  the environment has  further  increased the need to 
upgrade the organizational efficiency and skill level of these schemes.
In several instances, the response to these challenges has been a change in scale, with 
mergers or consolidation. This can help reduce the relative costs of the service, as well as 
broaden the offer of guarantee instruments, which may respond to differentiated needs in 
the target population, including expansion, internationalization, or ownership changes. At 
the same time, a trade-off is emerging between efficient scale and proximity to borrowers, 
which  historically  has  been  the  competitive  advantage  of  MGSs.  In  some  countries, 
this has been addressed by accelerating the rationalization of guarantee provision  into 
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Table 19: Government-Guaranteed Loans in Selected OECD Countries, 2007–2011
Country Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Definition













2,959 5,094 9,550 10,070 630 Government loan 
guarantees, SMEs, value of 
guarantee fund
Denmark DKr million 130.5 93.8 117.8 515.6 824.8 Government-guaranteed 
loans to SMEs 




381,400 436,400 600,300 472,019 437,200 Government-guaranteed 
loans to SMEs, flows





W trillion 39.7 42.9 56.3 56.1 55.5 Value of loans guaranteed 
by KODIT and KIBO, 
stocks 
Netherlands € million 409 400 370 945 1,040 Government-guaranteed 
loans to SMEs






€ million 115 157 143 139 167 Government-guaranteed 
loans to SMEs, flows
Spaina € million 5,210 7,053 5,906 7,236 7,502 Government-guaranteed 
loans to SMEs, stocks
Sweden SKr million 157 131 107 0b 0b Government-guaranteed 
loans, by Swedish Credit 
Guarantee Association
Turkey Turkish lira 
million 









$ billion 20.6 16.1 15.4 22.5 18.7 Government-guaranteed 
loans, SMEs, by the Small 







a  strong  credit  guarantee  chain  scheme, which  includes  (i)  first-tier  schemes  that  are
close to the firms and the local systems; (ii) second-tier regional or intersector schemes, 
which provide mainly counterguarantees; and (iii) a well-established national guarantee 
fund and, in the case of European countries, a supranational counterguarantee fund. The 
experience of each  individual system  is unique and difficult  to  replicate  in other areas. 




















A  major  challenge  for  additionality  of  CGSs  comes  from  selection  mechanisms,  the 
importance of which  largely depends on  the design of  the scheme. The first selection 
mechanism  concerns  the  type  of  firms  which  seek  guaranteed  loans.  As  financial 
conditions of guaranteed credits are generally more favorable than ordinary loan contracts, 




by borrowers and lenders (moral hazard).
A second selection mechanism that may reduce additionality takes place at the level 
of  the  lending  institutions, as  they may have an  incentive  to  transfer  regular credits  to 
the program so as  to  reduce  the overall  risk of  their  outstanding credits. Additionality 
may also be reduced by “interlender substitution”, i.e., by established borrowers shifting 
their demand towards lending institutions that are linked to guarantee schemes, whose 
observed uptake would thus not reflect services to other credit-constrained companies 
(Vogel and Adams 1997).
Bank Lending Efficiency 99
The  design  of  the  scheme  is  crucial  to  governing  the  selection mechanisms  and  the 
incentives of borrowers and  lenders.  In particular,  the  following risk management tools 
may have a distinct impact on additionality, as well as on sustainability:
• Credit risk assessment. Retail appraisal and close follow-up by the guarantor may 






• Eligibility	 for	 CGSs. In an attempt to maximize additionality, some schemes 
restrict eligibility to those firms which have been denied credits on regular financial 
markets.  In  some cases,  additionality  is  sought by narrowly defining  the  target 
of the program, which may be a sector or specific categories of firms for which 
severe market  failures were  identified. However, overly  restrictive schemes bear
the risk  that credits are artificially modified to fit  formal  requirements  (Vogel and 
Adams 1997). 
• The price of guarantees. CGSs need to strike a balance between financial returns 
and attracting viable customers. While high fees may increase operating budgets, 
they may  also discourage  creditworthy  firms  from applying  for  guarantees  and 
reduce  the overall  uptake of  the scheme, and hence  impact on  its capacity  to 
leverage the equity fund.
Despite  the  increasing  demand  for  evaluation,  assessment  evidence  on  CGSs  is  at 
present  rather  scarce. There  is  a need  for more  in-depth evaluation at  the micro and 
macro  levels,  to  assess  the  overall  welfare  implications  of  guarantee  systems.  More 
investigation  is  needed  on  the multidimensional  aspects  of  credit  guarantee  systems, 
which take into account direct and indirect costs and benefits. Full assessment demands 
that financial sustainability and additionality are jointly taken into account, and that CGSs 
are evaluated against alternative policy instruments. For this purpose, it is necessary to 
improve  the availability of data at  the  level of  the firm and  the scheme.  In  the case of 
PGSs that are run by public agencies which may have several programs  in place, this 
requires an accounting approach which accurately records expenditures and incomes of 
the schemes on a regular basis. 
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2.4. Trade Finance and Supply Chain Finance for SMEs
Steven Beck and Sunniya Durrani-Jamal50


















(post-acceptance finance),  the supplier sends an  invoice to the buyer which the buyer 
approves in a supply chain finance platform, on an irrevocable basis. Once approved, the 
supplier is able to sell the invoice (i.e., asset-based finance) to a financier.






cash even just 30 days earlier  could make a  substantial difference; companies would 
have a steady flow of working capital to maintain production capacity, process new and 
existing orders, retain staff, and ultimately expand operations and employ more people.




(iii) how ADB’s Trade Finance Program closes these gaps; 
50   Steven Beck  is  head of  trade  finance,  and Sunniya Durrani-Jamal  is  senior  economist with  the Private 
Sector Operations Department of ADB.
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(iv) ADB’s  work  to  close  a  knowledge  gap,  which  includes  informing  policy  and
regulations governing trade finance, including Basel III; 
(v) the benefits and challenges associated with supply chain finance; 
(vi) ADB’s new Supply Chain Finance Program; and 
(vii) other products that can be developed to meet niche financing requirements of 
SMEs.
B. Demand for Trade Finance and Supply Chain Finance









may  have  had  increased  trouble  accessing  sufficient finance,  which  could  ultimately 
threaten the flow of supply to large firms. As such, in addition to supporting SMEs, supply 
chain finance can also be an integral part of securing the supply chain over the long run. 
This realization has also increased demand.
Notwithstanding these factors heightening demand for trade and supply chain finance in 
challenging times, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence supporting the view that SMEs—




banks, and other public institutions providing loans and guarantees to support trade and 
supply chains.
C. The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade Finance in Asia
In Asia  the  relative health of commercial banks  (that strengthened after 1997) and  the 
rising tide of intraregional trade protected it in a rather limited way from the ill effects of 
the crisis, and for a limited period. 
Banks  in  Asia’s  emerging  markets  (the  People’s  Republic  of  China  [PRC],  India,  the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) are more integrated into the global financial 








they did not know which institution would go bankrupt next; the interbank market was 
shut. This overreliance on one currency poses risks to the international trade system, as 
has been seen at various intervals during the crisis. Interest in the renminbi as a potential 
alternative settlement currency rose as a result.
Another  important  impact  of  the  crisis  that  hit  Asia  was  the  inability  to  get  payment 
obligations  from  banks  (such  as  letters  of  credit)  guaranteed.  These  guarantees  are 
critical to trade. The fact that most Asian banks were not in jeopardy and were in much 
better condition than US and European banks was lost. Trust and confidence in financial 
institutions  everywhere  evaporated  at  the  height  of  the  crisis,  so  did  the  interbank 
system of guarantees that are so important to trade. But even in the best of times, and 
notwithstanding crisis, banks in countries where ADB’s Trade Finance Program operates 
have trouble securing guarantees, hence the existence of persistent market gaps.
Pricing  for  trade  finance doubled  and  fluctuated wildly  during  the  height  of  the  crisis, 
including for imports to Asia (required for export production).
Much of Asia was, and to a lesser extent remains, dependent on export markets in the 
US and Europe. As a  result  of  the crisis,  and ensuing  recessions  in  traditional  export 
markets, many Western buyers were performing poorly or going bankrupt. This resulted 
in a considerable rise in nonperforming loans in many export-dependent Asian developing 
countries and this has had an adverse impact on Asia’s banking sector.
The main point here is that while Asia’s finance sector was generally healthy, it was not 
immune  to significant weaknesses  in  the West’s financial system. Notwithstanding  the 
general health of Asia’s financial system, at the height of the crisis the ability of banks to
provide Asian companies with finance to support trade was severely impaired.
D. Market Size and Market Gaps 
One thing that became clear during Trade Finance Expert Group meetings convened by 





















There  are many  reasons  for  the gaps  in  trade  finance. With  respect  to  the  regulatory 
environment, Basel is one contributing factor, but another is anti-money-laundering and
know-your-client requirements. Following the terrorist attack on 9 September 2001 in the 
US, a plethora of strict anti-money-laundering and know-your-client requirements have 





countries or do not bother going into developing markets. As such, banks are increasingly 
unable to provide the guarantees that are so important to trade with emerging markets. 
This  contributes  to  the  trade  finance  gap.  Even  after  the  financial  crisis,  this  lack  of 






enterprises  in  bank  portfolios.  These  elements  mean  that  risk  management  units  in 
financial  institutions around  the world are  reluctant  to agree  to credit  limits  that would 
result  in  the provision of bank-to-bank guarantees  (and funding)  to support  trade. The 
Trade Finance Program provides technical assistance and feedback on annual reviews 






chain  finance  and  to  understand  what  impact  this  gap  has  on  growth  and  jobs.  By 
continuing to conduct these studies ADB hopes to establish trends in gaps to facilitate an 
understanding and to underpin interventions to narrow gaps.
E. ADB’s Response to the Trade Finance Gap
ADB’s Trade Finance Program plays an important role in closing gaps for trade finance. 
The program does this by providing guarantees and loans within 24 hours at market rates 







than 8,300 transactions (Figure 24).
Because  demand  exceeded  the  financial  capabilities  of  the  Trade  Finance  Program, 
a  strategy of  focusing where gaps were proportionally  the  largest was developed,  in 





been  implemented  (Myanmar will be the 19th market  in which the program operates, 
hopefully  by  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  2014),  more than  90%  of the  program’s 
portfolio  has  been  in  Asian  Development  Fund  countries.  The  six  largest  markets 







(Figure 25). Given the  importance of  this market segment  in  job creation, and the  fact
that gaps disproportionately involve SMEs, it is important that the Trade Finance Program 
provides this support.
Figure 24: Growth of Supported Transactions, 2004–2013
























Another  important  element  of  the  Trade  Finance  Program  has  been  leverage  of  its
finite resources by bringing  in cofinancing partners.  In addition to the risk assumed by 
commercial bank partners, risk distribution agreements under the Trade Finance Program 
were signed with the Export Finance and Insurance Company from Australia (Australia’s 
official export credit agency), the Dutch development finance institution (FMO), the OPEC 













comfort  and brings  the private  sector  into Trade Finance Program  transactions  in  the 






gaps growing,  fuelled by political,  economic,  and  regulatory  uncertainties,  it  does not 
Figure 25: Transactions Supporting SMEs in Trade
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Trade transactions Intraregional trade SMEs supported
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Source: ADB Trade Finance Program.
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seem likely any time soon. That said, ADB needs to keep this overall objective in view, to 
ensure the private sector is drawn in as much as possible.
G. Knowledge Dissemination is a Priority
In addition to the transactions done under the Trade Finance Program, there has been 
knowledge dissemination, which delivers tangible and measurable results in closing 
market gaps. Trade Finance Program personnel talk to banks and insurers regularly, 
including their risk management departments, to share the program’s experience in 
markets of operation. This has resulted in the private sector establishing limits for new 
markets  to support  trade.  Information  is critical  to closing private sector market gaps, 
but it has been in short supply. Through its study on market gaps, and its systematic 
“knowledge  dissemination”  discussions  with  banks  and  insurers,  the  Trade  Finance 
Program has closed financing gaps by closing knowledge gaps.
H. Trade Finance Register: An Important Tool to Assess Trade Finance Risk
In an effort to give statistical weight to the argument that trade finance carries a relatively 
low probability of  loss,  the Trade Finance Program proposed  for  the first  time to  track 
default and loss rates in trade finance at a global level. This initiative was named the Trade 
Finance Register and was housed at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The 




latest  report,  the  default  rate  on  trade  finance was  identified  at  0.05% on more  than 
11  million  trade  finance  transactions.  These  statistics  have  been  discussed  with  the 




closely with the ICC and its sister multilateral development banks to provide data that will 
contribute to broader, deeper, and ongoing register reports.









are  one  potential  large  pool  that  should  be  attracted  to  trade  finance.  The  register’s 
statistical work will help provide potential  investors with the  information they require to 
enter  the  trade  finance  business,  still  a  little-known  and  little-understood  business  in
capital markets and investor circles.
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ADB and  the Trade Finance Program exist:  to be first movers  into new and uncertain 
markets,  to  fill  financing  gaps  for  economic  growth,  to  provide  technical  assistance 
to upgrade skills in the public and private sectors, and to create structures (including 




process  in  itself  has  been  extremely  important  in  delivering  significant development 
impact  in Myanmar.  First, most  of  the Myanmar  banks  have  never  been  through  this 
kind of process, so what they learned (what kind of information ADB requires, how the 
information needs  to be  reported)  is very valuable. Working with ADB’s Trade Finance
Program through this process will help Myanmar’s new private banks understand what 
potential correspondent banks, international investors, and (over time) rating agencies 
will  require.  The  open  and  frank feedback  from  the  Trade  Finance Program  about  its 
assessment  of  the  banks  has  enhanced  this  learning  process, which  is  so  important 
at  this  stage  of  Myanmar’s  development.  Second,  the  Trade  Finance  Program  talks 
with  the Central  Bank  of Myanmar  about  its  due  diligence methodology  and  findings 
are  providing  important  information  and  learning  opportunities  for  bank  regulators.
Third, the due diligence process was critical for ADB to gain a better understanding of 
the banking system and individual banks in that market. Equally importantly, the Trade 
Finance Program is now able to share what is learned from the due diligence process with 
partners around the world. There is a thirst for knowledge about Myanmar and the due 
diligence process has provided important insight that can be shared. This is the beginning 
of a process to bring the international financial community to Myanmar and will serve to 
close gaps for trade finance in that country.
In  addition,  the Trade Finance Program conducted  training  seminars on  trade  finance 
for bankers  in Yangon  in 2013. This  form of  technical  assistance  is  very  important  to 
Myanmar at this stage. It will help bankers deliver trade finance services to companies and 
will mitigate the program risk in dealing with Myanmar banks in trade finance transactions.
J. Boosting South–South Trade
It has become trendy to talk about the promise of South–South trade in creating economic
growth and jobs. There is no doubt that the opportunities are enormous, but to realize 
its full potential there needs to be more points of contact and more relationships among 
banks to underpin more trade. With the exception of a few global banks with a presence 






In an effort  to  resolve  this  impediment  to  realizing more South–South  trade, work has 
been undertaken under the Trade Finance Program with the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the IDB’s trade finance program
has been actively introduced to Asian banks to encourage them to sign up to IDB’s 
trade finance. In turn, the IDB has encouraged Latin American banks to  join the Trade 
Finance Program so that the program can provide guarantees to these banks covering 
payment  obligations  from  Asian  banks  to  support  South–South  trade.  In  addition  to 
covering  transactions,  by  having  banks  from  both  continents  in  the  respective  trade 
finance programs, both institutions will facilitate the establishment of direct relationships 
between banks on both continents. 
The AfDB has implemented a trade finance program, which has been modeled after ADB’s 
Trade Finance Program. ADB worked closely  to support  the  implementation of AfDB’s 
program and provided Trade Finance Program operations manuals, legal documentation, 
and training. The intention is to “swap” banks with the AfDB’s trade finance program, as 
has been initiated with the IDB.
1. ADB’s Supply Chain Finance Program
While ADB has developed a strong capacity to support trade,  including among SMEs, 





lenders. For buyers it (i) reduces working capital requirements by stretching out payment 
terms to suppliers, (ii) enhances relationships with suppliers through early payments, and 
(iii) helps secure delivery of supplies. For suppliers, supply chain finance (i) creates the 
opportunity to receive early payment of invoices, (ii) reduces working capital requirement 
by  reducing  payables  outstanding,  (iii)  allows  better  and predictable  payment  flows, 
(iv) creates an enhanced buyer relationship, and (v) reduces financing costs. For lenders, 







assessments  that  focus  almost  exclusively  on  financials  and  collateral,  supply  chain 
finance  focuses on the strength and  longevity of a supply chain as well as  the mutual
dependence between buyer and supplier. 
Notwithstanding the  benefits,  there  are  challenges  and  impediments  to  supply  chain 
finance that help explain why there is a gap in the market. Limited risk-bearing capacity 
among financial institutions is one. A lack of understanding around structures to mitigate 







The benefits  and  impediments  explain  the  imperative  for ADB  to  start  a  supply  chain 
finance  program  (Table  20).  The  Supply  Chain  Finance  Program will  complement  the 




payments  throughout  the supply chain, and will  (i) enable SMEs that were  traditionally 
not deemed bankable to receive finance; (ii)  improve cash flow for developing member 
country  (DMC)  companies,  especially  SMEs,  to  enable  growth  and  job  creation;  and
(iii)  encourage more financial  institutions  to develop and broaden supply chain finance 
operations. In addition, under the program, data will be collected on the net increase in 
companies served under the program, which is expected to be 15% during 2014–2017. 
An  important  element  of  the  Supply  Chain  Finance  Program,  and  a  feature  that  also
distinguishes  it  from  the  Trade  Finance  Program,  concerns  its  proposed  focus  on 
assessing and monitoring SME  risk. ADB currently  lacks experience  in assessing and 
monitoring this risk, which impedes its ability to implement projects that directly impact 
SMEs  in  real  sector  activity. Development of  this  expertise  is  critical  to designing and 
implementing future projects that support SMEs.
2. Future Programs for SMEs
The challenge now for all participant banks,  insurers, regulators, and government  is to 
recognize challenges and coordinate to overcome the  impediments to realizing the full 
potential  that trade and supply chain finance can deliver  in terms of growth,  jobs, and 
poverty reduction.
Table 20: Comparison between Trade Finance and Supply Chain Finance Programs
Trade Finance Program Supply	Chain	Finance	Program
Bank risk Corporate/SME risk
Only supports companies with existing bank 
relations
Can support companies not traditionally 
considered bankable
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Governments  across  OECD  and  non-OECD  countries  engage  in  financial  services
provision to pursue public policy objectives through PFIs. Their purpose is to mitigate 
failures  in  financial  markets  and  enhance  access  to  finance  for  strategic  sectors  or 
financially constrained groups, including SMEs, start-ups, or households. 




to  address  structural  gaps  in  financing,  such  as  the  provision  of  funding  for  large 










markets,  addressing  short-term  financing  gaps  and  mitigating  cyclical  fluctuations 























Financial intermediaries exist to match those who want to borrow with those who want 
to lend, as in a market with numerous agents there is typically asymmetry of information. 
With imperfect information, prices do not clear markets, leading to credit rationing (Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981).52 In addition, the matching process involves nonlinear transaction costs 
(which are also related to the amount of lending or borrowing involved) and a transformation 
of the maturity of deposits, as usually those who lend tend to prefer short-term contracts
(i.e., to have their money readily available in case the need arises) and those who borrow 
tend to prefer  long-term ones  (to finance  investment projects). Financial  intermediaries 
provide another public good: project screening. Financial institutions usually have more
experience and knowledge of the macroeconomic environment, being in a better position 













in isolated regions (providing economic additionality) or in broadening access to finance for 
sectors overlooked by private banks (providing financial additionality), because borrowers 
lack collateral or have projects that require a large upfront investment,  i.e.,  in transport 
52   Credit rationing occurs when a project could be financed at a market interest rate (its net present value is 




(IDB  2005, Gutiérrez  et  al.  2011).  PFIs  can  also  finance  sectors  affected  by  negative 
externalities, as in the case of agricultural projects subject to systemic risk or export risk 
(Levy-Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza 2004).
In  addition  to  these  structural  reasons,  PFIs  can  have  a  cyclical  role.  In  a  context  of 
regulatory and financial environment change, when uncertainty might reduce willingness 
to lend by the private sector, or during economic downturns when the scarcity of capital 
might  reduce  private  credit  availability,  there  is  an  anticyclical  role  for  PFIs  supplying 
funds. Indeed, having the financial infrastructure already in place in the form of a PFI ready 

























“missing-middle”  finance  gap,  in  2004 KfW  launched  a  program  (Unternehmerkapital) 
designed to adapt finance solutions originally intended to target larger firms to the needs
of SMEs (OECD 2013b).
53  According to the Inter-American Development Bank (2005), these rationales express a social view on 
financial  intermediation, which  contrasts with  the political view (when access  to  finance  is  promoted  for 
political reasons, leading to state capture) and with the agency view (which suggests balancing costs and 
benefits of public intervention, before settling on a decision) (see also Levy-Yeyati, Micco, and Panizza 2007).
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Many  small  businesses  face  difficulties  in  financing  viable  projects,  which  limits  their 
potential to create jobs and spur aggregate welfare (Cressy 2002, OECD 2006, Schmit 
et al. 2011). According to Cressy (2002), there is no consensus on whether this “funding 
gap”  is  an  equilibrium  situation  or  a  market  failure.  Government  intervention  would 
be  desirable  only  in  the  latter  case,  and  if  the  identified  deficit  is  permanent  rather 
than transitory.
The sector of activity of some SMEs (i.e., those with intangible assets) makes them prone 
to having financial constraints, as they typically own a limited amount of assets that can 
be  used  as  collateral  (European  Association  of  Credit  Guarantees  [AECM],  European 
Association of Public Banks  [EAPB], Network of European Financial  Institutions  [NEFI] 












or  liquidation  costs  are  not  precisely  defined  (IDB  2005,  2013;  Ratnovski  and Narain 








funded. SME activities  and  entrepreneurial  dynamics  can  spill  over  into  the  economy, 














D. Empirical Evidence on SME Access to Finance
The empirical evidence supports the idea that SMEs have constraints on their access to 
finance (OECD 2006, OECD–ECLAC 2013). In recent summary papers, Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt,  and Martínez-Pería  (2008);  Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt,  and Maksimovic  (2008);  and 
Beck  (2010)  review  some  of  the  problems  in  access  to  finance  by  SMEs,  and  some 
empirical evidence showing that SMEs are more credit constrained and use less external 











moderate in many developed economies over 2010–2011, in emerging economies there 
was a more prominent increase in SME financing, in a context of rapid expansion of the 
business sector overall (OECD 2013a).
In countries with a good institutional setting (i.e., where property rights are well-defined), 
SMEs  have  less  problems  in  accessing  finance  than  in  institutional  environments 
characterized by lack of transparency and uncertainty about rights and their enforcement
(Ratnovski and Narain 2007). 
In a recent survey of 91 banks  in 45 countries (13 of them OECD countries—Austria, 
Belgium, Chile, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland,  and  Turkey),  Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt,  and  Martínez-Pería  (2008)  describe 
the  approach  used  by  banks  to  decide  on  SME  finance,  and  find  that  more  than 
80% of  public  banks  have  separate  departments  to  deal with SMEs  and more  than 
90% of private  and  foreign-owned banks do  so. However, while  the  sale of  financial 
products is decentralized, the decision on whether to lend (the risk management, 
loan  approval,  and  loan  recovery  functions)  continues  to be  centralized.  The  authors 
also  find  that, when  deciding  on  SME  lending,  foreign-owned  banks  rely  on  scoring 
models as one of the few inputs in the decision process, and that they tend to accept 
real  estate  as  collateral.  The authors  find  that  the  share of  applications  approved by 
55   Beck (2010) suggests that financial development is positively associated with firm size, and recommends 
using the “access possibility frontier”, defined as the maximum share of SMEs that can be served by financial 
institutions in a commercially viable way, as an approach to understanding the size gap in corporate finance.
The access possibility  frontier would  then give an  idea of public policies designed  to move  towards  the 
frontier and of the policies designed to push the frontier forward.
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foreign  banks  is  statistically  lower,  their  loan  fees  are  statistically  higher,  and  the 
share of  secured  loans  is also higher. Moreover,  the authors  find  that banks are  less 
exposed  and  charge  higher  interest  rates  and  fees  to  SMEs  relative  to  large  firms, 
and  at  the  same  time  banks  experience  higher  nonperforming  loans  from  lending 
to SMEs. 
Box 3: Typologies of Public Financial Institutions
Public  financial  institutions  (PFIs)  are  defined  by  the  existence  of  a  public  policy mandate, which  can 
vary in scope, from general missions, such as universal banking groups that target SMEs as part of their 
general  commercial  activities,  to  general-interest missions  that  comprise  financial  institutions  targeting 
several areas or sectors with a social value but that are not necessarily profitable. The narrower mandate 
is of those promotional institutions that have a specialized target segment and well-defined objectives.
The PFIs with a general mission are known as commercial public banks. When PFIs have a general-
interest or promotional mission, they can be classified as development banks (general-interest banks when 
they have  several  development objectives,  such as  infrastructure projects or  housing development,  or 
promotional banks when they target only SMEs). Development banks can have a retail model (engaging 
directly with SME clients) or wholesale business model (dealing with SME clients through other institutions). 
In addition, there are development agencies, i.e., PFIs that do not issue liabilities but provide a coordinating 
















































problems (OECD 2013a). 





that, during normal times, PFIs do not intervene in particular markets or sectors, but in 




instruments (IDB 2013, 12). 









57 See De la Torre and Ize 2009; Rudolph 2010; Anginer, De la Torre, and Ize 2011.
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3. Public Financial Institutions can Inject Liquidity
PFIs have lower restrictions on funds availability, as it is usually the case that governments 
inject  capital  in  them  to  compensate  for  the  inability  of  the private  sector  to maintain
lending levels.
To mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis on firms in general and SMEs in particular, 
governments  around  the  world  have  increased  policy  efforts  to  relieve  their  financial 
distress and ensure  their  liquidity. Addressing  long-standing  finance challenges during 
times of crisis is a role complementary to the private sector, as it targets those market 


















Arancibia 2012).  In  the United States,  as public  loans granted by  the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) account for about 1% of all small businesses  loans (Wiersch and 
Shane 2013),58 securitization measures were increased to augment liquidity. In a global 
survey of PFIs, De Luna-Martínez and Vicente (2012) confirm that PFIs scaled-up their 
operations to compensate for the credit crunch in the private finance sector. 





back  to  58%.  PFIs  participation  in  second-tier  lending,  originally  justified  under  the 
low operational costs and higher coverage through the private network, has slowed, 
accounting in 2011 for 34% of activities (ALIDE 2012). The reason argued by commercial 
58   In  the  US,  debt  instruments  are  the  first  source  of  funding  for  SMEs;  however,  the  Small  Business 
Administration has used this instrument on a smaller scale than European PFIs.
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banks  for  this  scaling  back  is  that,  even  though  initial  funding  for  SME  lending  was 
coming through another PFI, the banks themselves would be responsible for assuming 
the  risk  in financing SMEs and  they were not willing  to  take  that risk. First-tier PFIs  in 
Latin American countries have started channeling  their  resources  through nonfinancial 
intermediaries, such as nongovernment organizations specialized  in microfinance, and 
rural savings banks.
In  addition,  in  Latin  American  countries,  missions  have  been  revised  and  PFIs  have 






because  of  the  crisis.  Thus,  indirect  instruments  (guarantees  and  counterguarantees) 
have been created and expanded.
F.  Opportunities and Challenges for Public Financial Institutions  
in the Postcrisis Environment




Another  key  challenge  is  how  to  scale back  the  financial  assistance  to  those  sectors 










prespecified norms. However,  from a mission  statement point  of  view,  it  presents  the 
challenge of deciding when to phase out activities to leave room for the private sector.
With respect to corporate governance arrangements, PFIs can have an independent 
or a government-appointed board. Both options have advantages and disadvantages. 
Assessing the performance of the board presents many challenges, as many subjective 
and qualitative elements interact (OECD 2007, Frederick 2011). As risk-taking activities 
in  the SME segment are more volatile  than  in other sectors,  there might be a conflict 




PFIs when there are problems—recapitalization is costly and regulatory intervention may 
be sensitive. Within government there might be another conflict between the supervisory 
role and the PFI business role.




Capital  plays  a  different  role  for  public  and  private  financial  institutions.  In  private 




the  fact  that PFIs  recapitalized some banks and capital was  injected  into  the system, 
might give the impression that these measures will be undertaken again should another 
crisis occur. 
Having a public policy mandate implies that both development banks and development 
agencies have to abide by it. Financial considerations might enter into the decision, for 
example, of whether to foster growth  in a segment  (i.e., SMEs).  It might be necessary 
to undergo some financial  losses until the market  is developed, or until  the investment 
realizes. On the other hand, financial constraints may  lead to  lending only to profitable 
firms or viable projects. There, a challenge arises concerning the possibility of engaging 
in  competition with  the private  sector.  There  is  an  additional  risk  of  crowding out  the 
private sector because PFIs have access to cheaper funds and might be subject to less 
regulation. This generates an uneven playing field (Ratnovski and Narain 2007).
Another aspect to consider when assessing the opportunities and challenges that PFIs 
face concerns  the plausible  fragmentation of support  that SMEs might be subject  to. 
During  a  crisis,  say  at  national  level,  banks might  find  insufficient  access  to  funds  to 
operate  their  regular  activities.  One  of  the most  compelling  piece  of  evidence  in  this 
regard  is  the  information presented  in  the OECD Scoreboard on Financing SMEs and
Entrepreneurs (OECD 2012, 2013a, and 2014).59 Foreign banks (or banks whose matrix 
is  located outside  the geographical  location of  the crisis) might not have  the  incentive 
to continue  lending  to SMEs because of  the  increase  in credit  risk  that a crisis might 
present. In such events, supranational PFIs might be able to channel resources from other 
regions to restore the lending channel in that context. Alternatively, seeking cofinancing 
opportunities with  the private  sector might be useful  as a way  to pool  resources and 
increase cooperation in order to overcome the fragmentation of support. For example, 









The  financial  crisis  has  led  to  a  reconsideration  of  PFIs’  business  models.  In  some 
countries,  this has  implied a shift,  at  least  in part,  from second-  to  first-tier  lending  in 
order to overcome the increased risk aversion towards SME lending by private players.
When the provision of credit is done through first-tier lending, dealing directly with SMEs, 
the PFIs need to have a large and extended branch to access its customers. In this 
model, the interest rate can be lower because of the lower transaction cost of not dealing 
with intermediaries. On the other hand, the advantage of using second-tier instruments
is that it ensures a complementary role with the private sector. In addition, second-tier 
instruments might be more efficient as they benefit  from existing private  infrastructure. 
Moreover,  risk management need not be as sophisticated as  it  is  in direct  lending, as 
it  only needs  to assess  the  risk of  the private  institutions  that will  be dealing with  the 
SMEs (Gutiérrez et al. 2011). And risk credit is partially absorbed by the partner institution 







development, as measured by income. The authors stress that the lending environment is 
more important in shaping bank financing to SMEs than firm size or bank ownership type.




(Sweden)  did  during  the  crisis,  on  the  understanding  that  if  SMEs were  approaching 
public banks to obtain funding, it was because of a previous rejection by private banks at 
market rates (OECD 2014). However, this view might seem to contrast with the standard 







lending, and  loans are offered at market  interest  rates  (which  in some cases might be 
higher than the average, given the fact that SMEs are riskier than other segments).







PFI (Beck 2010, Thorne 2011, IDB 2013). It is important not to overlook other constraints 
in  addition  to  financial  ones,  and  compare  alternatives  (Beck  2010). Along  the  same
lines, IFC (2011) suggests bearing in mind the financial context (accounting and auditing 
standards, credit reporting systems, collateral and insolvency regimes, and payments 
and settlements systems) of each country when deciding on public sector interventions. 
Similarly, Kraemer-Eis, Lang, and Gvetadze (2013) suggest that policy instruments must 
be under continuous revision in order to remain optimal.
Across studies that several institutions have undertaken there is a consensus that the 
performance of PFIs improves with a clear and sustainable mandate, an adequate risk 
management system, and sound corporate governance, which in particular clarifies the 
ownership policy (Smallridge and Olloqui 2011, World Bank 2012, IDB 2013). The same 
research acknowledges  that  the  implementation of  these good practices  is difficult  to 
achieve in countries with a weak institutional setting. IFC (2011) suggests that, in such 
cases,  the  implementation  of  second-tier  lending  functions  best,  and  to  improve  its 
functioning  it  suggests building capacity and  technical  expertise,  and  finding  the  right 







where the private sector is not operating requires highly specialized management. While 
in wholesale activities risk management is needed at the institutional level (to select the 
institution which will coordinate the direct lending) but not at the project level (Gutiérrez 
et  al.  2011),  the  response  of  banks  engaged  in  retail  lending managing  PFIs’ money 
targeted to SMEs showed that banks were reluctant to assume the implied credit risk and 
were therefore not lending to SMEs.
PFIs  should  be  financially  sustainable  and  able  to  add  economic  value,  even  though 
their objective is not to maximize profits but generate enough resources to accomplish




Regarding risk management, PFIs should be able to assess credit risk, liquidity risk, 
market risk (on interest rates and on currencies), and operational risk (IDB 2013). Klein 
(2010)  suggests  that  PFIs  have  financing  schemes  where  profits  can  cover  the  cost
of  capital.  He  advocates  that  it  should  be  clarified when  PFIs  receive  subsidies,  and 
sunset clauses for finance programs specified. Kraemer-Eis, Lang, and Gvetadze (2013) 
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suggest sharing the risk with the private sector to avoid moral hazard problems, and that 
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3 Diversified Financing Models
3.1.  Nonbank Financing for SMEs: The Role of Factoring  
for Financing SMEs in Asia
Shigehiro Shinozaki60




is  likely  to  target  growing  SMEs  to  develop  a  niche market.  Asia’s  factoring  industry 
has dual potential. At  the national  level, domestic  factoring—as a part of supply chain
financing—will support growth-oriented SMEs to expand, given funding flexibility. At the 
global  level,  international  factoring as a complement to trade finance will support SME 
exporters and promote intraregional trade that serves global rebalancing. Increased trade 
in Asia is creating more business opportunities for the factoring industry. The majority of 
enterprises are SMEs in any country and their contribution to total exports is significant. 





industry—including  its  roles, benefits, and challenges—and addresses  the potential of 
factoring in Asia.

















and securities dealers and brokers), and risk-taking institutions (e.g., venture capitalists, 
private  equity  funds,  pension  funds,  and  mutual  funds)  are  collectively  categorized 
as NBFIs.  To  encourage  the NBFI  industry,  the  establishment  of  a  sound competitive 




helps  to  promote  inclusive  economic  growth  in Asia.  As  a  supporting  industry,  SMEs 
contribute to intraregional trade through subcontracts with large firms. In the globalized
economy,  large  firms  seek  the division of  labor  to  enhance business efficiency  to win 





definition,  it  can be expressed as a  combination of  trade  finance and a  technological 
platform that connects  trading partners and financial  institutions, and provides various 



















or  the  sales  of  receivables  from exporters  to  the  third  party  (forfaiter).  Letter-of-credit-based  finance or 
documentary credit for suppliers or exporters is a typical trade finance modality.
131Diversified Financing Models
Factoring  is  generally  interpreted  as  a  short-term  supplier  financing  scheme  where 






it is important to vitalize intraregional trade through encouraging internationalization. To 
this end, it is crucial to develop sophisticated payment systems in international trade. 
Conceptually,  there  are  four  payment methods  for  export-  and  import-oriented  firms: 
(i) cash in advance, (ii) letter-of-credit-based finance or documentary credit, (iii) documentary 
collection, and (iv) open account or deferred payment. From a viewpoint of payment risks, 
SME  exporters  are  likely  to  prefer  cash-in-advance  or  full  payment  prior  to  shipment 






the payment can be made based on the document-against-payment or the document-
against-acceptance in exchange for shipping and title documents. It is different from the
letter of credit because banks do not guarantee the payment from the  importer to the 
exporter; documentary collection  is  relatively  riskier  than  the  letter of credit. The open 
account or deferred payment brings all risks to the exporter (e.g., waiting to receive the 
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cash  in advance after shipping goods, and so are  released  from cash flow problems; 
importers enjoy the simplified transaction with cost efficiency, and so are released from 
complicated and costly procedures such as opening letters of credit.
























(deferred payment)  
 















Export guarantee  
Cash Flow Cash-in-advance 
at a discount  
D/C = documentary collection, L/C = letter of credit. 
Source: Author’s illustration.










while  international  factoring  as  a whole  is  relatively  small  in  scale.  In  2012,  domestic 
factoring on a global basis was €1.8 trillion (84% of the total), while international factoring 
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between 2 and 30 in the selected Asian economies under review.
C.  Factoring for SMEs: Benefits and Challenges
1. Domestic Factoring



































































































































































































































































































































































































































In  general,  factoring  enables  companies  to  improve  their  business  efficiency  and  risk 
management by (i) improving cash flow or providing needed working capital in a flexible 
and timely way; (ii) not counting as a liability on the balance sheet, but rather as an off-
balance-sheet  transaction;  and  (iii)  transferring  risk  to  the  factor,  resulting  in  a  hedge 
against settlement risks. Besides its function as a financing tool, factoring also protects 
suppliers against bad debts, especially in markets lacking credit insurance capacities, 
and helps  in  their  receivables management. Basically,  factoring companies do not see 
SMEs  as  an  underwriting  risk  because  of  factoring’s  nature  of  individual-transaction-
based financing.62 Therefore, factoring is beneficial for start-ups, rapidly growing SMEs 
with weak credit history and no collateral, and SMEs in emerging economies with less-








transactions and trade disputes).
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enterprises with constant  sales  to  reliable buyers,  factoring does not  fit  firms’ 
long-term  funding  and  capital  investment  needs.  Moreover,  there  are  many 
nonfactorable businesses with unpredictable processes such as construction.







statistics give only a partial picture of  the  factoring  industry. The development 
of financial  infrastructure, such as a credit  risk database,  is critically  important 
for  reducing the  information cost  for  the  factoring  industry, not  to mention the 
banking sector.
(iv) Funding for businesses. Active factoring companies are mostly bank-oriented 
and their funding is largely dependent on banks. Meanwhile, there are independent 
factoring companies that encounter funding difficulties.
(v) Regulatory	 framework. Because of  the small  number of  factoring companies 
in Asia,  the establishment of  a  regulatory  framework  for  factoring companies, 
including licensing, will encourage new entrants into the factoring industry and 
support its overall growth. A well-organized regulatory environment will also 
supplement the lack of factoring data (e.g., statistics compiled by the regulator 
through monitoring reports). 
Regarding the regulatory framework, there are several questions on regulating factoring 
companies:
(i) Legal status of factoring businesses.  If  commercial  law  regards  factoring 
as a buying  and  selling  activity,  the  factor will  not  be  a  creditor  and  factored 
receivables will be a part of the factor’s property (bankruptcy is remote for the 
seller). If factoring is regarded as a financial service, the factor will be a creditor 
and the  legal  framework will be necessary, especially  in the case of default by 
the seller.
(ii) Self-regulation. The legal framework for factoring has generally not been well-










programs to make the factoring industry more efficient.
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and new entrant participation in trade in goods and services, and as a result promotes 
intraregional trade in Asia.
However, there are several challenges to promoting the international factoring business. 
As mentioned,  international  factoring  comprised only  about  16% of  the world  total  in 
2012.  Increased  direct  export  factoring will  help make  it more  functional.  In  addition, 














network (IFG, FCI)  




































to regional and country contexts and needs.
D. Potential for Factoring in Asia
Factoring is a growing business globally. Asia is participating in this trend, though 
factoring is still small  in scale in the region. Ideally, factoring takes on a catalytic role in 






trade that serves global rebalancing.
Increased trade in Asia is creating more business opportunities for the factoring industry 
(Figure 35). The majority of enterprises  in any country are SMEs and their contribution 
Figure 34: Potential for Factoring in Asia
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to  total  exports  is  not  insignificant.  The more  SMEs  are  internationalized,  the  more 
intraregional trade is encouraged. The factoring industry is in part expected to promote 
SME internationalization in support of intraregional trade. The more that SME savings are
mobilized through intraregional trade, the more that global rebalancing is promoted. At 
the same time, the factoring industry can support financial inclusion in Asia.
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3.2. Capital Market Financing for SMEs
3.2.1.   Raising Growth Capital for SMEs: The Case  
for Mezzanine Finance 
This  section  discusses  the  limitations  of  debt  financing  and  introduces  the  range  of
















Capital  gaps  also  exist  for  companies  seeking  to  effect  important  transitions  in  their 
activities,  such  as  ownership  and  control  changes,  as  well  as  for  SMEs  seeking  to 
deleverage and improve capital structures. The long-standing need to strengthen capital 




to focus on mechanisms that enabled firms to  increase their debt  (e.g., direct  lending, 
loan guarantees), as funding from other sources (e.g., business angels, venture capital) 
became more scarce (OECD 2010a, 2012).
In  the  aftermath  of  the  2008/09  global  financial  crisis,  the  bank  credit  constraints 
experienced by SMEs in many countries have further highlighted the vulnerability of the 
SME  sector  to  changing  conditions  in  bank  lending.  Banks  in many OECD  countries 
have been contracting their balance sheets in order to meet more rigorous prudential 





64 Section based on Chapter 3 OECD (2014).
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As the banking sector remains weak and banks adjust to the new regulatory environment, 
institutional investors and other nonbank players, including wealthy private investors, 
have a potential role to play in filling the financing gap that may widen in the postcrisis 
environment. However,  a  lack of  awareness  and understanding on  the part  of SMEs, 
financial institutions, and governments of these alternative instruments, their modalities, 
and operations constitute a major barrier to their use.
This  section  discusses  the  limitations  of  debt  financing  and  introduces  the  range  of




B. Financing SMEs: The Spectrum of Financing Instruments 
1. SME Lending: Market Failures and Mitigation Techniques












Furthermore, in OECD, countries since the 1980s, as large corporations and local 
authorities have been moving away  from  the banking system and borrowing on more 




At  the  same  time,  specific  constraints may  limit  lending  to  SMEs, which,  in  addition, 
generally  involves  small  loan  volumes  (under  €1 million)  and  can  imply  relatively  high 





business models, and access to collateral or guarantees. 
65 Additionally, debt payments are in many countries tax deductible. 
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2. Alternative Financing Techniques
Financing instruments alternative to straight debt alter this traditional risk-sharing 
mechanism.  Table  21  provides  a  list  of  financing  techniques  that  are  alternatives  to 
straight debt, categorized into four groups characterized by differing degrees of risk and 
return.  The  following  paragraphs  briefly  describe  these  groups.  The  remainder  of  the 
section  focuses on hybrid techniques, particularly mezzanine finance, which  lies  in  the 
middle of the risk-reward continuum.
Table 21: Alternative Financing Techniques for SMEs and Entrepreneurs
Low Risk/Return Low Risk/ Return Medium Risk/ Return High Risk/ Return 
Asset-Based	Finance Alternative Debt Hybrid	Instruments Equity	Instruments
•  Asset-based lending
•  Factoring
•  Purchase order Finance
•  Warehouse receipts 
•  Leasing
•  Corporate bonds





















of asset-based finance are factoring and leasing. 
In  the case of  factoring, a company sells a  receivable  from a party with a good credit 
rating to a factoring company at a discount. For instance, an SME might manufacture and 





which it has a claim, in this case, the retailer. 
Another  common  form  of  asset-based  finance  is  leasing.  In  this  case  an  SME  may 
need capital equipment, but banks would not be willing to  lend funds to purchase the 
equipment  because  of  the  company’s  credit  rating. With  leasing,  the  financial  leasing 
company purchases the piece of equipment and retains ownership, but allows the SME 
to use the equipment under a leasing contract while receiving lease payments. The lease 
payments will be close to the leasing company’s cost of borrowing the funds plus a credit 
risk spread.  If  the company does not make the  lease payments,  the  leasing company 
takes possession of the asset. 
What all techniques of asset-based finance have in common is that they allow the SME 





b. Alternative Debt Instruments
The next category of AFTs illustrated in Table 21 consists of alternative debt instruments, 
such as corporate bonds (when issued by SMEs) and securitized debt, in which investors 
in the capital markets, rather than banks, provide the financing for SMEs. Few SMEs have 
succeeded  in  issuing  corporate  bonds because of  difficulties  that  small  privately  held 
companies have in meeting investor protection regulations and the high relative cost of 
bond issuance for small companies. 
Securitization  of  SME  debt  takes  place when  cash  flows  from  assets  are  transferred 
to  a  specialized  company  that  uses  these  flows  to  support  a  fixed  income  security
(an  asset-backed  security)  that  is  sold  to  investors  (Thompson  1995).  In  the  case  of 
SME  loan  securitization,  the  originating  bank  or  similar  entity  sells  SME  loans  to  a 
specialized company. The specialized company creates a new security backed by 
the  payments  of  SMEs,  which  is  sold  to  investors.  The  investor  accepts  the  risk  of 
nonpayment  by  the  SMEs  in  the  portfolio  and  receives  payments  of  interest  and 
principal. Thus, the financing of the SME is transferred from the banking system to the 
capital market.
One  basic  characteristic  of  these  instruments  is  that,  like  bank  loans,  they  represent 
an unconditional claim on  the borrower, who must pay a specified amount of  interest 
to  creditors  at  fixed  intervals,  regardless  of  financial condition.  They also  have  high 
priority  in cases of bankruptcy. The  interest  rate may be fixed or adjusted periodically 
according  to  a  reference  rate.  However,  neither  corporate  bonds  nor  securitization 
is  widely  used  by  SMEs.  In  this  sense,  these  techniques,  which  are  on  the  border 
between traditional finance and alternative finance  instruments, can only be described 
as innovative  since  they  are  not widely  used by SMEs.  It will  require  effort  by  private 




be kept in mind. First, these techniques are likely to be accessible only to the best-rated 
SMEs. Second, these instruments do not address the problem of excessive SME reliance 
on debt or provide an improved capital structure for the firm.
Despite  the  factors  that  limit  the  applicability  of  corporate  bond  issuance  and
securitization by SMEs,  there may  still  be  some  justification  to  consider  public  efforts 
to  encourage  their  utilization  for  SME  financing.  If  these  instruments  are  structured 
so as  to make  issuance possible by SMEs,  they might enlarge  the  range of  financing 
instruments  available  to  them,  offering  alternatives  to  traditional  bank-based  finance. 
Furthermore,  it  is  arguable  that, since  the  onset  of  the  financial  crisis  in  2007/08, 
banks in many OECD countries are limiting their lending to reasonably creditworthy 
SMEs; in other words, the market in SME financing has not been functioning normally. 
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In  those  circumstances,  it  would  be  justifiable  to  consider  exploring  the  use  of 
these techniques.66
The basic techniques  illustrated concern the financing of  low-risk SMEs. The following 
paragraphs consider techniques that are better suited to higher-risk, higher-return 
activities. In Table 21, these techniques fall under two broad headings: hybrid techniques,
and equity techniques. 
c. Hybrid Instruments
A common feature of hybrid techniques and equity is that the investor accepts more risk 
and expects a higher return than with the other techniques outlined above. As mentioned, 
the risk–reward characteristics of bank credits induce bankers to avoid risk even at the 











share control with outsiders. 
C. What is Mezzanine Finance?
Because hybrid finance  is better able  to distribute  risk and reward with  investors  than 
straight debt finance, it is often a suitable form of finance for SMEs seeking expansion, 





























seek  to participate  in  its management  (Credit Suisse 2006). However,  in  return  for  the 
lower ranking and unsecured nature of mezzanine capital, investors require detailed and 
prompt information on the economic progress of the business, and usually define specific 
financial  indicators, or covenants, which  the company must observe. For  the  investee 
companies—especially  SMEs—this  gives rise  to  increased  requirements  as  regards 
accounting, oversight, and information policies.  It also requires  intensive monitoring on 
the part of mezzanine investors.
Table 22: Comparison of Mezzanine Finance and Other Financing Techniques
Item Senior debt Mezzanine Equity
Economic perspective Debt Equity Equity
Legal perspective Debt Debt Equity
Ranking Senior Contractually subordinated Junior
Taxation Debt interest deductible Debt interest deductible Tax on capital
Covenants Comprehensive restrictions Tracks senior, but looser None
Security Yes, 1st ranking Yes, 2nd ranking No
Investor’s involvement 
in management
No direct involvement Moderate involvement; 
board seats
Direct involvement
Purpose Contractually specified Not specified Not specified
Term 4–5 years 5–10 years Open ended
Interest Costs Cost of funds + 255–350 
basis points
150-300 basis points above 
senior
None
Repayment Amortizing from cash flow Bulleta upon exit or at 
maturity
None
Warrants None Almost always None




Mezzanine  finance  complements  rather  than  replaces  other  forms  of  finance.  As  it  is 
considered equivalent to an increase in equity by banks and other traditional lenders, it 
offers greater scope for additional straight debt. In addition, it can be used in conjunction 
with  various  forms of  equity  finance,  such  as  private  equity,  venture  capital,  business 
angels, or listing on an exchange or similar trading platform.
1. Instruments for Mezzanine Finance
A mezzanine facility typically includes several financing instruments (tranches) of varying 





A  simple mezzanine  facility  contains  (i)  one  or more  categories  of  subordinated debt;
(ii)  a  tranche  in  which  the  investor  receives  a  success  fee,  i.e.,  a  share  of the  firm’s 
earnings  or  profits;  and/or  (iii)  an  equity-related  tranche  in which  an  investor  receives 
a payment whose value  is contingent upon a rise  in the value of the company, usually 
reflected  in  the  company’s  share  price.  The  latter  tranche  is  often  called  the  “equity 
kicker”.  The  following  paragraphs  illustrate  in  more  detail  the  main  components  of 
mezzanine facilities. 
(i) Subordinated loans (sometimes called junior debt) are unsecured loans, at a 





paid at the loan’s maturity.
(ii) Under  sales or turnover participation rights, the investor receives a payment 
based upon the performance of the company, in terms of revenue, turnover, or 




of  the  company.  Additionally, fixed  interest  payments  can  be  included  in  the 
contract.  Participating  loans  do  not  share  losses.  In  the  event  of  bankruptcy, 
providers of participating loans share in the results of the liquidation in the same 
way as other loan creditors.
(iii) Profit participation rights are equity investments that entitle the holder to 
rights over the company’s assets (e.g., participation  in profits or  in the surplus 
on  liquidation,  subscription  for  new  stock)  but  not  ownership  rights,  such  as 
participation  to  shareholders’  meeting  and  voting.  Profit  participation  rights 
are not defined by  law and can  therefore  to a  large extent be negotiated and 




(iv) “Silent” participation  is  closer  in  legal  form  to  an  equity  investment  than 
subordinated or participating loans. In this form of financing one or more persons 





(v) Equity “kickers”  include a payment  to  the  investor  that  reflects  the  increased 
value of the company enabled by mezzanine finance. The most common equity 
kickers  are  warrants  which  give  the  holder  the  right  to  purchase  a  specific 
number  of  shares  at  a  predetermined  price.  The  value  of  the warrant  is  the 
difference between the price at which a share of the company can be purchased 
by exercising the warrant (the strike price) and the market price. The value of
this instrument can be determined by market process where the company is 
publicly traded or is sold to an outside investor through a merger or acquisition. 
In  cases where  no  such  basis  for  pricing  the  equity  interest  is  available,  the 
value of the equity warrant is determined using a valuation technique specified 
in the contract. 





particular, mezzanine capital  can serve SMEs when  the  risks and opportunities of  the 
business  are  increasing  but  they  have  insufficient  equity  backing,  and,  for  this  same 
reason, face difficulties in accessing debt capital (Credit Suisse 2006).
The traditional market for mezzanine finance has been upper-tier SMEs, with high rating 
(BBB+ or above) and demand for  funds above €2 million. Thus,  it  is a  form of finance 
that mainly  supports  growth  plans  of medium-sized  companies;  it  does  not  generally 
apply  to  the smaller  segment of  the SME sector. Nevertheless,  in  recent  years,  some 
financial  institutions,  particularly  public  financial  institutions,  have  started  to  extend 
mezzanine  finance  to  SMEs  below  the  upper  tier  and  with  smaller  funding  needs. 
For  SMEs  in  this  segment,  which  normally  have  to  rely  on  regular  loans  or  equity  to 
meet  their  funding  requirements,  the  opening  up  of  the mezzanine market  to  smaller
and  lower-rated  borrowers  enables  broader  choice,  more  tailor-made  financing, 
and  better  conditions  for  negotiation  on  the  terms  for  new  senior  debts  and  equity 
(European Commission 2007).
In  general,  an  important  precondition  for  raising mezzanine  capital  is  that  the earning 
power  and market  position  of  the  business  should  be well-established  and  stable.  A 
company must demonstrate an established track record in its industry, show a profit or 
at the very least post no loss, and have a strong business plan for the future. Qualitative 
factors,  such as  the  track  record and capabilities of  the management, play  important 
parts in the investment decision.
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D. Government Support to Mezzanine Finance
The rationale for government intervention in the market for mezzanine finance relates to the 
existence of a financing gap (or market failure) in certain parts of the SME finance market, 






Policy makers in some countries and in international organizations have sought to 
encourage  the  use  of mezzanine  finance  because  of  its  potential  to  provide  finance 
efficiently  to  key  categories  of  SMEs,  and  to  extend  it  to  SMEs  with  lower  credit 




(i) Participation  in  the  commercial  mezzanine  market,  through  the  creation  of 
investment  funds that  target certain categories of SMEs and award mandates 
to private investment specialists. In many OECD countries, governments have 
formed special investment funds that invest alongside private investors in SMEs. 
Some of  these  funds may only  invest  in mezzanine vehicles, while many have 
flexible  investment mandates  that permit  them to  invest  in a broader  range of 
assets. There are two main ways in which public entities invest in SMEs through 
funds: 
(a) a  simple  fund  structure  in which  the public  entity  joins other public  and 
private entities and provides resources (equity, debt, or mezzanine) to 
SMEs; or
(b) a  fund of  funds structure,  in which  the public entity allocates  funding  to 
several funds that provide financing to SMEs.
(ii) Direct  funding  to  SMEs  can  be  provided  by  a  special  agency  (e.g.,  an  SME 














does not sponsor a  fund that makes  investment  in SMEs, nor does it provide 
direct funding to any. Instead, government support takes the form of funding at 
highly attractive terms.
All of  these mechanisms  require  private  funds  to  complement  public  funding,  and  all 
require SMEs to pass various tests of financial viability in order to qualify for official support.








In  countries  where  private  lenders  were  in  retreat,  recourse  to  officially  supported 
mezzanine credit appears to have grown as governments stepped in to fill the void.  In 
Table 23: Public Schemes to Provide Mezzanine Finance to SMEs
Indirect Investment via Funds
Direct Provision of Finance  
to Companies
Funding of Private Investment 








other public and private 
investors





(ii) Simple Fund Structure
•  Public Investor 
 – Establishes investment 
policy
 – Joins other public  


























has, however, been a subsequent recovery and these programs seem to be on track 
for further growth. In cases where measures were introduced in response to the crisis,
utilization has  remained high as governments have stepped  in  to fill  the gap at a  time
when private banks’ credit offerings were shrinking. Recent policy  initiatives by several 




crucial  to  reducing  the  vulnerability of  the sector  to changes  in  the credit market and 
to  address  the  “growth  capital  gap”  that  constrains  the  most  dynamic  enterprises. 
OECD work is under way to map the range of financing instruments available to SMEs 
and entrepreneurs and  to assess  the potential and challenges of  these  instruments  in 
addressing different financing needs of SMEs. 
This  section  has  focused  on  the  functioning  of  the market  in mezzanine  finance  and 
on policy programs  in  this area. On balance,  this  form of  finance has not  received as
much public attention as venture capital or specialized exchanges for SMEs, but it holds
potential to respond to two critical problems in SME finance.
First, mezzanine finance can play an  important  role  in widening  the  range of financing 
vehicles  available  to  SMEs.  The  expansion  phase  of  the  firm  financing  cycle,  where 
mezzanine is most commonly used, has been identified as one where market failure is 
common. This is not to say that mezzanine is the best solution to the scarcity of growth 
capital at all  times, but  that  it  is highly  relevant when used by certain firms  in specific 
situations. While mezzanine finance is less suited than venture capital to financing high-




finance, since  it enables companies  to  improve  their capital  structure and  lessen  their 





Furthermore,  in  cases where  the withdrawal  of  private  funding  has  eased  but  private 
investors  still  hesitate  to  take  new  risks, mezzanine  can  be  a  highly  relevant  tool  for 
exiting the crisis. Because it has characteristics that help investors recognize new growth 
opportunities, partly through innovative risk-sharing techniques, mezzanine has the 
potential to encourage new private funding and to direct investment to those firms with 
the best growth prospects. 
152 ADB–OECD Study on Enhancing Financial Accessibility for SMEs






the  early  evidence  suggests  that mezzanine  finance  can  be  an  important  part  of  the 
continuum of financing options that together constitute an efficient financial system.
One salient fact about the market in mezzanine finance is its uneven development across 
OECD  countries.  It  seems  difficult  to  ascribe  differences  in  the  use  of  mezzanine  to 
obvious  factors  such  as  the  state  of  development  of  the  economy or  the  institutional
structure of the financial system. Even countries at similar levels of development and with 
similar financial structures appear to have vastly different levels of usage of mezzanine.
In  some  countries,  a  well-developed  commercial  market  in  mezzanine  finance  has 
functioned  for more  than  two decades with minimal public  involvement. However,  the 
traditional market for commercial mezzanine finance has been upper-tier SMEs, with high 
credit ratings and demand for funds above €2 million. Increasingly, governments in OECD 
countries have developed measures  to offer mezzanine products  to SMEs with  lesser 
credit ratings and smaller funding needs. Public intervention has been taking two main 
forms:  (i) participation  in  the commercial mezzanine market by public entities  (national 
or subnational development funds, international organizations), which create investment
funds targeted to certain categories of SMEs and award mandates to private investment
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3.2.2. The Potential of SME Capital Markets in Emerging Asia
Shigehiro Shinozaki67
Asia’s  bank-centered  financial  systems  require  reduction  of  the  supply–demand 
gap  in  lending as a core policy pillar  to  improve SME access  to finance. Meanwhile, 
the  diversification  of  financing models  beyond  conventional  bank  lending  is  another 
key  policy  pillar  to  better  serve  various  financing  needs  of  SMEs  and  expand  their 
financial  accessibility.  The  rapid  growth  of  emerging  Asia  is  generating  SME  long-




of  diversified  financing  models  which  requires  more  sophisticated  and  innovative
institutional arrangements  in order  to  respond effectively  to  the  real needs of SMEs. 






developing the “exercise” equity market68 and the social capital market in Asia is also 
















67  Financial  Sector  Specialist  (SME  Finance),  Office  of  Regional  Economic  Integration,  Asian  Development 





tapping the organized market. 
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Such a supply–demand gap suggests the  limitations of bank  lending for enterprises  in 
raising sustainable and safe funds for business, especially for SMEs. Once unexpected 
events such as a financial crisis occur, the banking sector will naturally respond to such 
events and take actions to mitigate associated risks, which will cause a credit crunch 
in  the banking  sector  and  seriously  affect SME access  to  finance. Moreover, Basel  III 
might accelerate  this  trend  in banks by  further  restricted financing  for SMEs. The root 
causes of financial crises change as global financial systems become more advanced. 
Well-established SME finance policies will alleviate credit contraction, but cannot remove
it  entirely.  To  supplement  the  limitations  of  bank  lending  for  SMEs  amid  the  complex 
global  financial  environment,  the diversification of  financing models, with  flexibility  and 
innovation, is indispensable.
Capital market  financing  for  SMEs  is  one  of  the  policy  challenges  under  the  pillar  of 
diversified financing models which requires more sophisticated and innovative institutional 





















growth agenda among policy makers and regulators, which should be incorporated into 
a comprehensive range of policy options on SME finance.
Capital markets are typically susceptible to changing external economic conditions, 
especially during a  financial  crisis.  In OECD countries, most economies were severely 
impacted by  the 2008/09 global financial crisis, with  the  level of equity  investments  in 
2011  still  below  precrisis  levels  in  several  countries  (Figure  36).  SME  capital markets 
should be well-designed to mitigate risks arising  from the external environment, which 
requires a sophisticated institutional mechanism that supports SMEs in direct finance and 
manages any possible risks.
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energy efficiency, and green finance,  the potential  for developing  the  “exercise” equity 
market and the social capital market in Asia is also explored.
B. SME Capital Markets Landscape in Asia
1. Type of SME Capital Markets











2. SME Equity Markets












market  for SMEs and venture businesses  in the Republic of Korea and  is operated by 


















The listing requirements on the mai have been relaxed compared to the main board. For instance, the issuer 
must continuously operate at  least for 2 years (3 years in the main board) and hold paid-up capital of no less 
than B20 million after public offering (B300 million in the main board). There should be no less than 300 minority 
shareholders (1,000 in the main board). The mai copes with only equity products (common stock and warrant) 





investors  in  mai  stocks  are  domestic  individuals  and  institutions  (97%  of  trading  in  2012).  Foreign  investor 
participation in the mai accounted for only 1.6% of trading in 2012. The Government of Thailand has supported 
establishment  of  several  venture  capital  funds  such  as  the SME Venture Capital  Fund  that  amounted  to B1 
billion since 2000, but the venture capital industry is still quite small in scale in Thailand. The Thai Venture Capital 
Association comprises 14 members.
The Securities  and Exchange Commission  is  responsible  for  regulating  and  supervising  Thai  capital markets 
including the Stock Exchange of Thailand and the mai. Although still in the trial-and-error stage, the commission 
is taking several initiatives to develop SME capital markets in Thailand. First is the program to promote SME bond 
issuance  through educating SMEs  (through  free  seminars on  issuing bonds)  and creating  incentive  schemes
continued on next page
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Box 4 continued
for  them  to  tap bond market  (concessional  rating  fees,  bond application  fee  exemption,  and  registration  fee 
exemption  in  the  Thai  Bond Market  Association).  Second  is  the  program  named  IPO,  Pride  of  the  Province 
to facilitate the potential of local firms to raise funds from capital markets through the provision of free training 
courses, consultations, and listing fee exemption. Third is the program to allow accredited investors (institutional 





Figure: SME Capital Market in Thailand—mai
IPO = initial public offering, SME = small and medium-sized enterprise. 
* 19 September 2013.
Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand.
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Equity  markets  for  SMEs  in  emerging  Asia  are  typically  small  in  scale,  with  market 
capitalizati n  equal  to  less  than  10%  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  and  market
performances  that vary significantly by country  (Figure 37).  In  the PRC, both  the SME 
Board and ChiNext have been sharply expanding  in  terms of  size and  the number of 
listed companies, with more than 1,000 listed companies in both markets combined, 
although their growth rates have slowed recently. KOSDAQ and Hong Kong, China’s 






SMEs.  Extensive  national  policies  and  strategies  for  improved SME  access  to  capital 
markets are needed.
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bond transactions under the QIB system are quite limited and not attractive to individual 
and institutional investors because of the existence of low investment grade bonds (BB 










bond markets in the PRC.
4. Regulatory Structure
Table  24  highlights  the  regulatory  structure  for  capital markets  that  SMEs  can  tap  in 
selected Asian  countries.  This  section  uses  the  term  “SME markets”  for  convenience 
because SMEs are part  of  the  target  issuers  in  concessional markets. On the whole, 
the baseline  laws and  regulations show no differences between  the general and SME 
markets in the observed countries. Under the control of uniform capital market laws and 
regulations, the responsible regulator (e.g., the securities commission), stock exchange, 
or the operating SRO generally provides special rules, guidelines, and regulations on SME 
markets. The  listing criteria and  the disclosure  requirements  for SME markets are  less 
than on the main board of the stock exchange.
However,  there  are  some  limitations  to  reducing  the  requirements  for  listing  and 
maintaining  stocks  in  such  concessional  markets.  SME  markets  have  mainly  been 
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created  under  a  stock  exchange  or  regulated  SRO.  Given  the  no  stand-alone  and 
specialized  legislation  that  is  separate  from  the  general  set  of  capital  market  laws,
direct financing venues may be inflexible to SME funding needs, particularly with regard 
to  size.  For  instance,  the minimum  number  of  shareholders  in  a  stock  offering  and 
the maintenance of stocks stipulated under the baseline laws may not fit the funding 
needs  of  those  who  want  to  raise  a  small  amount  of  funds  from  limited  investors.
The  regulatory  framework  for  SME  capital  markets  should  be  flexibly  examined 
upon necessity.























1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012















2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012






























1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012















2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C. Potential for Developing SME Capital Markets






would be high. However, such preconceptions are not proved with clear evidence, and 
advanced  technology  may  make  possible  the  creation  of  SME capital  markets  with 








A three-tiered approach  is used to assess  the potential of capital market financing  for
SMEs:  (i) online and paper-based surveys  for  the supply and demand sides of growth 
capital, (ii) study meetings on the development of SME capital markets, and (iii) interviews 
with the supply and demand sides. Study countries selected are the PRC, India, the 
Republic  of Korea,  and Malaysia.  These  countries  have  a  unique path  for  developing 
an  SME market  as  mentioned  earlier.  Two  types  of  online  and  paper-based  surveys 
were  conducted  from April  through  July  2013  in  cooperation with  partner  institutions





all  types  of  industries.  The  survey  used  a  set  of  questionnaires  specially  designed  to 
ascertain real needs of the supply and demand sides for the development of SME capital 
markets.  In  parallel,  half-day  study meetings  followed by  intensive  interviews with  the 
supply and demand sides were organized  to  supplement  the survey  findings  in  India,
the Republic of Korea, and Malaysia.70 As a result, 105 completed questionnaires in the 
supply-side and 431 valid samples  in the demand-side were collected from four study 
countries combined (Boxes 5 and 6).
69  Partner  institutions:  (i)  the PRC: National Association of Financial Market  Institutional  Investors and China 
Association  of  Small  and Medium Enterprises;  (ii)  India:  Bombay Stock  Exchange;  Indian  Private  Equity 
and Venture Capital Association; Association of National Exchanges Members of India; Federation of Indian 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises; Chamber of  Indian Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises; and the 
Associated Chambers  of Commerce  and  Industry  of  India;  (iii)  the Republic  of  Korea:  Korea  Exchange, 
Korean Venture Capital Association, and Small and Medium Business Corporation; and (iv) Malaysia: Bursa
Malaysia, Malaysian Venture Capital Association, and SME Corporation. 




Box 5: Composition of Supply-Side Organizations Surveyed








securities firms (27% of  total samples), venture capital companies  (27%), banks  (23%), and  investment 
companies and funds (14%). In India, securities firms (35%) and venture capital companies (14%) accounted 
for the majority of samples. In the Republic of Korea, the combined number of market organizers (stock 




The questionnaire  for  the supply-side was designed  to  investigate  the policy stance and actions  to be 
taken, business strategies, existing market performance, product type, market model, and critical factors 
to develop an SME market. In this survey, special questions for securities firms and investors were prepared 
to  identify  their business  stance  in  the SME market, but  sufficient numbers of  valid  samples were not 
obtained this time. The small sample size is an issue to be improved.
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100 employees or less.
At the time of survey, business conditions of SMEs surveyed were generally good as compared to 6 months 
prior in study countries. In the PRC, India, and Malaysia, the majority of sampled SMEs were bigger than they 
had been 6 months prior.
The questionnaire for the demand-side was designed to investigate business conditions, funding instruments, 
obstacles to accessing finance, demands on capital market financing, and factors critical to developing an SME 
market. Similar to the supply-side survey, the small sample size is an issue to be improved.
continued on next page
2. Supply-Side Analysis
a. Policy Stance on SME Capital Markets




































































































































































A. People’s Republic of China
B. India
C. Republic of Korea
D. Malaysia
Sector Location Company Age Employment
Box 6 continued
continued on next page
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A. People’s Republic of China B. India
C. Republic of Korea D. Malaysia
Box 6 continued





Funding for business easy
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Funding for business easy
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Funding for business easy
Borrowing from FI easy
Loan rate decreased
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b. Policy Actions to be Taken
There are several policy options and approaches to stimulate SME capital markets at the
national level. The respondents ranked necessary measures to develop an SME market, 
with different priorities  from country  to country  (Figure 40). On  the whole, however, all 
study countries considered it necessary to have a comprehensive policy framework for 
SME access to capital markets. Policy measures to develop an investor base for an SME 
market and promoting market  literacy  for SMEs and  investors are  the most  important 
actions to be taken by the government  to realize a  functional market.  In  the PRC,  the 






Figure 39: Is Developing Capital Markets for SMEs a Policy Priority?
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c. Performance of SME Capital Markets
Answers  from  four  countries  on  the  growth  potential  of  SME  markets  somewhat 
corresponded  to  the  actual  performance  of  existing  SME  markets.  While  the  PRC 
respondents  expected  continuous  growth  of  SME markets  (SME Board  and ChiNext 
under the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) considering the strong appetite of SMEs for growth 
capital, Malaysia had a cautious view of  the growth of  the existing capital market  that 
SMEs could tap (ACE/Bursa Malaysia) considering the unpopularity of the market, with 




stock exchanges) because their markets were relatively new and might be vulnerable in 
times of economic uncertainty.
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Figure 40: Actions Necessary to Develop SME Capital Markets
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Figure 41: Existing SME Capital Markets Growing?
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C. Republic of Korea D. Malaysia
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d. Product Type and Market Model
The supply-side respondents preferred to develop equity products rather than corporate 
bonds  and  debentures  for  SMEs  in  India,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  and  Malaysia;  this 
preference was reversed in the PRC (Figure 42). In emerging Asia, corporate bond maturity
of 5–10 years tends to be popular, but bond instruments are part of debt financing and 
their  relatively  high  yields  can  still  be  considered  constraints for  SME  issuers.  In  the 
PRC, high-yield bonds can be incorporated in wealth management products and traded 
among shadow banking systems for  infrastructure  investments. This might explain the 
preference for SME bonds in the PRC.
To  explore what  type  of market would  be  appropriate  for  SMEs,  four market models 
under  two  large categories can be extracted  from the current SME market structures: 
(i) an exchange market, consisting of (a) a domestic market, and (b) an AIM/international 
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There were two split opinions among country respondents (Table 25). In the PRC, India, 
and the Republic of Korea around 70% of the respondents preferred the development 
of a domestic exchange market as an appropriate capital market venue for SMEs, while 




the stock exchange and a relatively well-organized risk-conscious mechanism with 
transparency backed by laws and regulations. They had concerns about there being 
no potential investor base for the non-SRO-operated SME market outside of the stock
exchange’s control and the social capital market. 
Conversely, around 65% of the respondents in Malaysia preferred the development of a 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e. Critical Factors Needed to Create an SME Market
Figure  43  shows  the  comparison  of  critical  factors  needed  to  create  an SME market 





listing procedures. These actions ranked eighth, sixth, and third in the demand-side. The 
top three priorities for SMEs were (i) raising funds speedily, (ii) the small amount of funding 
available, and (iii) simplified listing procedures, while these ranked eighth, fifth, and third in
the supply-side. Only the third priority was shared between both sides.
In  India,  the  top  three  priorities  in  the  supply-side  were  (i)  raising  funds  speedily  for 
SMEs, (ii) simplified listing procedures, and (iii) information dissemination of SME capital 
markets, while these ranked fourth, third, and 10th in the demand-side. The top three in 
the demand-side were  (i) simplified disclosure requirements,  (ii)  low cost for  listing and 
maintenance,  and  (iii)  simplified  listing  procedures,  and  these  ranked  10th,  fifth,  and 
second in the supply-side. The item of simplified listing procedures was shared between
both sides among the top three issues.
In  the Republic  of  Korea,  the top  three  priorities  in  the  supply-side were  (i)  simplified 
listing procedures, (ii) low cost for listing and maintenance for SMEs, and (iii) low cost for 
establishing and operating an SME market, and these top two issues ranked sixth and 




In Malaysia,  the  top  three  priorities  in  the  supply-side were  (i)  tax  incentive  schemes 
for  issuers  and  investors,  (ii)  low  cost  for  establishing  and  operating  an SME market, 
and  (iii)  raising  funds speedily  for SMEs, and  the first and  the  third  issues  ranked fifth 
and  fourth  in  the  demand-side.  The  top  three  in  the  demand-side  were  (i)  simplified 
listing procedures, (ii) simplified disclosure requirements, and (iii) low cost for listing and 
maintenance, and these ranked ninth, 11th, and seventh in the supply-side.
The critical factors needed to create an SME market vary among countries because of 
different  circumstances  regarding SME financing and capital markets. However,  these 
findings suggest a common  issue  in priority actions between  the supply and demand 
sides, i.e., actions to reduce the cost burden for SMEs to tap capital markets. The cost 
issue is often touched upon when establishing an SME market because the market size 
is typically anticipated to be small in scale. As indicated in Table 25, on the whole, country 
respondents tended not to see the establishment cost as a critical barrier to a new market 
if it is needed. However, the cost issue is crucial for creating a sustainable market venue 
for SMEs. Given  that  governments  regard  an SME market  as part  of  national  growth 
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Figure 43: Critical Factors Needed to Create an SME Market
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and  venture  capital  companies  in  the  four  countries,  especially with 60%–75% of  the 
samples willing  to access banks  further. SMEs wished  to sharply  reduce dependence 
on both their own capital and informal individual borrowing for business. The results also 






Figure 44: Funding Instruments: Present and Future
A. People’s Republic of China B. India





























































The  survey  results  also  highlighted  the  supply–demand  gap  of  SME  finance  in  study
countries.  In  the  PRC,  around  40%  of  the  surveyed  SMEs  had  access  to  midterm 








they  are  likely  to wish  to  access  venture  capital  companies  for  further midterm  (25% 
of the surveyed SMEs) and  long-term funding (14%)  in the future.  In Malaysia, 25% of 
the surveyed SMEs were content with midterm and  long-term bank credit, while 33% 
of  those desiring  long-term credit  from banks. Long-term  funding needs of SMEs will 
177Diversified Financing Models
Figure 45: Loan Term: Present and Future
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needs in the construction and real estate sectors.
Table 26: Average Funding Amounts per Firm
Item
Funds Raised So Far  
($ million)
Funds Desired  
($ million)
China, People’s Rep. of 3.29 14.69
India 0.96  0.99
Korea, Rep. of 1.87  2.05

















b. Barriers to Accessing Financial Institutions
Poor access to finance is a chronic condition for average SMEs, and there are several 
underlying factors on both the supply and demand sides. Figure 47 illustrates the barriers 
for SMEs  in  accessing  formal  financial  institutions  in  study  countries. Surveyed SMEs 
in  the  four countries  identified that major supply-side constraints on access to finance 
were  (i)  requiring  collateral  and  guarantees  as  prerequisites  for  loans,  (ii)  complicated 
borrowing procedures, (iii) the strict lending policies of financial institutions, and (iv) high 
lending  rates.  They  recognized  that  lack  of  knowledge  of  financial  products  was  the 
most  serious  demand-side  barrier  to  accessing  finance.  The  findings  suggest  that 




positive  effects  to  improve  financial  accessibility.  This  also  implies  that  capital market 
literacy is needed to involve SMEs with growth potential in formal financial markets, which 
will be attributed to good market and government responses to their potential long-term 
funding needs.








in the Republic of Korea (for equity), and 54% in Malaysia  (for equity).  In the  last three 




Figure 46: Purpose of Funds Desired
A. People’s Republic of China B. India
C. Republic of Korea D. Malaysia
Note: Valid samples: the People’s Republic of China: 303; India: 40; the Republic of Korea: 28; and Malaysia: 60.
Source: Author’s compilation.



























(i) complicated procedures to issue stocks; and (ii) high stock issuing costs such as 
listing fees and maintenance of listed stocks, addressing the case of equity finance. This 
suggests  that  simple  procedures  and  a  low-cost  structure  are  key  in  the design of  a 
functional SME capital market, given the potential demands from SMEs.
D. New SME Capital Market Models
The previous discussions have given an overview of  the numerous challenges 




(ii) social capital market (exchange and nonexchange markets). 
Figure 47: Barriers to Accessing Financial Institutions
A. People’s Republic of China B. India
C. Republic of Korea D. Malaysia
Note: Valid samples: the People’s Republic of China: 303; India: 40; the Republic of Korea: 28; and Malaysia: 60.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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Figure 48: Willingness to Access an SME Capital Market
A. People’s Republic of China
Companies Willing to Utilize a Specialized Equity/Bond Market
Expected Benefits Reasons for Hesitating to Access
Expected Benefits Reasons for Hesitating to Access
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C. Republic of Korea
D. Malaysia
Companies Willing to Utilize a Specialized Equity/Bond Market
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1. Exercise Equity Market for SMEs
The creation of an exercise equity market for SMEs, separate from the exchange market, 
can be beneficial, especially  in  lower-middle-income Asian countries.71 The concept is 
to create a preparatory market for smaller but growing firms that will eventually tap the 







accountants networks; and (iii) designing government policy support measures such as 
tax incentives for SME issuers and investors.
Developing  SME  capital  markets  presents  a  twofold  challenge:  demand  creation, 
and market sustainability. To this end, a well-organized investor base and supporting 
professionals  with  government  preferential  measures  are  prerequisite  to  stimulating 
demand for an SME market. Meanwhile, with low-cost operations, liquidity enhancement 




on  their  stage  of  growth.  For  instance,  growing  SMEs  tend  to  seek  access  to  long-







and professional bases that support SMEs  in equity financing  is needed to  implement 
this concept. In this regard, extensive national policies and strategies for SME access to 
capital markets, with appropriate regulatory backing, are key to realizing the preparatory 
market concept.
It is a concern that, unless stand-alone regulations are established through separate 
legislation  from the general capital market  laws,  the exercise market may conflict with 
such general laws. For instance, if the number of shareholders for a stock offering and 
maintaining stocks in the nonexchange market exceeds the statutory minimum number 
stipulated  in  the  general  capital  market  laws,  SMEs  listed  in  such  a  market  will  be 
regarded as public companies under the general laws, which means that they cannot 
enjoy preferential treatment even if they are listed in the special market. In other words, 
their funding will be limited to small-scale fund raising from a limited investor base.
71 The concept was discussed in Indonesia as part of the JICA Capital Market Project (2008–2010). The
term “exercise equity market” is a phrase developed from a stream of discussions on SME capital market
in Indonesia.
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2. Social Capital Market
The  social  capital  market  is  also  a  promising  venue  for  SMEs  as  a  place  where 





investors are defined as  investors  seeking  to make  investments  that  create a positive 
social  and  environmental  impact  beyond  financial  return  (JP Morgan  2010),  including 
social  venture  capital  funds, microfinance  investment  vehicles,  pension  funds, mutual 
fund managers, institutional fund managers, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, and 
family foundations. JP Morgan (2010) estimated that the impact investment market has 
the potential  to absorb $400 billion–$1  trillion over  the next decade, particularly  in  the 
areas of housing, rural water delivery, maternal health, primary education, and financial 
services. An ADB survey (2011) indicated that 74% of investors in the sample who were 
not currently impact investing would consider transacting on a social stock exchange.
There  are  two  social  stock  exchanges  operating  in  the world:  the  Impact  Exchange, 
and the UK Social Stock Exchange. Both platforms were established in June 2013. The 
Impact Exchange, located in Mauritius, is operated by the Stock Exchange of Mauritius 







































and supervised by the Singapore-based Impact Investment Exchange Asia, targeting 
Asian and African social enterprises. Impact Investment Exchange Asia also established 
an online platform, named  Impact Partners,  in March 2011  that provides a dedicated 




Investing Network showed that  impact  investors plan to commit $9 billion  in 2013, up 
from $8 billion in 2012.





first  private-led  social  exchange,  but  ultimately  decided  to  use  the  existing  exchange 
market for operations, probably because of potential barriers to sustainable operations in 
a new platform. The use of an existing platform brings several benefits to a new market:
(i)  cost  efficiency,  (ii)  transparency and credibility,  and  (iii)  standardized operations and
management. These are challenges to be overcome in creating an independent market, 
with a possible solution being the creation of an exchange market or partial collaboration 
with the existing stock exchange. At the same time, however, such arrangements could 
prove  inflexible  for  the  particular  funding  needs  of  different  issuers  given  that market 


















financing, was  identified among SMEs surveyed, where  they expected  to be  released 
from poor funding environments and to grow further with increased social credibility, while 




The  supply-side  survey  identified  that  developing  an  SME  capital  market  is  a  policy
priority toward sustainable economic growth, considering the segment is underserved 
in  capital markets  (i.e.,  SMEs)  and  the  limitations  of  bank-centered  financial  systems. 
The supply-side generally  recognized that a comprehensive policy  framework  for SME 
access to capital markets is needed, with policy measures to develop an investor base 
and  promote  market  literacy.  However,  the  lackluster  performance  of  existing  SME 
capital markets is generating a discreet stance for developing an SME market among the 
supply-side.
Referring  to  the  existing  market  structures,  capital  markets  that  SMEs  can  tap  are 
classified  into  four  models  under  two  categories:  (i)  an  exchange market  comprising 
(a)  a  domestic market,  and  (b)  a  professional market;  and  (ii)  a  nonexchange market 
comprising (a) an SRO-operated market, and (b) a non-SRO-operated OTC market. The 
market  type appropriate  for supporting SME growth at  the national  level  is dependent 
on the country context. Two opinions were extracted from the supply-side survey. The 
countries  that  support  the  development  of  a  domestic  exchange  market  for  SMEs 
stressed the cost efficient structure of existing markets because of established trading 
platforms to be utilized for an SME market and the risk-conscious mechanism backed 
by existing  regulations, while having a concern about  the  lack of potential  investors  in 




tap the exchange market.
Although  the  priority  factors  to  develop  an  SME market  are  different  by  country, the 






A  twofold development path can be considered  in  the SME capital market:  (i) private 
initiatives linked to private sector development (business oriented), and (ii) public initiatives 
under  the  financial  inclusion  policy  and  national  growth  strategies  (social  oriented). 
In such two tracks, exchange markets and nonexchange markets can be organized. 
Accordingly,  three  types  of  costs  come  out:  infrastructure  cost,  regulatory  cost,  and 
policy cost (Table 27). For the infrastructure cost, the expected cost size will be different 
between  exchange  and  nonexchange  markets,  depending  on  the  usage  of  existing 






but  it  will  be  different  between  private  and  public  initiatives  because  the  regulatory 
coordination  between  the  capital market  regulator  and  line ministries  responsible  for 
SME sector development and access to finance is needed in exchange markets under 
public initiatives. The expected policy cost will be different between private and public 




and  subsidies  for  application  and  listing  fees;  (iii)  socialization  or  dissemination  of 
market literacy, and training for potential SME issuers and investors; and (iv) supporting 
infrastructure development, such as increased number of certified public accountants, 
Table 27: Cost Structure of SME Market
SME Capital Market
A. Private Initiative B. Public Initiative
Private Sector Development 
(Business Aspect)
Financial Inclusion 







Infrastructure Cost S M S M
Existing exchange 
platform to be utilized
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  Fostering sophisticated investor base and 






and  the  venture  capital  industry.  The costs  and benefits  should be well  examined  to
design an SME market with whichever type of market model and initiative being chosen.
The cost issue is a big burden for developing an SME market, given the public initiative 





enterprises as a response to the national growth strategies, and needs a comprehensive 
policy  support  framework.  The  social  capital  market  targets  specialized  segments  of 






(i) demand creation  focusing on  target segments such as social enterprises and
SMEs  led by women, with design of  a  low-cost  structure  for SME access  to 
capital markets; 
(ii) establishment  of  an  investor  base  to  provide  initial  risk  capital  for  potential 
growth-oriented SMEs, especially through fostering the venture capital industry; 
(iii) strengthening market literacy for potential SME issuers and investors; 
(iv) investor protection mechanisms backed by proper laws and regulations; and 















policy  support  framework  with  well-organized  policy  coordination  among 
regulators  and  line  ministries  responsible  for  SME  sector  development  and 
access to finance.
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4  Challenges for SME Access to Finance: Lessons from 
Experiences of ADB and OECD
T his chapter describes  the similarities and differences  in small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) access to finance across Asia and OECD regions, covering bank and nonbank  finance options,  capital markets,  and  the policies  and  regulations 
implemented  to enhance financial accessibility  for SMEs. The chapter  is structured as 
follows:  it  first  identifies  the common problems, and  then describes  the solutions and 
policy recommendations that have been applied. Then it highlights special issues in each 
region, and the policy solutions implemented. 
4.1. Access to Finance for SMEs is a Structural Problem
In Asian and OECD countries, SMEs face structural challenges in their access to finance. 
Both demand and supply factors intervene. From the demand-side, intrinsic characteristics 
of SMEs  (lack of collateral, small amount of  lending  involved, and  information opacity) 
make them less attractive to lenders than bigger firms. From the supply-side, the small 
amount  of  lending might  not  compensate  for  the  costs  of monitoring  and  screening, 
financial  intermediaries might not be geographically widespread  to serve  the needs of
SMEs  in  isolated regions, or  the products offered might not be suitable  to cover SME 
financing needs.
4.2. SMEs Depend on Debt Instruments
In addition, both in Asian and OECD countries, there is a strong dependence of SMEs on 
debt instruments, which might be rational as debt instruments tend to suit SMEs needs 
better than equity-type ones because they are less costly and technically less intensive; 
they have a different  tax  treatment  (interests on debt  are deducted before  calculating 
overall  profits  while  dividends  on  equity  are  paid  after  taxes  are  deducted);  and  firm 
owners might be disinclined to give ownership or control rights in exchange for capital. 
Dividends on equity instruments, however, are only paid if the firm has been profitable, 
while debt has to be paid always.
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4.3. There is a Role for Public Financial Institutions
In Asian and OECD countries, public financial institutions are widespread to foster SME 
lending, given  that credit  rationing and SME  intrinsic characteristics make  it difficult  to 








easily  hedge  risk over  time and across a  large amount of  beneficiaries,  being able  to 
compensate for the reduced supply from private banks and the increased volatility in risk 
aversion by private providers (Arrow and Lind 1970).







Ireland).  Finland has  increased  the  lending cap on government  financing  for SMEs;  in 
Sweden the public financial  institution ALMI augmented the share of cofinancing of  its
instruments (OECD 2013a).
In OECD countries, many direct lending programs incorporate capacity building 
nonfinancial assistance to help SMEs overcome their information opacity. This is the case 
for example in Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, the Republic of Korea, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Turkey (OECD 2013a).
4.5. … and Also Bank Efficiency
In addition, increasing bank efficiency is a common shared problem in Asian and OECD 
countries, although the problem is more acute in Asia. Nevertheless, both areas present 
the challenge of  improving  the  instruments and enhancing  the supply of bank options 
for  SMEs.  As  mentioned,  the  provision  of  sustainable  credit  guarantee  systems—a 
widespread measure in Asian and OECD countries—has the benefit of being an indirect 
measure with power for leverage.












banking sector, nonbank sector, capital markets, and related policies and regulations to 
support evidence-based policy making on SME finance  in Asia and the Pacific. These 
initiatives are supplemented by national and regional demand-side surveys in order to 
provide a more comprehensive  view of  the evolution  in  financing  trends and needs  in 
ADB and OECD countries. This data infrastructure will contribute to designing new policy 
approaches of SME finance to address the long-standing challenges of sustainable and 










their operations are still very small in scale.
4.6.  The Financial Crisis had a Different Impact  






services  from OECD countries.  It  also  increased awareness of  the  effects  that  capital 
flows can have on the overall economy.
4.7.  Basel III will Have a Different Impact in Asia  
and in OECD Countries
Basel III requires banks to have tighter risk management as well as greater capital and 
liquidity, which has sparked a debate on the potential negative impact on SME lending. 
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As many emerging Asian countries have yet to decide whether or not to introduce Basel 
III, it will have more influence on the banking sector in the OECD area than in emerging 
Asian economies. However, when building resilient national economies, bank regulators 
in the two areas need to balance financial stability and financial inclusion with a high level
of  risk  consciousness  against  unexpected  events  such  as  a  financial  crisis.  Resulting 
asset preference and deleveraging of banks, particularly European banks with significant 
presence in Asia, could limit the availability of funding for SMEs even in the region not yet 
introducing Basel III. 
4.8. Capital Market Development
In OECD countries,  the financial crisis of 2008/09 motivated policy makers  to  look  for
alternatives to debt finance  for SMEs. Equity-type  instruments might suit  the needs of 
SMEs with high-growth potential. There is a wide range of alternative to debt products, 
which rank from low-risk, low-return products (such as asset-based finance, or corporate 
bonds or securitized debt) to high-risk, high-return products (such as private equity, 
venture capital, and equity derivatives). Corporate bonds and securitization are scarcely 
used by SMEs. It will require effort by private entities and/or public authorities to create 
an  environment  in  which  it  is  possible  to  develop  instruments  that  are  suitable  for 
sale  to  investors and use such  instruments on a sizeable scale. There are  two  further 
considerations that limit the applicability of these techniques to SMEs: these techniques 
are  likely  to be accessible only  to the best-rated SMEs, and these  instruments do not 
address the problem of excessive SME reliance on debt or provide an improved capital 
structure for the firm (OECD 2013b).
In  Asia,  the  nonbank  sector  and  the  venture capital  industry  are  at  early  stages  of 
development  and have  not  established  feasible SME products.  In  addition,  the policy 
framework  is  not  sufficiently  advanced  to  support  innovative  financial  instruments 








4.9. Policy Measures 
In OECD countries,  the crisis  led to a substantial number of policy measures destined 




maturity was increased. 
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In  Asia,  the  provision  of  credit  guarantees  was  also  a  widespread  policy  option  to 
recover SME lending  levels.  In some cases, government policies provided interest rate 
subsidies  to SME  lending, but  this option presents many drawbacks as  it distorts  the 









In  Asia,  more  coordination  is  needed  among  financial  regulators  and  line  ministries 
responsible  for  SME  development  and  access  to  finance.  In  many  Asian  countries, 
line  ministries  have  designed  their  own  financing  schemes  to  policy  targets  such  as 
fishers,  agri-businesses,  local  SMEs,  small-scale  manufacturers,  and  SME  exporters 
and  importers.  These  schemes  have  been  developed  often without  cooperation  from 
financial  regulators or  the  central  bank.  As  potential  policy  intervention,  government 





addressed in a holistic manner that goes beyond already established ways. 
4.10. Lessons Learnt
The  banking  sector  is  a  leading  player  in  financial  systems  in  both  Asian  and OECD 











another policy priority  in  the  two areas but  from different points of  view.  In Asia,  sour 
experiences of the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis sharply raised Asia’s 
risk  consciousness  against  global  economic  uncertainty,  and  further  highlighted  the 
limitations of bank lending to SMEs. In OECD countries, the global financial crisis seriously 
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harmed  the cash  flows of SMEs and  forced  them  into bankruptcy.  Taking account of 
these conditions in Asia and OECD countries, broadening the financing model is needed 
for the scaling up of SME access to finance and promoting balanced and resilient national 
economies in the two regions.
Thus, policy  frameworks on SME access  to finance should address  two pillars—bank 
lending efficiency and diversified financing models—given the established bank-centered 





providers  to offer financing. There  is,  therefore, a  role  for public financial  institutions  in 
solving  structural  and  cyclical  problems  in  SME  access  to  finance,  provided  that  the 











and develop  innovative financing models  that serve various  funding needs of SMEs  in 
different  business  life  cycles. Crowdfunding,  a  new  financing model where  individuals 













options  that  support  wide-ranging  financing  models  for  SMEs,  which  will  contribute 
to realizing resilient national economies with sustainable growth. To this end, lessons 
extracted  from different  financial markets and policy  interventions are a useful  tool  for 
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